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COEKRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



INCLUDING AN OUTLINE AND 
STUDY OF THE WORLD WAR AND 
OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 



BY 
ROBERT EARL SWINDLER 

Author of "Methods and Suggestive Outlines in History." 

Head of the Department of History, Humboldt State Normal School, 

Areata, California 




BOSTON 
RICHARD G. BADGER 

THE GORHAM PRESS 



Copyright, 1920, by Richard G. Badger 



All Rights Reserved 

•SS75 



JAN 17 1920 



Made in the United States of America 



The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 

©CU 561 499 



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TO 
LIEUTENANT ORAN L. RABER 

MY ONE-TIME CLASSMATE IN COLLEGE 

AND EVER A SYMPATHETIC 

FRIEND 



PREFACE 

WE believe we are justified in starting out in this volume 
upon the fundamental and scientific basis that, if 
we are to cure a malady, we must understand its cause, — 
we must properly diagnose the case; that in order to find 
a remedy for war and build securely on the foundation for 
a lasting peace, we must understand the underlying causes 
of conflict. Accordingly, the first part of this work is the 
outgrowth of the author's interest in, and study of, the 
causes of war, — with particular reference to the wars of 
the past half-century. This study naturally and fittingly 
led to a more intensive study of the European background 
of the World War, its remote and fundamental as well as 
its immediate causes. 

There was also recognized the need, well nigh universal 
up to the very present, of a brief suggestive course in book 
form, for the study of the Great War, — its background, 
progress and issues, and the peace outlook, which would be 
suitable for the busy student and the busy citizen, who are 
simply bewildered in the great mass of unorganized material 
that confronts them, — and that this should be adapted to 
the schoolroom as well as the home. Hence the second and 
third parts of this work. 

For the most part, in following out the two-fold plan 
just mentioned, the author presented his material in his 
original articles for the schools and the public, year by 
year and month by month, as the Great War progressed. 
Necessarily therefore, the chronology and subject-matter 
as continued in the present treatise are largely as they were 
written then. This accounts for present-tense verbs and 
descriptions occurring in a number of places where, if writ- 

5 



6 Preface 

ten from the present field of view, they would occur in the 
past tense, etc. But these matters do not materially alter 
the nature or the accuracy of the book. On the contrary, 
they show points of view and problems of the recent past 
that it is well to keep in mind, in our attempt to understand 
and interpret the present world status, and to follow the 
tremendous work before the peace conference, in the adjust- 
ment of the pending momentous and multitudinous issues of 
reconstruction. 

As mentioned a number of times in the body of this work, 
the treatment of our subject herein presented is not in- 
tended to be exhaustive. Already too much of such ma- 
terial is presented to the ordinary reader. There is a very 
great amount of information, covering all phases of this 
war: its causes, the peace movements and propaganda dur- 
ing the war; diplomatic relations of the various govern- 
ments ; international movements of various sorts and inter- 
national law, with its violations ; official "books" of the war- 
ring and other nations ; the tools, implements, inventions, 
provisions, regulations, etc., of war; the issues of the war; 
forms, theories, ideals and practices of the different govern- 
ments and peoples involved in the war ; finances and financial 
problems; possibilities in peace terms and arrangements, 
including the much discussed League of Nations and the 
Bolshevist movement and danger, — and so on. But in all 
this there is for the general reader absolutely no systematic 
organization or uniformity of plan for study or teaching. 
The author's plan, therefore, is to present as adequately as 
may be, in a very brief treatment like this, the essential 
points, so that they may be better grasped and understood 
by the average reader, and to suggest a wider reading and 
study for those who may have a little more time. 

R. Earl Swindler. 
Areata, California 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 



PAGE 



I .Introduction — Our Schools and a New Patriotism . . . 11 

II General Statement 17 

III Classification and Comment 23 

IV Fundamental Causes 81 

V Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions ... 40 

VI The Immediate Background of the War in Europe . 51 

VII Causes of the Present War 58 

VIII Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 74 

IX Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1904) 81 

X Causes of the British-Boer War 91 

XI Causes of the Spanish-American War (1898) 105 

XII Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 115 

XIII The United States 121 

XIV German Diplomacy and Strategy 128 

XV Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 135 

XVI Official Peace Discussion and Negotiations .... 160 

XVII Peace Negotiations (continued) 168 

XVIII Official Peace Negotiations (concluded) 176 

XIX The League of Nations 186 

XX The Constitution of the League of Nations .... 202 

APPENDIX 

I President Wilson's Address at Paris 215 

II President Wilson's Address at Boston 223 

III President Wilson's Address at New York 233 

IV Final Draft of the League Covenant 245 

Bibliography 263 

Index 265 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



THE CAUSES OF WAR 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION OTJR SCHOOLS AND A NEW PATRIOTISM * 

YOU will recall readily the famous poster for the Sec- 
ond Liberty Loan, with the picture of the statue in 
New York harbor, of "Liberty Enlightening the World." 
The lady artist who designed this poster received a splendid 
prize from the United States Government, and she deserved 
it, for that poster went a long way in raising nearly $5,000,- 
000,000, to help make the world "safe for democracy.'' The 
appeal that "Liberty must enlighten the world" had its ef- 
fect. But let me tell you, recent convulsions, as in Russia, 
are teaching us that not only must liberty enlighten the 
world, but intelligence must enlighten liberty, in order to 
save the world. Our schools must save the democracy "for 
which we fight. Our students, by making the most of their 
education and their American ideals, are to help gain and 
preserve the blessings of liberty to mankind. 

Many of the nations which, up to the present, have been 
taking leading places in the affairs and problems of the 
world, can do so no more. The war is sapping their man- 
hood and retarding their institutions that train for greatest 
worth and usefulness to their fellowmen. Other nations, in 
their new-found freedom, know not how to use it, because of 
past oppressions and inexperience in self-government. Never 
did the world need leaders as it does today ; never did it so 
need men of vision and of high ideals, men of incorruptible 

1 Written February, 1918. 

11 



12 The Causes Of War 

moral fiber and integrity, men of sacrifice and of unfaltering 
determination in the arduous paths of service. The youth 
of America should be made to realize that here at once is 
their rich heritage and their unexampled opportunity. Not 
with one speck of pride or of superiority should they look 
upon this situation, but as a privilege to serve unequaled in 
the history of man. Out of this vision and this great op- 
portunity is to come a new patriotism that has no bounds 
less than the planet itself. 

We must become more familiar with our country's most 
cherished ideals. We must see to it that our youth are in- 
telligently imbued with those ideals. Only by so doing are 
we to vitalize our teaching and our training for citizenship 
in our schools. The principles of democracy are at stake 
in the world today; and if the major portion of the stu- 
dent's education in these trying times is not the gaining 
and putting into practice of these principles of patriotism 
and SERVICE, his education, costly as it is, is a failure. 
To the extent that his science, his art and his philosophy of 
history and of life fail to serve these ideals, just to that 
extent our educational system is serving the same base end 
as has Germany's in the past generation. Many of our 
students and teachers do not need this warning; yet there 
are many others that do, for to be asleep to the real needs 
and vital test of democracy in this time, is to be playing 
with our destiny as a free people. The supreme test of 
mankind today is a test of ideals, of moral and spiritual 
principles and standards of conduct; and everything ma- 
terial on earth must serve one or the other of these two 
opposing ideals. The one we hope America will be as ready 
to stand for as her patriots have always professed for her ; 
the other we know autocratic powers have always stood for, 
and have made the lovers of freedom pay the price in suf- 
fering and blood. The clearer these principles are held 
before the younger generation, the safer are American de- 
mocracy and world liberty to be. 



Introduction 13 

The provincialism in many circles, and the still prevalent 
ignorance of the present world conflict afford most con- 
vincing evidence of the universal need of enlightenment. And 
we know whence that training, to be effective, must come — 
it must come through the education of the youth of our 
land. We should never forget that it was from the enlight- 
ened walls of schools throughout the nations that liberty 
was born — both religious and political freedom — and this 
fact answers the question why the schools of the nations 
have furnished the first martyrs in every great struggle for 
liberty. 

It is truthfully said, that in a democracy, where the peo- 
ple themselves rule, they should always know, before they 
embark on any great project, why they are going into it. 
Yet, even today, after the United States has witnessed this 
titanic world struggle for four and one-half years, not one 
boy in one hundred can give the essential causes of the war. 
This is not the student's fault, but the fault of aimless and 
indefinite teaching and training, for which we are all to 
blame — even the government of the United States (for it 
simply reflected the general disinterestedness of the masses 
of the people) which should have kept us better informed of 
the facts, from the beginning of the war. 

What are these American ideals, for which we now stand 
and stake our all? What is this liberty and democracy of 
which we rather flippantly speak in this generation, the self- 
ish side of which we have appropriated so well, but which, 
nevertheless, is the message of our great republic to the 
world? The answer has come over and over again in the 
lives of our great American patriots, in their fervent 
speeches and their earnest devotion and invaluable service 
to their country. Their conduct is our creed, and we should 
therefore study their lives with a new purpose. The an- 
swer must likewise come in the present crisis. The war has 
brought out what sacrifice there is in the great heart of 
France. It has enabled England to find her soul, and with 



14* The Causes Of War 

it a truly new England is born. Likewise must Columbia 
find her heart and her soul if she would realize her high mis- 
sion in the world. As never before our citizens must be filled 
with the conviction that America's lesson is an abiding faith 
in humanity, and in the growing principles, the institutions 
and the final triumph of democracy among men; that here 
we worship principles, not personages, but have the highest 
regard and greatest reverence for our statesmen who have 
so nobly embodied those principles — a Washington and a 
Lincoln, not "sacred majesties" to be bowed down unto, but 
citizens enshrined in the hearts of their countrymen because 
of the service they have rendered free government in the 
hours of its utmost need. Let our boys and girls feel a new 
thrill of pride in our magnificent Stars and Stripes, because 
in them they see a new meaning, whether floating in home 
breezes o'er the peaceful institutions of a free-born people, 
on the great marts of trade, or on the blood-stained and 
treacherous field of battle, unfolding to the oppressed peo- 
ples of the earth the foundation tenets of American free- 
dom, and giving to all the assurance that true representa- 
tive democracy, by the grace of God, shall no longer be an 
experiment, but a triumphant realization, destined to pre- 
serve to the nations government by the initiative and consent 
of the governed. 

How much in this day do we really appreciate the coun- 
try in which we live? How much thought do we give to the 
blessings she affords us? Does it often come to our minds, 
that for every pleasure that is ours today, some one in the 
past has dared to sacrifice comfort and life to give us that 
pleasure? For centuries our forefathers have been fighting 
the battles of liberty and pouring out their life-blood that 
we might be secure in that liberty. They did it, as one has 
said, that these priceless heritages "might not perish in 
the graves of the fathers." 

How much we owe our ancestors for all that, and how 
much we are in debt to our country ! God pity the boy or 



Introduction 15 

girl who, when knowing this, would give nothing in return. 
It is no idle dream that Uncle Sam is urging us to do our 
part. Would we curse the generations yet to come by 
failing to uphold liberty in this crisis ? The words of Patrick 
Henry are still as applicable as they are eloquent, "Is life 
so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price 
of chains and slavery?" From all over the world comes the 
statement that never did America fight in a juster cause 
than she has just been fighting. And that cause she must 
still uphold. In failing to do our part now, we should be 
recreant Americans. Rather let us pause in our mad rush 
for the perishing things of life, to appreciate the compli- 
ment the world is today paying to American citizenship. 

But our schools must hasten to give to this citizenship 
a vision which comprehends not only its own state and na- 
tion, but is world-wide. Indeed, Columbia's highest resolve 
must be to be true to the principles that gave her birth, and 
gave to the world the inspiration of liberty. For it is her 
privilege, in this "age of ages telling" to move under the 
impelling conviction that this world cannot remain perma- 
nently half free and half enslaved by privileged autocracy; 
and that the God of human destiny has decreed that it shall 
become free — that the faith in which American citizenship 
was born and has been nurtured, the faith in which other 
peoples have come to believe, and which is now the only hope 
of the race, shall be realized in fact — and that "govern- 
ment of the people, by the people, for the people," cannot 
"perish from the earth." 

Citizens of America: it is your duty to know the justice 
of your country's cause. And, you who have not gone to 
war, it is your privilege and opportunity to serve your coun- 
try in the highest sense. All this and more, you have the 
opportunity to stand for those principles that have made 
America what she is, and so honored throughout the world. 
Yours is the leadership in these great movements whose 
watchword is service and whose task is to keep our people 



16 The Causes Of War 

at home and at the front true American patriots and citi- 
zens, through all the grime and mud and fire and terror of 
war, and until they all come home. 

Only when she realizes that it was in a righteous cause, 
can a mother be comforted for the loss of her son in France. 
Only when a father sees that the liberty he holds so dear 
was at stake, and might have been lost for generations to 
come, if the enemy had won, can he be reconciled to have 
sacrificed his valiant son on the altar of war. It is because 
of these things that the writer, though late as it now is to 
learn, is attempting to give you the causes of this mighty 
conflict. 



CHAPTER II 



GENERAL STATEMENT 



WITHIN the last generation there has been a world- 
wide uneasiness and expectancy that has never been 
equalled in the past. The decade before the present war 
witnessed the greatest unrest the world had ever known. 
Statesmen and seers everywhere felt that something was 
going to happen, but no one knew just what. Now we 
have learned what was imminent. The recent revolution in 
Russia and the entrance of United States into this war will 
prove to be the greatest events of the World War period. 
It is but the continuation of the fight of the peoples of the 
earth for their liberties from oppression. It is another 
powerful link in the mighty chain of which the English revo- 
lutions of 1642 and 1688, the American Revolution and the 
French Revolution were the first links. And men will see, 
as never before, that the French Revolution of 1789, with 
the single exception of the present conflict, is the greatest, 
most tremendous event of modern times. 

If there is one thing above all else that the study of his- 
story teaches, it is that there is a unity or continuity, in 
human events and purposes and that man's true progress is 
through evolution. In this truth is found the explanation 
of the fundamental causes of war. The revolutions referred 
to above are a few of the many examples of this fact. It is 
equally true that revolutions of the people never go back- 
ward, ultimately; every one spells progress in the end. We 
should therefore in view of this fact, keep our faith in 
democratic Russia, for like France she will recover from 
her period of anarchy and severe trial — her deception and 

17 



18 The Causes Of War 

spoliation by German perfidy — and will come out all right 
in the end, although it may be generations before she is 
fully recovered. The very means of oppression, such as abso- 
lute monarchies, the "armed peace," under which the nations 
have groaned, ambition of rulers and of governments, and 
often war itself — are but the means by which the people may 
rise. At a terrible cost, it is true; yet, progress is always 
costly, and in its truest sense the survival of the fittest holds 
even unto the last. 

Whether recognizing this evolutionary principle or not, 
we know that there has been for years, and still is, among 
the most intelligent and best classes everywhere, a great 
cry and longing for world peace — not simply a cessation of 
military warfare, but an era of peace for weary mankind. 
This, however, is not to be confused with the present social- 
istic and pacifist movement, which is wholly abortive, and 
would be in the interest of the autocratic central powers, 
and not in the interest of democracy. Yet, despite all we 
have heard and been taught in recent years concerning 
peace and the end of warfare, we are learning, what the 
American people have been slow to learn hitherto, that there 
are times in the history of nations when, in order to enjoy 
peace, they must be prepared for war. It would be suicide 
for any great nation at the present time to act otherwise. 
One people, in its philanthropic enthusiasm, cannot bring 
peace to the world, much less any little group of peace advo- 
cates. Nor can it guarantee its own peace — it cannot adopt 
a policy of peace, and say it will have it, whether others 
will or no. We see this in our own experience now. Indeed, 
the realization of this fact is one of the reasons why the 
President and Congress plunged this peace-loving country 
and non-aggressive American people into the mighty world 
conflict that rages today. France has been confronted with 
such a situation in the past, and other examples are not 
wanting. It amounts to this — as, I have believed for years 
— that, instead of diminishing the chances of war, the anti- 



General Statement 19 

preparedness peace tendency may augment these chances, 
may invite conquest, or as in the case of the United States, 
because of the aggressions of others, may help to drag an 
unwilling people into war. There are several nations fight- 
ing today that not only did not want war, but did not 
expect it, and those least prepared have suffered most. 
War was thrust upon them ; there was really no choice. 
The nations of the world are so close together and so in- 
terdependent in our day that one cannot have peace when 
others are determined upon oppressive war. The allied 
nations were unwillingly dragged into war, let me repeat, 
but thanks to the people's instinct for human liberty, they 
are in the war heart and soul now, and are in it to crush 
the inhuman and merciless beast of autocratic and bigoted 
oppression ! Pity it is that many of us have not seen until 
now that autocracy has always been the arch-enemy of free- 
dom and human rights, and never could be trusted. Its 
whole foundation, as history shows, has been laid in hypo- 
critical presumption and class privilege and selfishness, play- 
ing upon the innocence and ignorance of its unfortunate and 
incapable victims. 

The trouble with the peace advocates before the war (and 
all honor to them — God forbid that the teachers of the 
young should be aught else) it seems to me, has 
largely been this: they have observed particularly the ef- 
fects of war, but have done little along the practical line of 
studying its causes and proposing effective remedies. Not 
until the present gigantic conflict has there been anything 
like concerted and serious action on the prevention of war; 
and still less is the understanding of its causes. Many peo- 
ple, indeed, declare useless any study of the causes of war. 
With this view, the writer cannot at all agree; it is but 
blind fatalism, dangerous and utterly helpless in the face of 
the world situation and of most wars. How are we to apply 
the remedy — How are we to have peace — if we do not under- 
stand the cause? As in the study of medicine and disease, 



20 T\e Causes Of War 

so in this field, the search for causes is no less indis- 
pensable than the search for remedies; and certainly, the 
scientific method of treatment requires that we find the 
causes before we apply the remedy. The failure to do this, 
I maintain, is just the reason why so much that has been 
said and attempted in the past has been fruitless and dis- 
appointing. Men have not made a careful and systematic 
search into the causes of war. It is remarkable how little 
space is given to the causes of war in our histories. Gen- 
erally speaking, they have been examined most superficially 
— have been strangely neglected. With one breath history 
instructors are teaching that causes and results are more 
important than wars themselves, and in the next breath they 
are hurrying their classes on from the causes to the wars 
and their results. Better not know the names of battles 
and leaders than not understand, in some degree at least, 
why the armies are fighting. 

Those who oppose an intensive study of the causes of 
war, because they think it would increase the warlike spirit 
from the mere thinking upon the subject, have, it seems to 
me, a most peculiar and illogical method of reasoning. It 
is the people's not knowing the causes of wars that has often 
enabled their rulers to plunge them into conflicts and keep 
them there. This is true to some extent in the present war, 
as most of us know, particularly with the central powers. 
The search for the truth is dangerous only to its enemies. 
An acquaintance with the causes of war, even modern con- 
flicts in civilized countries, can but lead the people to hate 
it more! When they see all the greed, the haughtiness, the 
selfishness, the blasphemous presumption of "divine right" 
monarchs and privileged classes, and sometimes the igno- 
rance, misunderstandings and honest differences of peoples, 
that are back of war, they will certainly be greater lovers 
of peace, and more intelligent workers for it. 

Moreover, it must be understood that there can be no 
real progress toward the peace we covet if we deny that 



General Statement £1 

there is such a thing as a righteous war. The liberty of 
American democracy rests on that foundation stone. God 
has so willed it, and we cannot change it, although we 
believe it is God's will that some day wars shall cease from 
the earth. War has often rendered a great service in the 
past, and even today it must be seen that in the struggle 
for political and economic independence, as well as that for 
physical existence and comfort, the necessities and ambi- 
tions of the strong will be satisfied at the cost of the weak. 
We say this should not be. Christianity and our finer in- 
stincts are trying to lead us away from it. Nevertheless, it 
is the physical law of nature, has all our past history as a 
race back of it, and is the "survival of the fittest," one of 
the greatest of all biological laws ; and, as Emerson says, 
the student of history may become more reconciled to this 
"copious bloodshed of ages past" — bloodshed often, too, 
in the name of the Prince of Peace — when he reflects 
that it is a temporary and preparatory state — age- 
long though it be — and has actively forwarded the cul- 
ture of man. Nor is this any argument in favor of war 
as such, today ; it is only a recognition of the service of war 
in the past. It is folly, it is a manifestation of ignorance 
of the history of mankind's development, to try to get away 
from or ignore the benefit of wars in the past. They are 
the price man has paid for his civilization, whether they be 
against kings on their "divine right" thrones, autocratic 
governments, religious bigotry and intolerance, or what not. 
Civilization has been destroyed by these conflicts, it is true, 
and is being destroyed; yet, more still of civilization has 
been preserved and gained, else we could not have democracy 
and enlightenment today; for man's normal condition 
throughout the ages, almost up to the present, has been a 
state of warfare and strife. Through the countless ages of 
the past these wars have raged. From it all there has come 
an evolution into the present state; and our faith can but 
repeat, "as was said three thousand years ago, so still 



22 The Causes Of War 

it must be said, the judgments of the Lord are true and right- 
eous altogether." In spite of the fact that wars have taken 
the physically best in all ages, they have sifted humanity, 
both physically and intellectually, and have found the best 
for its leaders. War has brought different races and na- 
tions of the earth together — at first to blows; but from 
blows to truce, to trade, to inter-marriage, and finally to 
peace. 

Considerations of this kind help to bring us to a true 
view of the nature and function of war. We became con- 
scious of the fact that it is mingled with everything, that 
it is the subject of the greater part of historical treatment, 
if we take the human race as a whole; that it has, until 
very recent times, been the chief occupation or employment 
of the most conspicuous men of the world's long history ; and 
that, in one form or another, it is the law of nature. With 
this view, we may study the causes of war intelligently, 
without prejudice, and be better able in consequence to 
utilize the knowledge thus gained in applying it to the 
remedies for war and the "fight for peace." So, the rela- 
tionship of the causes to the ends of war must never be lost 
sight of. Also, on the severity of wars, on the degree of 
their necessity, on the extent to which they go in violating 
the laws of civilized warfare and outraging the sense of hu- 
manity, will depend the opportunity of modifying their 
character and the probability of an evolution into a world 
peace. "Civilized" warfare, as practiced by Germany in the 
present conflict, has become so horrible as to generate one 
of the most powerful reactionary influences against it. On 
the other hand, the measure in which wars are inevitable, 
or have been (and this can be found only by a close study 
of their causes) will furnish the character and limits of 
remedial measures. 



CHAPTER III 



CLASSIFICATION AND COMMENT 



IT is manifestly true that in the present day there are 
only two classes of wars that are justifiable, namely, 
those for defense or self preservation, and those for liberty 
or freedom from oppression. Yet, the attempt to classify 
the causes of war, past and present, is difficult, and results 
are more or less inaccurate and uncertain. For convenience, 
however, and for the sake of discussion, they may be grouped 
as follows: 

1. Dynastic affairs. (Have ceased to be fundamental 
causes.) 

2. Religion. (No longer exists as a leading cause.) 

3. Love of a people for war. (Becoming rarer.) 

4. Colonial expansion. (Recent, but has lost its attrac- 
tion, except perhaps for Germany.) 

5. Racial predominance — tendency to domination by one 
race in a composite nation, as in Austria-Hungary. (Still 
a cause for strife.) 

6. National or race hatred. (Still strong, as in Ger- 
many vs. France and vice versa — inherited from the past, 
with distrust and misunderstanding.) 

7. Growth of nationality — to secure national unity. 
(Chief cause of most wars in latter part of nineteenth cen- 
tury, and some today.) 

8. "Balance of Power," in Europe. (Still a contribu- 
ting cause.) 

9. Imperfection of government — weakness, anarchy, as 
in Mexico and a few small states in Europe today. (Still a 
cause and excuse.) 

23 



24 The Causes Of War 

10. Territorial adjustment — tendency to secure natural 
boundaries. 

11. Trade rivalry and commercial motives. (Many of 
England's petty wars in the past century, also other Euro- 
pean countries.) 

12. Conquest — ambition of leaders. (Napoleon Bona- 
parte best modern example.) 

13. Great navies and standing armies of Europe — the 
"armed peace." 

14. Suppression of democratic and revolutionary move- 
ments of the people, by autocratic governments. (Ever a 
leading cause, but especially 1820-50.) 

15. Desire for political freedom and democracy, na- 
tional, world-wide, against autocratic governments. (Most 
recent, and greatest now.) 

16. To uphold the principles of international law. 
(More or less connected with several above.) 

We can get some idea of the multiplicity and complexity 
of the causes of the present war when we note that nearly 
all of the foregoing causes — all except possibly three — con- 
tributed to the conflict. It might be well also to state in 
passing that this all foreshadows greater problems of read- 
justment when the fighting ceases and even more complex 
than the problems of the war, the peace negotiations taking 
perhaps a longer period than the war itself, for the whole 
world will be vitally interested and must take part. 

One reads in a good many historic works and treatises 
on peace that wars usually have very trifling causes. This 
has sometimes been true; and some people think by this 
means alone to discredit war. Others, on the contrary, are 
partisans of great causes, and they likewise are sometimes 
right. Both these tendencies, however, lead to erroneous 
conclusions, for neither represents the facts of history. So 
many times the writer has heard men say that the present 
world war is without cause; from the pulpit, from the lecture 
platform, from the press — from all ranks of life comes this 



Classification and Comment 25 

statement; also, that it is useless, and serving no purpose. 
If so then the United States has erred and most grievously 
sinned in going into it. But let us remember that things 
do not happen in this world without cause, be that cause 
good or bad. The laws of nature and of God — which are 
one and the same — teach us that just as sure as there 
are events, these events have causes and results. Then, just 
as sure as there are wars, these wars have causes and re- 
sults. Here again we get back to the fundamental proposi- 
tion that to understand wars we must become familiar with 
their causes. The American people would do well today to 
read less about the details of what is happening, and the 
continual conjecturing that gets nowhere (leave that to 
the experts and those whose duty it is to give their atten- 
tion to it) and devote more time to a study into why the 
great world tragedy has come. We could then be more use- 
ful and ready to do our part when peace finally comes. We 
are in the war, and are called upon for untold sacrifices. We 
should know why these things are necessary and what really 
is at stake. It is no credit to the American people that 
when this mighty conflict began in 1914, they stood aghast, 
and in their ignorance of world problems and conditions 
said: "What are they fighting for over there, anyway?" 
"I don't believe they themselves know ;" "It is only a family 
quarrel between King George and the Kaiser," etc. We have 
been too self-contained and selfish, and have not realized 
how much their problems are ours, how the whole world is 
one brotherhood, and how close and interdependent all peo- 
ples are. At last we are being brought to realize that we 
must be citizens of the world, not alone of our state or 
nation, and that as citizens of the world we have obliga- 
tions no less binding upon us than are those of our country. 
It is idle to talk of a world peace without an intelligent 
world understanding. And once again, this goes to show 
how poor students of history we have been. It is not ex- 
aggerating to say that a few farseeing statesmen were 



26 The Causes Of War 

• 
trembling at the prospect of this war, and were trying to 
tell us the signs of the times, that in 1898, when the Span- 
ish-American war broke out, in 1908-10, when Austria an- 
nexed Bosnia and Herzegovina without their consent; in 
1912-18, the period of the Balkan wars — we persistently 
refused to listen, because indeed, we thought we were still 
living in an age of isolation, and had no concern in the prob- 
lems of the old world. We have continued to refuse to listen 
until it has all come home to us, with an outlook that is by 
no means a reassuring one. We should be given a few facts 
to disabuse our minds. 

For instance, it is not right for teachers and text-books 
to build up prejudice against England, even though it be 
done through ignorance, by representing her as the England 
of George III, when she was an aristocracy, instead of the 
Britain of toda}^, which in all but name is as much of a 
democracy as our own. We should know that England alone 
prevented Germany from going to war with us in 1898. 
The children should know that England's fleet has a num- 
ber of times kept us out of war. Moreover, it is not right 
to teach our youth that our own Revolutionary war was the 
only nor the first nor the greatest revolution of a people 
against their oppressors. Justice to the troubled history 
of France demands that we be brought to see that it was 
France that saved what democracy there is in Europe, 
though she may have taken courage from our example a 
few years before, that it was France who, single-handed, for 
years fought for liberty against the combined autocratic 
thrones of Europe (England at that time being one of 
them), and that a chastened France at last survived even 
the heartless Napoleon, who would have ruined her, because, 
recognizing his first service, she was too faithful to him. 
The youth should likewise know that the Kaiser and the 
autocratic government of Germany (the same kind of gov- 
ernment that England had a hundred years ago) have had 
designs on the United States— her Monroe Doctrine, her 



Classification and Comment 27 

democracy, her influence in the direction of liberty for a full 
generation. We should not be deceived about the character 
of the Kaiser and his government. He was too autocratic 
even for a Bismarck to support. Single-handed he has di- 
rected the policy of the Empire. His ministers have always 
been only his servants. As the historian West says, "He 
believes thoroughly in the 'divine right' theory, and he has 
repeatedly stated it in as striking a form as ever did James 
I of England or Louis XIV of France, two or three cen- 
turies ago." Whether he believes in that theory personally 
or not, he has certainly tried to get his people to accept it, 
and has acted upon it. Read this statement of his to the 
city of Munich : "The will of the king is the supreme law." 
And again, to a body of teachers upon the proper teaching 
of history: "You must teach that the French Revolution 
is an unmitigated crime against God and Man !" Address- 
ing a body of military recruits in 1891 he said: "You are 
now my soldiers. You have given yourselves to me, body 
and soul. There is but one enemy for you and that is my 
enemy. In these times of socialistic intrigue, it may hap- 
pen that I shall call upon you to fire upon your brothers 
and fathers * * * in such a case you are to obey me with- 
out a murmur!" In 1897 he referred to himself as the "Vice- 
regent of God." His relatives and friends have preached 
the same gospel everywhere they have gone, and especially 
in the Oriental countries and Turkey — they knew they did 
not dare to do so openly in America; but they did just as 
bad a thing — they deceived us as to the purpose of their 
visits here. A nominal friendly visit was nothing less than 
the perfecting of a knowledge of our military conditions and 
resources and of the German spy system in America. And 
this august mission was headed by no less distinguished a 
personage than the brother of the Kaiser himself! They have 
relied on that impression of the American people as proof 
that we would not go to war with Germany. The German 
government and Kaiser have little understood the true spirit 



28 The Causes Of War 

of American democracy ! Why should we not fight with all 
our might the power that would wipe democracy from the 
face of the earth? We have seen the fruits of liberty and 
democracy so bountiful all about us in the world that we 
have not understood nor appreciated this mighty counter- 
current that still survives out of a medieval age. It is 
high time that our eyes were opened, and that we see the 
greatest of all causes, for which we are fighting. 

We need also to distinguish carefully between real causes 
and pretended ones. The little things which are spoken of 
as causes, and are generally given by the parties engaging 
as causes, are usually but pretexts, or mere occasions, and 
not efficient causes. A king may lead a, country into war 
on a slight pretext, as in Austria in 1914 ; but the ideas and 
principles that are back of such acts — the type of govern- 
ment that they stand for — are the causes, and are not 
trifling. They represent a system, whose earmarks are op- 
pression, whose gospel is greed. The fundamental cause for 
Austria's plunging the nations of Europe into this war were 
her designs upon the Balkan states and her fear lest Rus- 
sia might gain or control them, and with them Constanti- 
nople. And Russia, with her Czar, was equally culpable, 
except that the Balkan states had a racial sympathy with 
Russia that they did not have with Austria. But now, thank 
God, the Russia of the. Czar is no more. And America's 
greatest obligation, next to saving her own liberties, is to 
help that struggling New Russia. 

Often a long standing and vital cause of conflict is hid- 
den behind such pretexts, or excuses, and is revealed only 
by the results of the war. This is one of the curses of auto- 
cratic governments and of ambitious, powerful monarchs. 
This leads us to say that while a war cannot be without 
causes, the cause may be unjust, or even useless, though 
the war itself cannot be, to the side that is wronged. If 
both sides have real grievances, as is often the case, the 
reason for each going to war must be understood, else we 
are partisans of the one and unfair to the other. On this 



Classification and Comment 29 

point, here in America, many a student and teacher, both 
North and South has misunderstood and misrepresented the 
Civil War and its causes, in the United States. We have 
therefore been unable to reconcile the causes with the re- 
sults of the war. There are usually at least as many causes 
of war as there are parties engaged in it. Ruin and sorrow 
for a lost cause was the price that the South had to pay for 
not understanding why the North and those devoted to the 
national cause should fight for the Union and liberty, for 
the negro. The "crime of reconstruction" is the reproach 
that the South can lay at the feet of the North with a radi- 
cal Congress, for not understanding why the South fought 
and sacrificed and suffered so long, having been taught by 
masters of thought to distrust a strong central government, 
as did their forefathers the government of King George. This 
is one of the many instances that go to show that peoples' 
ignorance of each other and their misunderstandings are 
one of the most potent causes of trouble. 

Now, let us return to a brief discussion of a few of the 
causes grouped above. Wars of religion have ceased to exist ; 
but religious prejudice has been taken into account in re- 
cruiting for the present war in those countries where "holy 
war" has been declared, as in Russia and Turkey, with 
slight traces of religious appeal otherwhere. Dynastic af- 
fairs in themselves can no longer cause war. Men's intelli- 
gence in times of peace has triumphed over their love for 
mar. Hence but for the others we could dispense with the 
first three causes entirely. Yet, it is not out of place to dis- 
cuss the love of people for war in the past. It helps us to 
understand what the war passion and loyalty let loose on 
the battlefield means today. 

Man has inherited the fighting instinct from his remote 
ancestors, who lived in a state of nature, with the lower 
animals. In that environment war is the effect of a need — 
the need to exist, to survive. It is the instinct to live, which 
is the greatest of all instincts. The farther we go back in 
the history of man and the nearer we find him to nature, and 



30 The Causes Of War 

the more he is under the control of his animal nature — why, 
the more we find that war with him has been the effect of a 
human need, and its end the satisfaction of that need. 

There are hundreds of cases on record of wars of con- 
quest due to the migrations of peoples who had outgrown 
their native valleys, plains or desert pastures. The pinch 
of hunger and famine drove them on, and the more satisfied 
and peaceful peoples whom they invaded became their vic- 
tims and slaves, or were pushed on, to struggle for existence, 
or fight for it elsewhere. Again, it is nature's law of the 
survival of the fittest. We recognize this principle in all 
animal life in nature. The big fish devours the smaller one ; 
the forest giant makes the smaller beast its prey, as it does 
the still smaller; the eagle's mighty strength was developed 
in order that he might prey upon more helpless creatures. 
The same law rules the plant kingdom. The large sturdy 
plant crowds out and kills its weaker, more delicate com- 
petitor. The more warlike plant, as the thistle and the 
thorn, "chokes out" the tenderer stem. So, savage man took 
his lessons from nature and from necessity, since he had no 
religion of the higher life and of unselfishness to guide him, 
except as his imagination slowly and feebly led him to "the 
gods" as arbiters of human destiny and judges of his deeds. 
It is only the religion of one God, a God of mercy as well 
as of judgment upon mankind, that can save the race from 
its animal instincts and from war. And were it not for that 
in man that is spiritual, and above nature, the principle that 
"might makes right" would still hold undisputed sway. The 
warlike instinct is therefore inherent in human nature, and 
man has to conquer it with his reason, else he is no better 
essentially than the brute. The war spirit we have inherited 
from generations for countless ages past, and it is only the 
long process of man's evolution into a higher state that can 
save that civilization for which we fight. Not until the 
spirit of Jesus of Nazareth has met its response in the spirit 
of man and has supplanted the beast in nations, will war- 
fare cease. 



CHAPTER IV 



FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES 



BECAUSE of their close relationship, we may treat com- 
mercial causes and those of colonial expansion together. 
There are those who hold to the materialistic conception of 
history, and claim that at bottom the real causes of war 
are economic in nature — that they even go back to a basic 
wrong in society — namely, the production and distribution 
of wealth in the capitalistic form. This is so far from the 
truth of the history of wars, however, that it may be dis- 
missed as altogether too narrow a view. Yet, the economic 
factor, and greed for gain, cannot be ignored. To a cer- 
tain extent in the recent past, society has had an economic 
basis in much the same way that in medieval times and in 
the ancient world men sought through war to secure mines 
and treasures, as for example, the ancient Romans and 
Carthagenians, as well as other peoples. It is true that 
military politics, built upon an economic basis, still domi- 
nates to a large extent in some countries. Some of the 
latest and best examples are Germany, Austria and Russia. 
This evil, however, has been no less true of international re- 
lations. The opium war between China and England was 
inspired by the very basest cupidity on England's part, and 
remains one of the black pages on English history. In fact, 
colonial wars have sought primarily and generally the em- 
ployment and security of capital, the monopoly of com- 
merce, or the exclusive use of the shortest and most lucrative 
trade routes. It is an earnest of better things, however,, 
that now most of the greatest world powers are seriously 
considering the neutralization of the strategic commercial 

31 



32 The Causes Of War 

points, such as Constantinople, Gibraltar, the Suez and Pan- 
ama canals, etc. That these places be dismantled and in- 
ternationalized is one of the strong demands that will be 
brought upon the parliament of the world at the conclusion 
of this war. This all is a gigantic task, however, and may 
not be accompanied in the near future. 

There has also been a certain degree of necessity in these 
economic wars, especially on the part of some peoples. Re- 
peatedly have nations felt it necessary, because of the over- 
weening ambitions of others, to engage in war, under pain 
of being reduced to an inferior position among the states of 
the world. Besides Belgium in this war, Denmark, China, 
some of the Barbary States, and the South African repub- 
lics may be cited as examples in recent times. Under pre- 
text of defending its flag, its citizens or its interests, a Euro- 
pean nation has taken advantage of the occasion to estab- 
lish itself and extend its power and control gradually. It 
was indeed a surprise to the world that the United States 
did not do this thing in the case of Cuba in 1898, and again, 
in Mexico more recently. The general result, however, has 
been to supplant a backward and most unprogressive civil- 
ization with a progressive, more enlightened, sanitary and 
democratic one ; and this result is at least gratifying. It is 
remarkable, for instance, that the Boers of South Africa 
have so loyally and with so very little friction supported 
England in this war, against their kindred, the Germans. 
The explanation lies in the fact that Great Britain has given 
them self-government, with more efficient administration, has 
taught them democracy, and they are far more prosperous 
than they were under the old regime. This is not to argue, 
however, that the end justifies the means. We may add in 
passing also, that we have been guilty of the same conduct 
toward the American Indians that the European nations 
have been toward the untutored and backward peoples of 
the Old World. 

With regard to our fifth cause, racial domination m a 



Fundamental Causes 33 

composite union, we may say that it is one of the greatest 
crimes of which governments and rulers have been guilty 
in the past. In most instances it is one of the basest forms 
of slavery, and has scarcely any justification whatever. 
There can never be world peace so long as an alien race or 
nationality, with different ideas, ideals and political instincts 
and institutions, lords it over a subject people, simply be- 
cause chance and might, or physical force, have triumphed 
over justice and humanity. The world can never breathe 
freely until the Polish people get their freedom and inde- 
pendence, as do the various peoples of Austria-Hungary — 
and are free to gravitate to those states or confederations 
to which they by race and right belong. Turkey must leave 
Europe, where she never has had a right to be. Turkey 
is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never has been. 
She has no right to exist, for she has ever existed unnatu- 
rally, by criminal subjection of peoples who otherwise would 
long have been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If 
there ever was a chimerical state it has been the Ottoman 
Empire. Its whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine 
and murder. 

Our sixth cause, national or race hatred may also be dis- 
posed of rather briefly. To the desire for revenge has been 
attributed by many, and perhaps justly, the greater part 
of wars. The German kaiser was right in part at least, 
when he said that this present conflict has its basis in the 
Europe of the past centuries. Nations, no more than indi- 
viduals can violate the laws of justice and right without 
at later times having to pay most dearly for these viola- 
tions. Like individuals, "the sins of the fathers are visited 
upon the children to the third and fourth generation," and 
on, and on, until the wrongs inflicted are fully atoned for. 
It is hard to forgive and forget great crimes. Nor is there 
so much virtue in forgetting as we are sometimes wont to 
believe. It is Christian and wise to forgive, but it is not 
always wise to forget. Particularly is this true in interna- 



34 The Causes Of War 

tional affairs. To forget the past is to fail to understand 
the present and to read the future. In the study of the 
history of mankind, this distinction needs to be made clear 
and appreciated. We can safely forget only when to for- 
get is to further the cause of liberty, as in the case of our 
past relations with England, and the troubles of our own 
civil conflict. We can forget in the case of England because 
we know that the England of a powerful aristocracy and 
"divine right" monarchs is no more. For the same reason 
we should have known and remembered the principles and 
conduct of the present kaiser and government of Germany. 
It is a sad fact that in the past the nation that has not 
been able to return evil for evil has been doomed to disap- 
pear from among the independent nations of the world. Let 
us hope that such a thing in the future cannot be. It is a 
terrible test of our faith, in the midst of the. present whirl- 
pool of horror ; but when faith is lost, all is lost. In ancient 
times, among the uncivilized peoples, even by scriptural in- 
junction, it was "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"; 
but when the world is "made safe for democracy" the prin- 
ciples of Christ can reign in the nations as well as in the 
hearts of men. Poor Belgium, poor Belgium ! What a com- 
ment on our Christian civilization! The time must come 
when the innocent cannot be made to suffer for the sins of 
the plunderers of justice and virtue, for the crimes of the 
privileged parasites of the human kingdom. 

In considering our seventh cause, i. e., the growth of 
nationality, we note that the present German empire was 
built upon a series of wars none of which was really justi- 
fiable, and Germany today is paying the price of her past 
perfidy — that of the founders of her empire. The union of 
Germany would indeed have been delayed to a later genera- 
tion, but who dare say she would not have been better for 
the delay? It would have been a Germany of democracy, no 
matter how long delayed, if it had been allowed the natural 
course of development. In taking Schleswig-Holstein Bis- 



Fundamental Causes 35 

marck was thinking of German imperial interests, not of the 
true interests of those provinces, much less of the interests 
of Denmark whom he robbed of them. Shortly after, he 
showed his perfidy by driving Austria out of Germany and 
German affairs, in the "Six Weeks War" just after he had 
persuaded her to help him conquer Denmark and take from 
her the two provinces, with the tacit understanding that the 
booty was to be divided between the two victors, Austria 
to have her full share. It is likewise well known that Bis- 
marck was courting war with Louis Napoleon of France, in 
1870, and that his mutilization of the telegram of the king 
of Prussia to France was the occasion of France declaring 
war. In other words, he tricked Napoleon and the gov- 
ernment of France into declaring the war which he (Bis- 
marck) desired. Nor did the "Iron Chancellor" conceal 
to his people the fact that he proposed to create a German 
empire on the principle of "blood and iron." That was 
his gospel for Germany. We know how dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the world it is for the government or 
people of a great country to revert to the war instinct, to 
become militaristic, in the sense that Germany has been since 
the time of Frederick the Great. The war spirit is the 
most violent of emotions, and in its desperation is much 
akin to insanity! On the pretext of nationality there have 
always been certain nations that have had a predilection 
for the life of war — different peoples (led by their rulers) 
at different times. At one time it was Rome; at another, 
Spain; at another time France, under Louis XIV; at an- 
other, Italy. For more than fifty years it has been Ger- 
many, led by Prussian autocracy. How well, how thorough- 
ly, how efficiently have the German people obeyed that gos- 
pel! Even their most wonderful arts of peace have been 
made to contribute to that end, instead of to the far nobler, 
disinterested end of charity for the whole world. "Gott 
straffe England" is the gospel of hate, not of patriotism — 
of hate in its most malignant form, and obedience to that 



36 The Causes Of War 

gospel is the explanation of the many outrageous acts of 
barbarism — the atrocities of Germans — of which we hear so 
much, and with which we are so familiar, today. But "Gott 
straffe England" was only the beginning. "Gott straffe de- 
mocracy" is the true purpose and watchword today; and 
that means the United States of America, first and fore- 
most of all, for America is first and foremost in democracy. 

The other great struggle for nationalism in the past 
century, namely, the unification of Italy, which is still 
going on, we need comment upon but very briefly. While it 
has not been unmixed with injustice on Italy's part, no such 
crimes can be laid at the feet of Victor Emmanuel, Cavour 
and Garibaldi as at the feet of the leaders for an imperial 
Germany. On the other hand the history of Austria, the 
arch-enemy of Italian freedom in the past century, is even 
worse than that of Germany. And now, that the whole world 
is reaping the fruits of these past wrongs, it must be a lib- 
erty washed in blood that is to rise upon the ruins of the 
past. One of the fondest hopes of the best servants of the 
world at present is, that this great catastrophe may be 
bringing near the end of the era of selfishness and of might. 

In considering the "balance of power" as a cause of war, 
we find that it has contributed to wars in Europe for cen- 
turies past; that it has its weight in the present war, and 
is dangerous for the future until, or unless the results of the 
present conflict and coming peace give guarantees that will 
obliterate the natural distrust of states and peoples for 
each other, together with the disturbance of peace and pros- 
perity throughout the world. 

Our ninth cause, imperfection of government is so evi- 
dent that it may be passed over with but a word of com- 
ment. It is in general only small and weak nations, or those 
in a more or less violent state of transformation of govern- 
ment, that are prey to the exploitation of war. Portugal 
and perhaps Spain have happily recovered from that state 
within the past and present generations, but there is no 



Fundamental Causes 37 

immediate hope for Mexico, nor for the new Russian states. 
The present allied intervention will bring its political re- 
sults only after years. The military object, of course, may 
be gained soon and Russia saved from Germany, but, after 
that, it will take her generations to find herself. 

The desire to secure natural boundaries, always strong, 
but more so if those boundaries have once been held, is one 
of the great causes for several countries engaging in war, 
even in the present war — as in the case of Italy, Russia, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and to some extent others. Not that this 
was the only cause with any of them ; but it was a great, if 
not controlling, motive. After France was plunged into the 
strife, of course she desired Alsace-Lorraine, as a better 
natural barrier against Germany, together with other rea- 
sons which are well known, chief among them being the race 
hatred, national feeling, and the keenest desire for revenge 
upon Germany for taking those provinces in 1871. Many 
unnatural boundaries must be wiped out at the conclusion 
of this world conflict, and a new map of the Eastern world 
made in the adjustment. 

Wars arising from trade rivalry in their essentials have 
already been discussed above, and may be passed over here. 
Wars of conquest and of the ambition of leaders next 
claim our attention. Facts already considered make it ap- 
pear that the nations in the past have lived chiefly on the 
principle that might makes right. The study of wars of 
conquest makes this conviction all the stronger. By this we 
are able to see how far as nations, up to the present war 
at least, we have been from the principle of peace and honor 
that we have been accustomed so much to talk about. With 
this realization many illusions, and many theories and fond 
hopes vanish. We are just beginning to take the world as 
it is — to understand it and frame our future plans upon 
that basis. It is a striking thing to note that, until recent 
times the right of conquest was never brought in question. 
That it has been condemned in modern times, however, is 



38 The Causes Of War 

proof of the value of our civilization. In these dark hours 
of trial we should keep this fact in mind ; it carries a mes- 
sage of hope for mankind. Until recently, the act of con- 
quering was appreciated as one of the very highest of human 
activities, and the greatest warriors were the greatest states- 
men. The literature, particularly the poetry, of the middle 
ages, was replete with the exploits of the military heroes. 
Force was desired by the state, with very few exceptions 
among the ancient and medieval peoples, above everything 
else. Let us be thankful we have gotten beyond that stage, 
and that the disturbers of the world's peace, notwithstand- 
ing their frantic efforts to justify their actions and to shift 
responsibility, nevertheless stand condemned before the 
judgment bar of humanity ! The ambition of a leader singly, 
can never again bring on a great war, nor has one ruler 
alone been able to, for a hundred years past. 

Great navies and standing armies are contributing causes 
only when other causes are back of them. Yet, we must see, 
as a result of this war, that great standing armies are abol- 
ished forever. This is imperatively necessary, not only to 
guarantee peace, but to enable the nations to pay off their 
tremendous war debts. At the rate that the armies and 
navies were building in Europe previous to this war, the 
whole continent would have been bankrupt in another gen- 
eration, even without war. How necessary it is then, that 
those expensive and crushing burdens upon the peoples be 
done away with, or lowered to the very minimum — to the 
extent that their expense shall be small, as compared with 
the arts of peace! 

The fourteenth cause listed above, namely, the suppression 
of democratic and revolutionary movements of the peoples, 
which has been a leading cause in the past, and has proven 
the perfidy of princes, is bound to decrease and vanish, as the 
cause of democracy grows and finally triumphs throughout 
the world. The long and patient struggle of the people is 
at last to be rewarded. It has taken thousands of years 



Fundamental Causes 39 

to develop democracy on earth, but now she is coming to 
her own, and the days of kingly power and oppression are 
numbered. To appreciate this fact, and to remember the 
principle for which we struggle — to keep our patience in this 
generation, it is necessary that we see events in terms of 
centuries, and great movements in terms of the great ages 
and stages of evolution of man's civilization, in eras as God 
counts them, in their true perspective and as they are. 

The desire for political freedom and democracy on the 
part of the people, is of course the other side of the struggle 
represented by the cause given immediately above, and can- 
not be considered wholly apart from it. Suffice it to say 
here that this struggle has been going on in modern times 
from the outbreak of the English revolution of 164& to the 
present time, is now at its greatest height, and will continue 
for ages to come, though unaccompanied in its last stages, 
we fondly hope, by the maelstrom of war. 

The last cause — to uphold the principles of international 
law and justice and the solemn obligations and treaties of 
nations — is, with the last above named, the greatest con- 
tribution of the United States of America to the world. 



CHAPTER V 

PRETEXTS AND EXCUSES FOB, WAR SOME ILLUSIONS 

\TATIONAL honor is sometimes made a pretext for war; 
-*■ ▼ it is also sometimes a real cause. The civilized world 
has never expected a nation to suffer the outrages of a for- 
eign State, — especially if they occur repeatedly. The 
United States has only followed a long-standing precedent 
in this respect. The American government and people 
showed a forbearance that was remarkable before entering 
the war against Germany. Critics of our government's course 
would do well to remember this fact. Several other nations 
would have refused to suffer what they have suffered, and 
would have gone to war, if they had been strong enough. 
The fate of Belgium, Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania has 
terrorized them into maintaining a technical peace. Noth- 
ing is more precious to a State than the respect for her 
personality, her honor, her sense of fair play. It is with 
nations as with individuals in this particular. If the United 
States, after her stand for the right of neutrals and for 
humanity, had done less than follow up her professions by 
war, she would have been considered the world over as vas di- 
lating and cowardly, as materialistic and selfish, and would 
have hindered rather than encouraged the cause of democ- 
racy throughout the world; the revolution in Russia would 
not have had her powerful aid, and democracy would be 
staggering o'er the whole earth. Belgium accepted Ger- 
many's challenge, rather than slavishly submit, because of 
the God-given right of all honorable people to govern them- 
selves and maintain their national integrity and honor. Like 
all free peoples, she would rather die than submit to the 

40 



Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 41 

vassalage of the inhuman strutting "lord of destiny" — she 
would preserve her honor before the world, though she might 
lose her existence, as the penalty. For this, Belgium has an 
immortal name in history, as has many an individual martyr, 
for like conduct. 

Despite the above, and numerous other instances, however, 
national honor has often been a mere pretext of ambitious 
States and covetous princes and worldlings, for waging war 
against a weaker people. 

During long centuries, up to the present, Europe has been 
rending herself, each group trying to make itself greater 
through the dependency of its neighbors, — all this under 
the pretext of succession to power, political equilibrium, and 
sometimes, "balance of power." This has kept alive among 
the nations the Machiavelian principle that might makes 
right. But, we must remember that of the many wars thus 
waged, the alleged causes were only pretexts, the real causes 
being deeper and more selfish. This point cannot be too 
strongly emphasized. Text books often lead us astray here, 
giving these excuses as the causes, rather than the motives 
back of them. On such pretexts Rome and Carthage con- 
tended for no less stakes than the "dominion and exploita- 
tion of the Mediterranean world." Later, Genoa and Venice, 
of the Italian city States, likewise fought for predominance 
in commerce and navigation; then Spain and Portugal, for 
their colonial empires ; then England, Holland and France, 
following the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. The real 
motive, however, was chiefly commercial, as the nature of 
these contests testifies. 

This was all done under the old-time conviction that, in 
order to have prosperity, a nation must gain a monopoly on 
trade and treasure, a monopoly of exchange and exploita- 
tion. Consequently, this era was followed up and completed 
by the conquests and wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. It had its revival, again, in the wars of colonial 
expansion in the past century. If a State could not secure 



42 The Causes Of War 

a monopoly, it felt that it must at least "turn the balance 
of commercial power" in its favor. Even modern and pres- 
ent day warfare is somewhat of a commercial enterprise in 
this sense. This is an astounding fact, once we come to 
reflect upon it. The nations still are jealous rivals; they 
desire to monopolize certain trade zones, and they still do 
business with each other on the old suspicious competitive 
basis — an economical theory of capitalism that for internal 
industry in the various countries was exploded long ago. For 
instance: the railroads of this country went through (1), 
the stage of competition of small roads, with much duplica- 
tion, extra cost, and poor service. They soon learned they 
were violating an economic principle — that this did not pay. 
So, (2), the next step was consolidation, wherein a few large 
corporations came to own and control all the former small 
roads, leaving the business in the form of a few great sys- 
tems. Next (3), came the period of cooperation, when pool- 
ing began. The rates and traffic in general were so ma- 
nipulated for the benefit of the railroads as a result, that 
the States and the national government were constrained 
to take up the problem of the regulation of the railroads. 
But the point is, the railroads doing business with one 
another, or former rivals, came to the principle of coopera- 
tion as the best and most satisfactory and feasible plan. 
This record can be duplicated, for many other industries. 

Today, as the war problem has developed, the efficiency 
of cooperation is manifest in every industry, and in all the 
industries of our whole national life, as they aid one an- 
other, for a common end. The world war has made co- 
operation and efficiency the two greatest words of the busi- 
ness world. The cooperation of the allies is bringing victory 
to them, while without it they were floundering in defeat. 
On no important undertaking along any line whatsoever, do 
they launch forth without the cooperation of all. Interna- 
tional commerce should long ago have been put upon this 
same basis, — should have been operated on the friendly and 



Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 43 

cooperative plan, instead of the suspicious and restrictive 
competition that still prevails. The old competitive theory, 
with first the "navigation laws" (as those of Spain, England, 
France and Holland), now, the protective tariff restrictions 
— ignores the truth that the well-being of one State is not 
incompatible with that of its neighbors, but almost always, 
the opposite. It has an interest in their prosperity, and 
their well-being contributes to its own. As we all know the 
"navigation laws" helped to cause many wars between na- 
tions or peoples. The protective tariff, that companion in- 
strument of the privileged classes, has likewise caused much 
trouble, especially internal, for all the great nations. Thus 
we see, it is privilege, selfishness and greed that are at the 
bottom and back of the usual pretended causes of war. 

Accordingly all European States have actually been es- 
tablished and consolidated by force. If one condemns this 
selfish conquest (as the world is condemning it today) it 
can no longer be a question of restoring that which was un- 
justly gained, of a revision and general transfer of titles. 
This would result in a complete overthrow of the political 
chart, and would return without profit to the parceling out 
of nations and to the disorder and anarchy of the middle 
ages. The present condition (previous to 1914) in the main 
has been confirmed by a long possession, and has been con- 
solidated by general consent of the powers of the world. 
As all nations, somewhere along their course, have proceeded 
in much the same manner, no one can criticise and condemn 
another unsparingly without reflecting discredit upon itself. 
This truth by no means argues, however, that there should 
be no territorial readjustments to right wrongs of the past, 
as a result of this present war. It is to help us to see, on 
the other hand, that many pretended arguments for free- 
dom of peoples and restoration of former conditions, that 
are advanced by Germany, her allies and sympathizers, are 
besides the point, and not at all parallel cases to those con- 
ditions of subject and unfortunate peoples whom she and 



44 The Causes Of War 

the other autocratic governments (including Russia in the 
past) have criminally oppressed, rather than enlightened 
politically and otherwise. For instance, the England of 
1917 is not responsible for a former England's crimes 
against Ireland. Since 1911 England has offered her "home 
rule," but civil differences and strife in Ireland would not 
have it so. It is all an Irish question now, not an English 
question, and the factions in Ireland are wholly responsible 
for its fall. England would gladly be rid of the thing alto- 
gether. It is what it has always largely been, — a religious 
question, a strife between Catholics and Protestants, of the 
Protestant Ulster counties and the greater Ireland, which is 
overwhelmingly Catholic. That is not the only difficulty at 
present, but it is by far the most important one. Ireland 
certainly ought to accept Home Rule, as England now of- 
fers it, rather than hold out for independence, as the radicals 
and lawless element are doing. Ireland alone is too weak 
to protect herself. She has not the wealth nor power to 
maintain an army and a navy, to guard an independent 
status, and without these she would be a prey to any power 
that might seek to enthrall her. The Germans are beside 
the mark when they demand that England give up Ireland, 
India, South Africa and Egypt, — all of which are as demo- 
cratically and self-governed as their people will accept — 
before they demand that Germany restore Belgium, Poland, 
Alsace-Lorraine, and the recently ravished Balkan States 
and Russia — all of which were exploited, and still are, sole- 
ly for the Teutonic race's benefit, not their own. Those 
nations and parts of nations, however, that are oppressed 
by foreign rulers and governments, such as Poland, Bo- 
hemia, Hungary (largely), the various Balkan peoples with- 
in the Dual Monarchy and the Italians in the Trentino and 
Triest regions— which once were free peoples, or joined to 
their own nationalities, must be restored, to work out the 
destiny of their own nationalities under democratic forms 
of government, if Europe is to have peace in the future. 



Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 45 

Of the weaker and less distinct types, such as Finland and 
several of the African and other colonial possessions, per- 
haps autonomy, or a gradual growth in self-government is 
best. The conditions seem to warrant this solution, even in 
the case of the Philippine islanders. To give them their in- 
dependence in the very near future, with their ignorance of, 
and inexperience in self-government, is mere folly, and would 
leave them the prey of the ambitious despoiler. It would 
be more charitable, if not more honorable, to sell them out- 
right, to the highest bidder, than thus to cast them adrift. 

Again, the difference we would point out is this ; when 
subject peoples are in the hands of liberal democratic gov- 
ernments they are relatively safe ; but wherever they are 
under autocratic rulers, they are continually in danger. 
History has abundantly proved the maxim, "Put not your 
trust in kings." 

We have already noted that, under pretense of defend- 
ing its flag, its interest or its citizens, many a nation has 
taken advantage of the occasion to establish itself and ex- 
tend its power gradually, over less able or less fortunate 
countries. These things have been so carried out at times 
that it has been impossible to chastise the aggressor, or pre- 
vent them. But happily, that age is passing. The latest 
example of the above cause, previous to the present war, 
was Italy, in her war with Turkey for North African pos- 
sessions, just before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, 
a few years ago. Yet, there are those who justify this type 
of war on the ground that it is necessary, as in the case of 
Hindus, Africans, etc., to make them subjects first, in order 
to transform them for the better afterwards. But at best, 
this is a very doubtful position to take, and is a mere excuse 
for war. The question is, does the end justify the means? 

For wars they have waged in the past on pretext chiefly, 
and not for sufficient cause, all the great nations of Europe 
are paying dearly today. England, for example, is suffering 
and paying the penalty in this war for troubles she engen- 



46 The Causes Of War 

dered and wars she helped to promote in her own selfish in- 
terests as late as the nineteenth century. The toll of 100,- 
000 brave men in the Dardanelles campaign was (in large 
part at least) the price she paid for upholding Turkey, "the 
Sick Man of Europe," a couple of generations ago. For 
less than fifty years ago England was still in much the same 
position that Germany was in 1914, with motives very simi- 
lar (under Disraeli) both with regard to her international 
policies and her allies. But England's democracy, the voice 
of her people, has saved her in the present generation from 
the condemnation that the world heaps upon Germany. 
Likewise, Germany can be saved from this condemnation 
in the future only, when democracy there, as in England, 
comes to her rescue. Moreover, one of the certain results 
of this war for Germany, whether it come soon, before the 
present war is over, or after years of internal struggle, will 
be the triumph of democracy over the Kaiser, the haughty 
Crown Prince and the autocratic princes and governments 
of the several States of the Empire. We should not be sur- 
prised also, to see Austria-Hungary dismembered, its vari- 
ous peoples reverting to the nationalities to which they be- 
long. The Czech movement in Bohemia shows the drift 
of affairs in that polyglot empire. 

This spirit of democracy, — of individual and social jus- 
tice — is responsible for the cooperation among the liberal 
governments that is to win the fight of the people of the 
earth for freedom. As we said in our introductory article 
of the present series, this is the culmination of the Political 
Revolution, and is the greatest and most glorious develop- 
ment of the modern age. The reactionary powers of Eu- 
rope have far underrated this great movement, and hence 
have miscalculated its strength and effect, all through the 
past decade and the present war. Similarly, many of us 
have little realized the magnitude and meaning of this great 
liberal wave in the present generation. On this fact Mr. 
John B. Winslow, chief justice of the Supreme Court of 



Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 47 

Wisconsin, has the following to say, — "The future historian 
will find many things of surpassing interest when he comes to 
review the opening decades of the twentieth century, but he 
will find nothing more interesting or significant than the 
great wave of democracy which is now sweeping over the 
earth. . . . This remarkable world movement must be ap- 
parent to the most superficial present day observer of the 
signs of the times. Let any such observer take the world's 
map and put his finger where he will, he will find some phase 
of it. In Great Britain it takes the form of nullifying the 
powers of the House of Lords and curbing the privileges 
of birth; in France and Germany it appears in the garb of 
socialism ; in China a republic supplants the rule of the 
Manchu dynasty, and in other countries it appears in vari- 
ous movements, all directed with greater or less wisdom to 
the wiping out of one form or another of privilege. ... In 
our own country the democratic drift is, perhaps, more 
marked than anywhere else. . . . Unless every sign fails, 
we shall have democracies . . . before many years such as 
the world has never seen on any scale before ; at least, we 
shall experiment with them." Greater weight attaches to 
this statement of Judge Winslow from the fact that it was 
made before democracy over the world made itself so po- 
tently felt in the present conflict. 

We can better understand the illusions of the German 
people and their ignorance of the true science of govern- 
ment (an ignorance or incapacity which many of their own 
statesmen have avowed) when we note the character of their 
leaders, no matter how great statesmen they may have been. 
The people of the whole empire practically have been nur- 
tured politically on illusions, false principles and pretexts, 
not on principles of justice in State and world affairs. Fred- 
erick the Great furnishes a case in point. In his memoirs he 
makes this statement: "My troops being always ready to 
act, my treasury well filled, the vivacity of my character, 
my ambition, the desire to have myself spoken of, — were the 



48 The Causes Of War 

reasons that I went to war with Marie Therese," — i. e., when 
he took the Austrian province of Silesia away from her by 
force and involved all Europe in war. Many German mili- 
tarists, both in the army and the navy, several great Ger- 
man authors of political science texts, as well as responsible 
heads of the great commercial concerns, — have persistently 
held forth this same soulless principle to the German nation. 
These things are perhaps too well known to need specific 
instances given here. It is true that other European gov- 
ernments acted upon quite similar theories a century ago ; 
but that the German Kaiser and government still cling to 
it, — is their peculiar crime in our day. Napoleon Bona- 
parte, after his campaign of 1812, made this remark con- 
cerning his own aggressiveness: "Alexander (of Russia) 
and myself were like two cocks, ready to go into battle with- 
out knowing why" — a statement which was false as to Na- 
poleon's designs- — but which nevertheless acknowledges that 
neither sovereign had just cause for precipitating that ter- 
rible year of conflict. Ambition, wholly selfish, was the real 
cause, of course. Napoleon's desire was that all kings might 
assist at his final imperial coronation. He took the world- 
conqueror, Alexander the Great, as his model. And today, 
the German Crown Prince, it seems, is not so far removed 
from the same folly as we were content to believe a couple 
of years ago. That the ambition of monarchs and leaders 
no longer plays the part in war that it once did, however, is 
a distinct step in the progress of the people's rule. 

As a final word let me repeat: the important; differences 
between fundamental causes of war, and the immediate causes 
and pretexts cannot be too strongly emphasized. The writer 
doubts if the present generation will bring elimination of 
the fundamental causes. A great deal, on the other hand, 
may be done to eradicate the immediate causes and pretexts. 
Secretary Bryan did a noble thing along this line, in secur- 
ing the twenty-odd arbitration treaties between the United 
States and other countries, to prevent wars until at least a 



Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 49 

year's consideration is made. Another instance a few years 
ago was the agreement between Argentine and Chili that 
they would not go to war for five years over boundary dis- 
putes that were about to lead to a clash of arms. They kept 
their agreement. Eradication of the vital causes, however, 
we may well question coming, except by the long, gradual, 
but sure process of political evolution. Stricter regulations 
may be made and enforced through international law and 
agreement, backed by the "League to Enforce Peace." But, 
like the "Balance of Power," to which it is similar, this can- 
not be permanent, in itself — it can serve only for a time. 
Yet, it is true that the coming peace is fraught with great 
possibilities in this direction, while revulsion at the present 
horrors leads many to "faintly trust the larger hope" of 
permanent peace hereafter. Do not such persons forget, 
however, that the whole process of civilization has been a 
development through continuous conflict toward compara- 
tive peace? This condition has been brought about by a 
slow process of education of the minds and conscience of 
men; and this we must realize in its final consummation be- 
fore there can be lasting peace for mankind. That the pres- 
ent tragedy of nations may lend impetus to and hasten the 
day of peace is the reasonable hope of most men, though 
many doubt its realization in the near future. 

The Europe of 1920 will little resemble that of 1914, just 
as the Europe of 1914, little resembled that of a century 
earlier. Greece was the first in the nineteenth century to 
recover her national life ; and now she is recovering it anew. 
Belgium was separated in 1830 from her unnatural incor- 
poration with Holland ; now, she must be resurrected to a 
newer, greater life, and guaranteed a free existence and de- 
velopment. Hungary received a constitution of her own, in 
the dual monarchy in 1848, if she did not gain the indepen- 
dence the patriot Kossuth dreamed for her; she must now 
be given an even freer hand, if not complete independence. 
Bohemia at that time struggled for self government; she 



50 The Causes Of War 

must be given complete "home rule," if not more this time. 
The Bohemians have already raised their voice in a men- 
acing way toward German Austria. Poland more than once 
rose in revolt against those who destroyed her independence. 
As President Wilson so timely pointed out in his war mes- 
sage, last year, the Poles must once more breathe as an in- 
dependent people. The great crime of partitioning in the 
eighteenth century must be atoned for, and the penalty paid 
and loss sustained, by her despoilers. The peoples of the 
world, — with friendly help and oversight in some instances 
of course, — must be left to work out their destinies and 
"the world must be made safe for democracy." The in- 
fluence of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs must be 
made as harmless as that of the Hanovarians in England 
today, or like them, must turn their influence into the cur- 
rent of democracy. 

War, we have said, assumes the survival of the fittest, the 
most apt, the best. But, the best for what? The fittest for 
what? That is the capital question now. It is not easy for 
one people to modify the wish, the interests, and still less 
the national characteristics of another. The failure at many 
efforts at it ha,s helped to bring on this colossal war. Once 
it could be done by war and the conqueror after the war; 
but in so far as this transformation is possible today, 
it is not by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free 
intercourse between nations, social and commercial, is per- 
haps the most powerful pacifying influence. When nations 
and races come to mingle with each other more vitally, like 
individuals they will come to understand and appreciate one 
another better, and will at last learn to heed that most cost- 
ly and precious lesson, that peace, and not war, is to be the 
true and only rational basis of civilized human society. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN EUROPE 

TO a considerable extent the conditions that brought 
about the great European conflict in 1914, of the pres- 
ent century, can be traced to the work of the Congress of 
Vienna, at the end of the Napoleonic era, a century before. 
The present decade, consequently, has often been compared 
and contrasted with the Napoleonic period, a little over a 
century ago. And in no other respect, perhaps, has the con- 
trast been so sharply drawn as in the difference of motive 
that actuated Prince Metternich and his autocratic congress 
of princes and their minions, on the one hand, and the mo- 
tives which have been the impelling force in the liberal na- 
tions in the World War of 1914-1918, on the other; and 
the contrast continues in the spirit and work of the peace 
conference at Versailles. 

Since the above is true, in our brief review of the imme- 
diate background of the great World War we cannot stop 
short of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and its imme- 
diate outgrowth, the Holy Alliance, a hundred years agone. 
There were two cardinal principles of this notorious Vienna 
congress that were responsible in so large a degree for the 
terrible woes of the present time, namely (1), the bargain- 
ing about of territories and nationalities as if they were 
"mere chattels and pawns in a game," and (2), the restora- 
tion of oppressive and autocratic kings upon their thrones, 
against the flame of democracy enkindled by the French 
Revolution, and the repression of all democratic aspiration 
of the people of the nations. One needs but to examine the 
history of the first half of the nineteenth century and recall 

61 



52 The Causes Of War 

the origin of our Monroe Doctrine to satisfy himself as to 
this fact. 

Despite the strength of the peoples' revolutions of 1830 
and 1848, which came so near overthrowing once for all this 
medieval tyranny, enough of it remained on the continent 
of Europe to make possible the next great step in violation 
of the rights of man, — the crime of Bismarck and the Prus- 
sian war-lords in their wars for the union of the German 
peoples in a great empire. This story is too well known to 
warrant its repetition here. But what was the consequence 
of this type of unification? That is what is all-pertinent to 
our subject in hand. It was simply this: Bismarck's im- 
perialistic and "blood and iron" policy soon arrayed a 
group of nations in bitter, distrustful and hostile feeling 
against himself, his sovereign and the new German Empire. 
To meet this menace to his dream of a "Deutschland uber 
Alles" the greater part of the remaining years of his life 
were spent. The astute Imperial Chancellor sought con- 
stantly an alliance to meet this growing hostility with an- 
other threat, or application, of "blood and iron." He 
would sow discord (divide et impera), — as has frequently 
been practiced by Germany since, — and bring in jealous 
rivalry, if possible, his threatening opponents, while he would 
seek an alliance with one or more of them. And this alliance 
would safeguard the interests of Germany in the future. 
Thus arose the Triple Alliance, Bismarck's famous "Drei- 
bund" of Germany, Austria and Italy, in 1881. Italy, con- 
trary to her natural interests and past experience, was in- 
duced to join in this "unholy" alliance with the Teutonic 
powers because of France's aggressive movements at this 
time in Algeria, northern Africa, — which territory was 
coveted by Italy and was adjacent to Tunis, which had 
already been appropriated by France and which in turn 
adjoined Tripoli which the Italians in 1911 fought with 
Turkey for. The Italian people, however, soon became 
aware that their age-long enemies, Austria and Germany, 



The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 53 

were more of a menace to them than was France. Hejice, at 
an early date Italy showed that she could not be depended 
upon in an offensive war as a partner of the Teutonic 
countries, — as many German writers pointed out years be^ 
fore the fateful outbreak of war in 1914. 

And now, to go back for another thread of our narrative. 
After the humiliation of France in 1871 Bismarck had hoped 
that his neighbor to the west had been so completely crushed 
that she could never again be a real obstacle to the ambi- 
tions of Germany. He was therefore astonished, and not a 
little alarmed, to witness the rapid recovery of France from 
her losses in this war. By 1875 he was planning another 
war with France, — one of the "sperlos versenkt" kind. But 
he had already sown the dragon's teeth. Great Britain and 
Russia both called a halt upon him. He was constrained to 
forego this war; but he must make up for this failure in 
some way. Then followed his constant effort until he se- 
cured the Triple Alliance referred to above. 

But before the "Dreibund" was accomplished the war- 
cloud had lowered over the Balkans, and in this both Ger- 
many and Austria were deeply interested. The Balkan 
provinces (as we bring out in Chapter VII of this work), 
stung to madness by the "Bulgarian Massacres" and other 
atrocities, led by Bulgaria, were planning a revolution and 
war to drive the abominable Turk out of Europe. And they 
looked to Russia for aid. The Czar was more than willing, 
since he had his heart set on Constantinople and the Medi- 
terranean trade. Upon the pretext of interfering in be- 
half of persecuted Christians he joined the Balkans, 
marched upon the Turk, and soon won a complete victory 
over the Sultan. In this Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the 
Ottoman rule in Europe would have ended, but for the jeal- 
ous intervention of the other great powers of Europe, led 
by Austria and Great Britain. This time they feared that 
Russia, rather than Germany (and Germany was with them, 
strongly seconding Austria) would break the "balance of 



54 The Causes Of War 

power" and threaten their expansion, if not their empires. 
Then, upon the close of this war, which only partly emanci- 
pated the Balkans from the Turk, came the famous Con- 
gress of Berlin. Bismarck was playing a grand role in 
securing this congress for Berlin, and he was the domi- 
nating figure in it. But the real significance of this Treaty 
of Berlin for our purposes is, that Russia considered Ger- 
many as one of the chief nations that had robbed her of her 
conquests of the war, and hence Russia was later willing to 
listen to the overtures of Germany's most watchful adver- 
sary, France. 

After the movements described in the preceding para- 
graphs had culminated for Bismarck and Germany in the 
Triple Alliance of 1881, France was the first to sense the 
larger meaning of it all, and sought an alliance to counter- 
act the "Dreibund." This led to the Dual Alliance between 
France and Russia; for Russia, as we have just seen, had 
had a forecast of Bismarckian diplomacy in the Congress of 
Berlin, and next to France, was most endangered by the new 
militant Germany. 

Great Britain so far, had kept aloof from both alliances. 
Relying upon her great fleet and upon her isolation by water 
from the Continent, she, like the United States for a cen- 
tury, felt for a time that she could steer an independent 
course. Both nations have since been disillusioned. (This, 
by the way, is a strong argument in favor of some sort of 
a league of nations, to take the place for a time at least, 
if not to develop finally into a permanent one, — of the "Bal- 
ance of Power," which will never remain "balanced"). It 
was the immense increase of standing armies on the Conti- 
nent, as against Britain's "contemptible little army" of 
volunteers, and the German feverish rush to build a great 
navy, that opened the eyes of Englishmen and, coupled with 
the reapproachment efforts of King Edward VII, led Great 
Britain about 1905 into the "friendly understanding — En- 
tente Cordiale — with France, and then with Russia. This 



The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 55 

Triple Entente amounted to a three-fold alliance against the 
Triple Alliance of the Teutonic powers and Italy, with the 
distinct advantage that England was able secretly to culti- 
vate a friendly feeling with Italy, for reasons that we have 
already stated. 

It is significant that this Triple Entente was consum- 
mated in spite of the Fashoda incident of 1898, which had 
threatened war between England and France, and in spite 
of some conflicting interests of these two nations in the 
Near East. Moreover, this Entente was maintained through- 
out the next decade (1905-1915) despite the difficulties that 
Great Britain and Russia encountered over "spheres of in- 
fluence" in Persia and boundaries in the Himalayas. These 
facts serve to show that Great Britain, France and Russia 
all distrusted the bold and unscrupulous policy of Germany, 
and would compromise their own differences in order to have 
each other's aid against this common danger, whenever the 
test should come. This explains the continuance of the 
Triple Entente to the very hour of war in 1914. 

Meanwhile Germany and Austria-Hungary were showing 
unmistakable signs of a determination to control all cen- 
tral Europe and also the Gateways to the East, by their 
Mittel-Europa-Berlin to Bagdad railway scheme, and Aus- 
tria's aggressiveness in the Balkans. Let us not forget that 
Austria had been instrumental in robbing Russia of the 
Balkan victories, 1878, and now (1908), while Russia as a 
result of the Russo-Japanese war and internal conflict was 
powerless to aid her Balkan kindred, annexed the Serbian 
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This she did without 
any nations' consent except her own (and encouragement 
of her ally Germany), and contrary to the wishes of her 
own inhabitants. 

The German Emperor had urged Austria to proceed with 
this seizure of the two Balkan provinces, promising her that 
with his "shining sword" he would stand by her side. Thus 
had Austria, at the risk of a great war in Europe, changed 



56 The Causes Of War 

by main force the status of a couple of Balkan provinces 
that had been assigned to her for protection at the Congress 
of Berlin, from a weak protectorate for administrative pur- 
poses, into a part and parcel of her empire. This is one 
of the five instances in which Germany and Austria in the 
decade 1905-1915, by their "brazen aggressions" threatened 
the peace of Europe and the world. These five instances the 
author has referred to in another chapter. But a little ex- 
planation is in place here. The first instance was when the 
Kaiser, after announcing that no changes of territory must 
be made anywhere in the world without his consent, in the 
first Moroccan crisis in 1905, after France, backed by Great 
Britain and Spain had informed the sultan of that country 
that he must submit to order and decency, — made a per- 
sonal visit to this sultan and informed him that he did not 
have to do anything of the kind. Although the Kaiser was 
finally obliged to retreat from this position through the in- 
ternational finding of the Algeciras conference, the French 
minister Delcasse, to assuage the wrath of Germany and the 
Kaiser's wounded pride, was forced to resign, to keep the 
peace. The second instance was the annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, just mentioned 
above. The third crisis was precipitated by the Kaiser send- 
ing his warship the Panther to the Moroccan port of Agidir, 
on the occasion of violent disorder breaking out there and 
France's sending troops, upon the advice of Spain and with 
the backing of England to restore order in that country. 
France was now upheld by the powerful assurance of Great 
Britain and Russia, which had recovered considerably from 
the results of the Russo-Japanese war. Yet, France yielded 
sufficiently to grant the Kaiser considerable territory on 
the Congo, as a counterpoise for what she was getting in 
Morocco, and thus again she helped to avoid a war with 
Germany. It was with very ill grace, however, that Ger- 
many acceded to peace at all on this occasion. Her great 
army expansion was not yet completed, else she would not 



The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 57 

have, as our German authorities tell us. This occurred in 
1910-1911. The fourth came in connection with the Balkan 
wars, 1911-13, when the German and Austro-Hungarian 
governments backed the Turks (German officers had been 
drilling Turkish troops since 1888, and in 1896 Wilhelm II 
had visited Turkey, sealed a strong bond of friendship with 
the Turkish government, and joined with the Turks as a 
promoter of their "holy religion," and trade with Germany) 
and were upon the point of going to war with the Balkan 
states. Great Britain more than any other European na- 
tion sought to prevent this threatened general European 
war, and should be given credit for the same. Had the En- 
tente been as aggressive as Germany and Austria, no doubt 
the World War would have broken out two or three years 
sooner. The fifth and last instance was the German Imperial 
Government's deliberately launching the greatest tragedy 
of history, in 1914. Since the precipitation of this fatal 
crisis is quite extensively treated in other portions of this 
book a further exposition of it here is unnecessary. 1 

1 For a further treatment of the above five crises the reader is referred 
to the International Year Book, 1914 to 1918 numbers. 



CHAPTER VII 

CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR 

THE writer has been encouraged by friends to make a 
separate statement of the causes of the present World 
War, before concluding the series of articles on the Causes 
of War. Such a statement is all the more pertinent at this 
time, since teachers and students, as well as the public gen- 
erally, are more vitally interested in the conflict so recently 
raging than in any former war, — as is natural they should 
be; moreover, a good deal of the opposition in this country 
to the war has been due to ignorance of its causes, — of why 
America is in it, — and of the issues at stake. Still another 
reason for the following treatise is, that nowhere have we 
found anything that approaches a complete and accurate 
statement of the vital causes as they have affected all the 
powers engaged, — either collectively or individually. And 
finally now that the war is over, if we are to be of service 
to the bringing of a just peace that we have been in waging 
a just war, we must understand the causes in order to help 
intelligently in applying the remedy for war. 

Two distinctions made in a former chapter I wish to re- 
peat at the outset, — namely, (1) that remote and funda- 
mental causes must be carefully distinguished from imme- 
diate causes and from pretexts; and (2) that there are dif- 
ferent causes for different nations, or groups of nations, 
and usually as many causes at least as there are peoples 
engaged in conflict. In this connection it is well to repeat 
that it is difficult to classify the causes fully and accurately, 
to do which requires great pains, as well as familiarity with 
every important detail of the life, government and ambitions 

58 



Causes of the Present War 59 

of each State. The treatment which follows, however, the 
author feels, is essentially just and reasonably accurate. 

We need spend but little time with the mere pretexts for 
this war, such as the Austrian forty-eight-hour ultimatum 
to Serbia for the assassination of the Austrian archduke 
and wife, — the twenty-four-hour demands and the ultima- 
tums of Germany to France and England, together with her 
demand that Russia immediately demobilize her vast army; 
— or Germany's excuse in the case of her invasion of Bel- 
gium, that England or France, or both, would have invaded 
that country, and thus broken their solemn treaties, as Ger- 
many did, if the Germans had not gone first. Most of the 
above excuses were premeditated lies, as the facts have since 
shown, and all were mystified, presumptuous, and wholly self- 
ish pretexts for war. It is worse than stupidity for a per- 
son to believe that England or France would have invaved 
Belgium, — no matter what irresponsible individuals may 
have said or imagined, — in order to break through into Ger- 
many, when England had only 50,000 troops ready in those 
first days, as against the vast army of a million superbly 
equipped men which Germany had ready for instant action 
on the Belgian frontier, to say nothing of Belgium's army 
of defense, also, in face of the fact that it took England two 
years to raise an army large enough to have the slightest 
hope of striking through Belgium., against Germany, had 
the British even desired it. It is equal folly to claim that 
France would have invaded Belgium, since she had prac- 
tically all her army concentrated on the Alsace-Lorraine 
border, at the other extremity of the country, a fact which 
proves that even after the German ultimatum (which 
amounted to a declaration of war) — France did not expect 
such dishonorable conduct by Germany ; and without the aid 
of England's little army, she would not have been able 
to save her own capital, Paris, in the battle of the Marne, 
in her extremity, throwing in, as she did, tens of thousands 
of young men, unarmed, to face certain death, in order to 



60 The Causes Of War 

fill up the lines and check the onrush of the Germans. These 
are the facts of history. The German government's per- 
sistent falsifying to the German people and to the world 
constitutes another of the long list of its atrocities and 
barbarous crimes, that are prolonging the suffering and 
horrors of war, even now. 

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the vital 
causes of the conflict. We shall take (1) those of the En- 
tente allies and (2) those of the Central Powers. This gen- 
eral and natural separation of the causes into two groups is 
necessary because, as stated above, there are different causes 
for different countries, and as many causes (or more), as 
there are nations engaged in combat. Let us take the indi- 
vidual States of the allies first. 

England's Causes for Going to War 

(1) Protection of her colonial possessions and main- 
tenance of her supremacy on the sea and in commerce. 

(2) Democratic principles vs. autocracy, and opposi- 
tion to the militarism of the German imperial government. 

(3) Germany 9 s invasion of Belgium and England's 
treaty obligation in guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. 
(The same solemn treaty that Germany violated.) 

(4) Maintenance of the "balance of power" in Europe, 
threatened by the rapid development and the ambitions of 
Germany. 

France 

(1) Maintenance of treaty obligations and their protec- 
tion (Russia and England in particular). 

(&) Fear of Pan-German dominance and conquests in 
Europe, with their dangers to France. 

(3) Revenge, for Germany's taking Alsace and Lor- 
raine in 1871, with race-hatred engendered by that act. 

(4) Democracy (France a republic) vs. military autoc- 
racy. 



Causes of the Present War 61 

(5) Distrust (as in England) of the colonial policy and 
ambitions of Germany. 

(6) German invasion compelled France to fight, in self- 
defense. 

Russia 

(1) Desire for control in Balkans and possession of 
Constantinople, with access to the Mediterranean, as against 
Austria-Hungary's ambitions in the same region (involving 
conquest). 

(2) Racial sympathy with Serbia and other Slavic 
States. 

(3) Distrust and hatred of Germany (by the Russian 
people especially). 

(4) Democracy vs. power of kings (recent factor). 

Italy 

(1) Hatred of Austria, an enemy of Italian freedom 
and unity. 

(2) Spirit of nationality — completion of unification of 
Italy, by securing Italian provinces still held by Austria. 

(3) Fear of the growing power and ambition of Ger- 
many, i. e., Italy wished to maintain the "Balance of Power" 
in Europe, which Germany was about to overthrow. 

(4) Desire for more Italian influence and commercial 
advantages in the Balkans. 

The Balkan States — Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Greece 

(1) Desire to work out their own destinies (spirit of 
nationality) and be free from Turkish and Austro-Hun- 
garian menaces — a sequel to the Balkan wars of 1912-13. 

(2) Securing of natural and national boundaries (race 
cohesion) as fruits of their conquests of 1911-13, which 
Austria deprived them of in the moment of victory. 

(3) Growth of spirit of democracy (resulting in recent 
action of Greece). 



62 The Causes Of War 

Japan 

(1) Fear of commercial power of Germany in the far 
East and in the Pacific. 

(£) Spirit of expansion and nationality. 

(3) Economic needs arising from great population with 
little room to expand. 

(4) The Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" — similar to posi- 
tion of U. S. with respect to Latin America. 

Small States of Europe, Asia and America, such as Portu- 
gal, Cuba, Slam, and semi-belligerent attitude of 
several other countries in Eastern 
and Western Worlds 

(1) Democracy vs. Autocracy. 

(£) Violation of international law and rights of neu- 
trality by Germany and other Central powers. 

(3) Treaty obligations with larger nations, with pro- 
tection they afford (as in Cuba with United States, Por- 
tugal with England, etc.). 

(4) Sufferings and hardships caused by the German 
submarine blockade and destruction of neutral commerce 
(so strong as to warrant separation from the four causes 
above — in fact, the leading cause for war with several of the 
small States referred to). 

Belgium 

( 1 ) Invasion by Germany, which carries with it : 

(a) Fight for national honor and for existence — purely 
a case of self-defense. 

(b) Maintenance of her solemn treaty obligations with 
England and France (the same obligation that Germany 
had with these same countries and Belgium, and which Ger- 
many so contemptuously broke, as "mere scraps of paper"). 



Causes of the Present War 63 

THE CENTRAL POWERS 

Austria-Hungary 

(1) Desire for control of the Balkans (conquest) with 
Constantinople, and predominating influence in the near 
East, particularly the Mediterranean countries and com- 
merce. 

(2) Growth of nationality among the Slavic and other 
peoples of the Austrian Empire, with its consequent peril to 
the oppressive, autocratic government of the Dual Mon- 
archy — (well may she fear it!) 

(3) Growth of democracy among the several peoples of 
the Empire (the companion to national feeling and desire 
for independence). 

(4) Pan-Germanism — philosophy of imperialism. 

Germany 

(1) Militarism, — the doctrine of "blood and iron." 

(2) Jealousy of England's commercial power and deter- 
mination to wrest from her the supremacy on the sea, and 
in colonial commerce. 

(3) Pan-Germanism — imperialism, the dream of a Teu- 
tonic "Mittel-Europa," with German domination on the con- 
tinent of Europe. (Berlin to Bagdad Railroad and coun- 

try.) 

(4) Autocracy's struggle with the growing spirit of de- 
mocracy throughout the world — the curse of "divine right" 
kings. 

(5) Domineering German diplomacy (one of the great- 
est immediate causes). 

Turkey 

(1) Hope of regaining lost provinces in Europe. 
(£) Revenge upon the Balkan States for their conquests 
of Turkish territory in the Balkan wars, 1912-13. 
(3) German influence and propaganda. 



64 The Causes Of War 

Bulgaria 

(1) Revenge upon the other Balkan States for depriv- 
ing her of much of her conquests in the First Balkan war, 
1912. 

(2) Hope of regaining her conquests of 1912. 

(3) German influences and sympathies, particularly of 
the ruling house in Bulgaria. 

U. S. REASONS FOR GOING TO WAR WITH 

GERMANY 

(1) To uphold the principles of international law, the 
sacred obligations of treaties, and the rights of neutrals, 
and of small States. 

(2) The moral ground of humanity, in the scale against 
barbarism. 

(3) To uphold her own honor and respect among the 
powers of the earth, and to prove the sincerity of her pro- 
fessed principles. 

(4) To cast in her powerful resources with the liberal 
governments of the world with the cause of democracy vs. 
autocracy, — to help make the world "safe for democracy. 



>? 



Explanation of Causes 

And now, to discuss the above causes briefly. We shall 
follow the order given in our outline, and take England, of 
the allies first. 

(1) Protection of colonial possessions and maintenance 
of supremacy on the sea and in commerce. It has been 
claimed by Germany that she has as good right to a colonial 
empire and supremacy on the sea as England has, which 
would be true if she gave her colonies the same freedom and 
self-government that England does hers. But just the oppo- 
site is the case, as Germany's colonies in Africa have shown. 
True enough it is that Great Britain got many of her cola- 



Causes of the Present War 65 

nial possessions and much of her consequent commercial 
power unjustly and by methods of oppression and force. 
But this nearly all happened before England became the 
democracy she is today ; and she has done as much as any 
nation on earth could do in recent years to right those 
wrongs of "kings and aristocracies" — in fact so much that 
her colonies are allowed more freedom than those of any 
other country (as England has always done on colonial lib- 
erties among the powers of Europe) ; while on the other 
hand, Germany's government and exploitation of her col- 
onies has been so oppressive generally speaking, and so 
feudalistic, that the colonists hate her, and welcomed the 
chance of war to remedy their condition. Again, Great Brit- 
ain's fleet and commerce threaten the world in no such man- 
ner as Germany's do, but have repeatedly been a protection 
to other countries from diabolical intrigues and aggressions 
by the German government and its agents. It was Germany 
above all others that worked and plotted to throw China 
into anarchy and disruption, at the same time extorting 
concessions from that helpless government that were most 
humiliating and embarrassing to the Chinese, as though 
China were vassal to the Kaiser, — all through a process that 
exhibited a deliberate policy of atrocity that rivaled in every 
respect the more recent ravages of Belgium. The Kaiser 
set these crimes afoot with the injunction to his agents that 
they should make the power of Germany felt in China, that 
the Chinese should be impressed by it. It is the German gov- 
ernment that has upheld and been chiefly responsible for the 
continuation of the horrible, ghastly murders, starvation 
and practical annihilation of the Armenian Christians in 
Turkey. By his mere word the Kaiser could easily have put 
an end to this butchery, any time in these recent years ; but 
instead, a few months ago, after one of the greatest mas- 
sacres of wholly innocent people was perpetrated, the Kaiser 
sent the congratulation to the Sultan, "God bless you for 
your noble victory," etc., etc. 



66 The Causes Of War 

(£) Democracy versus autocracy. We have already 
called attention to the fact that Great Britain as a whole 
is a democracy practically as much as our own. In fact it 
is more so, in several particulars (though not in others), 
especially, since 1900. On the other hand, we need only to 
read any historical account of the form and workings of the 
Prussian and German imperial governments to realize that 
they were practically absolute monarchies, — each in its 
sphere, and the Kaiser being at the head of both — veiling to 
the people their feudalistic character (a scheme of Bis- 
marck's, but followed more extensively since) only by pa- 
ternalistic reforms. 

(3) Germany's invasion of Belgium, besides breaking 
faith with England, presented a direct menace to that coun- 
try, from across the Channel, greater than any danger that 
has confronted her since the period of the early career of 
Napoleon Bonaparte, before the battle of Trafalgar, more 
than a century ago. Autocracy so near a growing democ- 
racy was not to be tolerated. 

(4) As to maintenance of the "balance of power" in 
Europe, we may say that the development of Germany in 
the present generation, — agriculturally, commercially, scien- 
tifically, financially and otherwise industrially — has been phe- 
nomenal, and has astonished the world! Add to this fact 
that her militarism and Machiavellianism in politics have 
kept pace with all this growth, and you have the "Teutonic 
menace" to Europe and to the world. 

Next France, with her causes. France, of course, was 
more directly menaced than England. Although France had 
compulsory and universal military service she was more dem- 
ocratic and therefore less prepared for immediate action 
than was Germany, and was a year — a fateful year — behind 
Germany in her military program. A democracy cannot 
mould a people into a perfect military machine so quickly 
as an absolute power above them can drive them into it. 
Yet, France saw that once more she must fight for liberty, 



Causes of the Present War 67 

fraternity and equality against the foe that would crush 
these foundation principles of democracy. This considera- 
tion for France explains both (1) her course for mainte- 
nance of treaty obligations with her allies and, (2), her fear 
of Pan-Germanism as causes of war for her. Her democ- 
racy and existence were both at stake. 

(3) Revenge for the exaction of Alsace-Lorraine from 
her by Prussia in 1871 was, naturally, a strong incentive 
for war on France's part. She has since that fatal year 
been the leading power in Europe to warn the world against 
the ambitions of Germany and the Hohenzollerns, and to 
counsel preparedness for the "inevitable day." 

Third, Russia. Russia's desire for control of the Balkans 
and possession of Constantinople, with access to the Medi- 
terranean sea was due chiefly to two causes, namely, (1) 
Growth of a national consciousness and pride among the 
most intelligent and influential elements in the State, and 
(£) the ambition of the Russian monarchs and privileged 
nobility to expand (east, south and southwest — and at an 
early time, west also, and north) to ice-free and unhampered 
ports on the seas. Constantinople as the capital of a new 
and greater Russi'a had been the'dreams of her czars since 
the time of Peter the Great. In this, of course, the Russia 
of the Czar was equally guilty with Germany and Austria 
in stirring up strife and precipitating the greatest of all 
conflicts. Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, contrary to 
her solemn pledges to Japan, with Port Arthur as the ter- 
minus of her great Trans-Siberian railroad and coveted port 
on the Pacific, it is well known, was the chief cause of the 
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. 

Russia's other causes are so similar to those of other 
countries of the allies that they may be passed over here. 

Fourth, Italy. Of all the allies so far considered — and 
perhaps of all of them, without exception — Italy has been 
most guilty. She is less democratic than the others — (ex- 
cept Russia at first), though far more so than either Ger- 



68 The Causes Of War 

many or Austria-Hungary — and has allowed her strong 
spirit of nationality and Italian unity to lead her into two 
wars of conquest within a decade, i. e., her war with Turkey 
in 1911, and the present war. Yet, Italy at heart is demo- 
cratic, her local government being patterned after that of 
France and her causes for war are most natural ones and 
emanate from the people themselves. 

Fifth, the Balkan States. These have been sufficiently 
commented on in a former article, and need not be sepa- 
rately treated here. The above outline of their causes will 
suffice. 

Sixth, Japan. Japan's motives are also sufficiently clear- 
ly given in the above outline of her causes, as are also those 
in the seventh (g), and eighth (h) groups of the outline, 
and to save space we omit further consideration of them at 
this point. 

The above discussion of the allies' causes with the rather 
full outline of the causes for the Central Powers will per- 
haps give the situation as affecting the European nations in 
themselves as complete consideration as is needed. It re- 
mains for us to go somewhat more into detail concerning our 
own country's causes for entering the conflict, and finally, 
to make a brief summary of causes in general, so as to fix 
the great weight of responsibility for the world tragedy 
where it rightfully belongs. 

Keeping in mind our classification of America's motives 
in this war, as a concise working basis, we could do no bet- 
ter in elaboration and in exposition of our case against Ger- 
many, than to consider thoughtfully the following para- 
graphs from President Wilson's noted Flag Day Speech of 
last year. 

"It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The 
extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial Ger- 
man government left us no self-respecting choice but to take 
up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of 
our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters 



Causes of the Present War 69 

of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled 
our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and con- 
spirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people 
in their own behalf . . . their agents diligently spread sedi- 
tion amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from 
their allegiance, — and some of those agents were men con- 
nected with the official embassy of the German government 
itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to 
destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried 
to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw 
Japan into a hostile alliance with her, — and that by direct 
suggestion from the foreign office in Berlin, . . . They re- 
peatedly executed their threat that they would send to their 
death any of our people who ventured to approach the 
coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were cor- 
rupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with 
suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise 
whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue 
did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances 
would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired 
peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This 
flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had 
we withheld our hand. 

"But this is only part of the story. . . . The war was 
begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to 
be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have 
never regarded nations as peoples, men, women and children 
of like blood and frame as themselves. . . . They have re- 
garded them merely as serviceable organizations which they 
could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own pur- 
pose. They have regarded the smaller States in particu- 
lar, and the people who could be overwhelmed by force, as 
their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their 
purpose has long been avowed. . . . The rulers of Germany 
themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well 
advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the 



70 The Causes Of War 

writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmo- 
lested, filling the thrones of the Balkan States with German 
princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey 
to drill her armies . . . developing plans of sedition and 
rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. 
The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere sin- 
gle step in a plan that compassed Europe and Asia, from 
Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped that their demands might 
not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether 
they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the 
final issue of arms. 

"Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military 
power and political control across the very center of Eu- 
rope and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia. 
. . . The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had 
a heart nowhere else ! . . . The choice of peoples played no 
part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial 
and political units which could be kept together only by 
force. 

"And they have actually carried the greater part of that 
plan into execution! . . . The so-called Central Powers are 
in fact but a single power. . . . The Turkish armies, which 
Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not them- 
selves, and the guns of German warships lying in the har- 
bor of Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day 
that they have no choice but to take their orders from Ber- 
lin. From Hamburg to the Persian gulf, the net is spread. 

"Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that 
has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set 
and sprung? ... It wishes to close its bargain before it is 
too late. . . . 

"If they fail, their people will cast them aside; a gov- 
ernment accountable to the people themselves will be set up 
in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, 
in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time 



Causes of the Present War 71 

except Germany. If they succeed, America will fall within 
the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain 
armed, as they will remain, and must be ready for the next 
step of aggression. . . . 

"Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the in- 
trigue for peace? . . . Their present particular aim is to 
deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the 
rights of peoples and the self-government of nations ; for 
they see what immense strength the forces of justice and 
liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employ- 
ing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Ger- 
many and without, as their spokesmen for their own de- 
struction, — socialists, the leaders of laborers, the thinkers 
they have hitherto sought to silence. . . . 

"The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted 
in this country than in Russia and in every country in Eu- 
rope to which the agents and dupes of the imperial German 
government each gets access. . . . They proclaim the lib- 
eral purposes of their masters ; declare this a foreign war 
which can touch America with no danger to either her lands 
or her institutions ; set England at the center of the stake 
and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion 
throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of 
isolation in the politics of the nations ; and seek to under- 
mine the government with false professions of loyalty to its 
principles. . . . 

"The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that 
this is a great people's war, a war for freedom and justice 
and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, 
a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon 
it and have made it their own, the German people themselves 
included; and with us rests the choice to break through all 
these hypocrisies . . . and help set the world free, or else 
stand aside and let it be dominated as long ago, by ... a 
power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in 



72 The Causes Of War 

the face of which political freedom must wither and perish. 
"For us there is but one choice, we have made it. . . . 
We are ready to plead at the bar of history." . . . 

Summary and Conclusion 

A brief survey of the causes catalogued and discussed in 
the foregoing articles with the study of the subject they 
imply, shows the following clear divisions and contrasts : 

(1) All the Allied powers and those fighting with them 
have democracy, with its attendant liberties as one of their 
leading causes; while none of the "Central Powers" were 
democracies, but were fighting for the principles ©f despot- 
ism. This is so universally true that the World War has 
become, above all else combined, a struggle of democracy 
with despotic power, and those two causes are truly in the 
balance. This fact alone brands Germany — her kaiser and 
imperial government, who have been the soul and masters 
of the Central States — as the chief culprits in this war and 
the arch-enemies of mankind, 

(2) The Central Powers, led by Germany, have been in 
the present generation (since 1905) the only exponents and 
defenders of the principle that "might makes right," and 
have since that time been in the grip of the "war-lords" Bern- 
hardt Treitschke, "Herr" Ballin, and such like, with the 
whole leadership of the German army and navy to preach 
that doctrine, a doctrine so welcome and sweet to the palate 
of the kaiser and imperial government of Germany. Here I 
cannot refrain from quoting a few characteristic statements 
of Berahardi : "War is the father of all things ; . . . a mor- 
al obligation, an indispensable factor in civilization . . . Ger- 
many is the fittest to survive. . . . The Germans have proved 
themselves . . . one may say, the civilized nation. . . . Ab- 
solutely the most important task of a modern State consists 
in making its armed force as powerful as possible." 

(3) In the decade between 1905 and 1915 five times Eu- 



Causes of the Present War 73 

rope was brought to the verge of a general war — every time 
by the brazen aggressions of the German and Austro-Hun- 
garian governments. Four times one or all of the allied 
States and the small nations they were protecting yielded, to 
save Europe from the devastation of war; but in 1914 they 
did not yield— THEY COULD NOT YIELD and remain 
free and honorable, treaty-abiding nations. 

(4) Finally, with respect to the United States' particu- 
lar case and cause, we wish it to be borne in mind that, al- 
though for two years England violated international law and 
our right to be neutral through her seizing, holding as con- 
traband and disposing of our cargoes, as well as rifling our 
mail, — yet she appropriated only property, and did not de- 
stroy even that; while on the other hand Germany by her 
submarine warfare utterly destroyed (and Germany set her 
submarine blockade in action first) not only our ships and 
cargoes, but also human lives, the lives of our citizens (who 
had a perfect right to be on the high seas — never before in 
the history of civilization were people absolutely denied the 
use of the open sea) — then boasted of her achievement and 
celebrated these murders with holidays and rejoicing! Is 
not the case sufficiently plain? The Judge of all has told 
us that "Life is more than meat, and the body more than 
raiment." 

We have omitted treatment of some of the lesser and im- 
mediate causes of this war, as well as several of the pretexts 
and excuses, but we feel they are not important enough to 
demand further space and consideration in this work. 

In our next month's article we shall begin an outline and 
suggestions by which the war may be studied in our schools, 
— after which the questions of peace will be taken up and 
studied carefully. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS (1911-1913) 

THE Turko-Italian war of 1911, in which the Italians 
so readily overcame the Turks, opened the eyes of the 
Balkan nations, and convinced them that the time was oppor- 
tune for a concerted movement to drive the "unspeakable 
Turk" out of Europe, and especially, out of Balkan affairs. 
Turkey had proven herself much weaker than was generally 
anticipated, and her once tributary states in Europe were 
now confident of victory and the fruits of victory, in the 
rounding out of their own nationalities and patriotic as- 
pirations. Thus did the Italians' victory over the Turks in 
1911 lead directly and immediately to the greater victory of 
the little Balkan states the next year. They knew that their 
triumph would eliminate the rule of the Ottoman entirely 
from Europe, if only the great European powers would leave 
them alone. As the great powers had a number of times in- 
tervened in their struggles with Turkey previously, however, 
they knew that possibility of intervention still existed. But 
their chance to win was such that they would run the risk 
anyway, in the hope that the justice of their cause would 
stay the meddling hand. And so war came. 

As indicated above, the First Balkan war came as a result 
of the universal conviction of the Balkan states that the 
time had come to throw off the last remnants of Turkish 
tyranny, and drive the monster out of Europe. Their strong 
national feeling and ambition to rule over all the people of 
their own blood fed the flame. 

The Second Balkan war was a fight over the division of 
the spoils of victory, of which Bulgaria had hardly received 

74 



Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 75 

her just share. This was unfortunate, but it was natural, 
as the victors had come to no previous conclusion as to their 
respective claims in the region conquered. This trouble was 
aggravated by Austria-Hungary's intervention at the close 
of the First war, backed by the "shining sword" of the 
German Kaiser. 

Before the Balkan wars of 1911-13 historians were ac- 
customed to include in the Balkan states Serbia, Montenegro, 
Roumania, Bulgaria, and sometimes Greece. After the First 
Balkan war a separate state, Albania, was set up, due to the 
jealous intervention of Austria. That made six. And 
since Greece received part of the region fought for and has 
also played an important role in the Balkans in the great 
World War, it is right that she be included in the Balkan 
group, as she is, geographically, in the peninsula. Accord- 
ingly, the writer, whenever referring to the Balkan states as 
a whole will include Greece. 

The Balkan question has been for three quarters of a cen- 
tury, and still is, a most complicated and intricate one. As 
already observed in an earlier chapter of this work, the wars 
of the nineteenth century, and particularly of the latter part 
of the century, have been mostly wars of nationality. It 
was to be expected, therefore, that this spirit would mani- 
fest itself strongly in the Balkans and prove a strong moral 
force toward victory. Nevertheless, all the world was sur- 
prised, and little less than astonished at the swift and ter- 
rible defeats that these little states inflicted upon the country 
that but a short time before had held them under its despotic 
sway of crime and massacre. 

The story of the unification of Italy and Germany we 
need not recount here, although they had their remote and 
indirect bearings on the recent Balkan troubles, — especially, 
since they paved the way for the ambitions of Italy along 
the Adriatic, and the mutual jealousies and intrigues of the 
Teutonic and Russian governments in the Near East. And 
the Crimean war (1853-56) needs little more than passing 



76 The Causes Of War 

mention. This war meant for Turkey (a), the abolition of 
Russia's protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and 
of the Czar's claim to special right of intervention in behalf 
of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, (b) closing of the 
Straits to the warships of all nations, and (c), the formal 
admission of Turkey into the family of European powers. 
It marked also a distinct step on the part of several of the 
small Balkan principalities toward freedom from Turkish 
rule, the setting up of independent governments, or their 
protection, control, or annexation by European powers. 
The chief significance of this all is that these small states 
and principalities have ever since remained a continual men- 
ace to the "balance of power" and peace of Europe. So they 
will continue to be if an effective League *of Nations is not 
formed as an immediate outcome of the World war. 

Bulgaria was the last of the original Balkan states to ob- 
tain independence of Turkey. The Bulgarian Exarchate was 
established as a separate religious community March 10, 
1870. This struggle resulted in a movement toward nation- 
ality. Bulgarian insurrections against Turkey broke out 
in 1875-6, and these led in turn to the Russo-Turkish war 
and the virtual loss of Bulgaria to Turkey, in 1878. Since 
that time the Bulgarians have looked to Russia repeatedly 
for aid, and have considered her their best friend and pro- 
tector, until the period immediately before the Balkan wars, 
when their German rulers began to veer them toward the 
Central powers. Bulgaria's defeat in the Second Balkan 
war, 1913, at the hands of the other Balkan states sealed 
her alliance with the Teutonic powers and Turkey ; and that 
explains her line-up in the World War. She had gained her 
final independence from Turkey in 1908. 

By the Congress of Berlin, concluded in July 1878, at the 
close of the Russo-Turkish war alluded to above, Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia and Montenegro 
were severed from direct rule by the Sultan. Montenegro, 
Serbia and Roumania achieved their complete independence 



Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 77 

at this time, while Bulgaria was a Turkish protectorate in 
name at least, until 1908, as stated above. 

From the remote past the different peoples of the Balkan 
peninsula have inherited racial animosities and political 
troubles and confusion. The Bulgarians resented the "ty- 
ranny" of the Greeks in ecclesiastical and educational mat- 
ters. The Albanians have always been wild and ungovern- 
able and unable to assimulate the benefits of ordered govern- 
ment and society. The Roumanians prided themselves in 
their Roman stock and traditions and held apart from the 
other peoples of the peninsula. As is stated in the Rand- 
McNally Atlas (p.4&): 

For 1000 years the Balkan Peninsula has suffered from political con- 
fusion due in part to its geographical position, which made it the meet- 
ing-ground of conflicting races and religions. In ancient times it was 
occupied by various branches of the Aldan stock, the Thracians in the 
northeast, the Illyrians in the northwest, and the Greeks in the south, 
whose commingling gave rise to the mixed Macedonian type inhabiting 
the northern central part of the peninsula. Under Roman, and espe- 
cially under Byzantine rule, it attained its highest development, Con- 
stantinople becoming the chief center of the world's civilization and 
commerce. In the seventh century, A.D., the Servians and Bulgarians, 
of Slavonic stock, pressed southward into the peninsula, driving the 
Greeks before them to the south, the Illyrians (ancestors of the present 
Albanians) to the southwest, and the Romans back toward the north- 
west. The introduction of Christianity in the ninth century marked the 
transition from barbarism to civilization. For a time the Bulgarians 
were masters of the peninsula, but in the fourteenth century the Servians 
established a short-lived supremacy which by the defeat of their army 
in 1389, followed by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave way before 
the irresistible advance of the Turk. Four centuries of retrogression 
ensued, during which the peninsula, with the exception of Dalmatia in 
the northwest, which continued under Venetian and later passed under 
Austrian rule, was abandoned to almost hopeless barbarity. It was not 
until the nineteenth century that the almost smothered germs of national 
vitality were quickened again under Russian influence, and that the 
Balkan peoples were aroused to struggle for freedom from the yoke of 
the "unspeakable" Turk. 

Coming back to recent years, we find that Bulgaria's de- 
sire to annex neighboring parts of European Turkey in- 
habited by Slav, especially Macedonia, was widely cherished, 
and more or less tension existed with Serbia, Greece and 
Austria even before the first Balkan war. It was also realized 



78 The Causes Of War 

that strategically Roumania 9 s position was one of command- 
ing importance. This can easily be seen by a glance at the 
map, which will show the peculiar shape and frontiers of 
Roumania. She has stood in the pathway of both Teuton 
and Russian advance toward the regions beyond the Black 
Sea, and, second only to Serbia, in these same powers' path 
to the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor and the Orient. 
Thus, the security of Roumania, like the other small states 
of this region, depended upon a delicate tension of inter- 
national relations that has justly been called the "powder- 
box" of Europe. And even now, let me repeat, only a strong 
League of Nations can guarantee peace in this troublesome 
region in the future. 

As Bulgaria was the last of the Balkan states (save only 
Albania) to gain her complete independence of Turkey, so 
Serbia was the first (save only Greece). But that did not 
make hers a stable government. She virtually gained her in- 
dependence in 1829, immediately after Greece became free 
from Turkey. And complete independence was given her by 
the treaty of Berlin, 1878. Her progress, considering her 
opportunity has been disappointing, — the most so of all the 
Balkan states ; and this has made her all the more a prey to 
Austrian and German intrigues. The new Jugo-Slav state, 
however, with a greater Serbia as the nucleus, gives promise 
of better things for the future. 

It was a general conviction of the students of the Balkan 
affairs just previous to the World War that, in case of a 
breakout of war in this region, the Central Powers and 
Russia would each attempt to seize as big a slice of the Bal- 
kan regions as possible ; the Russians would make for Con- 
stantinople, the Austrians for Serbia, Macedonia and the 
Saloniki coast ; the English would make for the Dardanelles, 
to protect their Eastern possessions ; the French for Rhodes, 
parts of Asia Minor and Syria, and the Italians for Albania 
and the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic. They were not 
very far wrong when the World War came. Said M. Berard: 



Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 79 

"The outcome cannot be anything but a general European 
war of the most terrible kind." (See Victor Berard, "The 
Balkan Question," Villari volume, with Introduction by 
James Bryce.) 

Italy's interest and part in the Balkan question in this 
period was summed up by an Italian as follows : — "Italy has 
every interest in preventing the influence of Austria and 
Russia in Macedonia from extending and being gradually 
converted into a more or less effective dominion." — (By an 
Italian deputy.) This feeling and interest explains the 
tenacity with which the Italian delegates to the peace con- 
ference cling to their shadowy claim to Albania and the 
southern Adriatic coast. 

While studying the Balkan situation just previous to the 
First Balkan war in 1911 the author of the present volume 
made this statement : "The idea prevails in Europe that 
the time has come for the solution of this most perplexing 
problem. England seems most anxious that this be speedily 
accomplished. According to Mr. Bryce there are two solu- 
tions. One is the absorbing of the existing nationalities into 
the great dominions and great nations which border upon 
Turkey. The other is the growth of these nationalities, or 
some of them, into nations and states. The latter, I think is 
the more satisfactory solution, and will prove the more likely, 
providing the great powers do not injustly intervene. Mr. 
Bryce concludes his chapter ('Introduction to the Eastern 
Question') with these words: 'He who, looking above and 
beyond the dust of current politics, will try to fix his eyes, 
as Mr. Gladstone did, upon the heights of a more distant 
landscape, will find reason to think that the development of 
these nationalities has in it more promise for the future than 
the extension of the sway of one or two huge military em- 
pires, and will believe that to encourage and help them to 
grow into nations is an aim to which such great and en- 
lightened peoples as those of England, France and Italy 
may fitly direct their efforts.' " This is ample evidence to the 



80 The Causes Of War 

writer's mind, of Great Britain's more liberal policy in inter- 
national politics in recent years, under the wise tutelage and 
leadership of such men as Gladstone and Lord Bryce. And 
as a sequel to this statement that I made eight years ago, 
let me say that the present Jugo-Slav movement has been 
made acceptable to the Allied nations through such earlier 
championship as that mentioned in the above quotation. It 
is not a new movement, born of the War, but is now, because 
of the World War, realizable beyond the fondest hopes of 
its early champions. 

We have omitted at this point of our study of the causes 
of war in recent years, any separate treatment of the causes 
of the Turko-Italian war of 1911, because we gave rather a 
detailed statement of the underlying cause and the meaning 
of this war in our chapter in which we treated wars of nation- 
ality of which this one between Italy and Turkey is (on 
Italy's part) the most prominent one of the twentieth cen- 
tury, previous to the World War. We may add in passing, 
however, that there was a good deal of sentiment, the vision 
and memory of the glories of ancient Rome and her sway over 
the land of the Carthagenians, — in the zeal with which the 
Italians fought the Turks and their subjects in northern Af- 
rica. Then too, this war meant one of the final steps in the 
unification of Italy, as the Italians conceived a united Italy 
to be, — the same thing that led them to enter the World War 
against Austria, for the provinces of the Trentino and 
Trieste. 



CHAPTER IX 

CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904) 

THE cause of the war for Japan was mostly economic 
rather than political. 1 It goes back to the enormous 
increase in Japan's population, the growth of her industries 
and commerce, and on the other hand to the inadequateness 
of her agriculture to supply a living for her growing popu- 
lation or to produce sufficient raw material for her manu- 
factures. For these very reasons, Japan has felt that she 
could not allow any other nation to secure a controlling in- 
fluence in any part of the Chinese Empire, much less in 
Korea. 2 

With Russia, the cause was primarily political rather than 
economic. It was therefore less vital than that of Japan. 
Economically, Russia had no such reason for bringing on 
such a conflict as had Japan. She is able to take care of 
herself for a long time to come, in that respect. 

Russia's great political aim, as Professor Hershey states, 
was to gain access to the sea in four directions, viz. : Black 
Sea and Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Persian Gulf, Pacific 
Ocean. 3 This has been her vision and ambition ever since 
the time of Peter the Great. She is still actively striving 
for all but the northern one of these. (And in passing it 
may be observed that this desire to secure such outlets helps 
to explain, to a considerable degree, many of the nineteenth 
century wars in these regions and is no small contributory 
cause to those conflicts.) 

1 Hershey, "Int. Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War," p. 2. 

1 "The Japanese people have grown to such numbers that they need an 
outlet beyond the sea and cannot resign into strong hands their nearest 
field for colonization and expansion"; Lawrence, p. 2. 

•Hershey, p. 3. 

81 



82 The Causes Of War 

Expansion in the direction of the Pacific has seemed to 
Russia to involve the least resistance as well as being of im- 
mense importance to her in Oriental politics and commer- 
cial influence. 

Her great efforts of recent years have been directed toward 
securing an ice-free port on the Pacific. This was directly 
her reason for the occupation of Korea. 

While the relations of Russia with the Far East go back 
to the conquest of Siberia and even farther, we are par- 
ticularly concerned here only with her advances in the latter 
part of the 19th century. 4 

In 1867 Russia got a strong hold on the island of Sag- 
halien. She exercised joint sovereignty with Japan over the 
island. In 1875 she found means to oust Japan and appro- 
priated the whole island to herself. This is an excellent ex- 
ample of Russian unscruplousness that was bound, sooner or 
later, to be met by the desperate revenge of the Japanese. 
Such action of Russia only helped on the Europeanizing of 
Japan to meet her hated rival in the Far East. 

The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into 
collision, arose from Russia's construction of the Trans- 

4 The history of Russian politics in Manchuria may be divided into 
four periods: 

(1) From the beginning (three centuries back) to the "Cassini Con- 

vention," 1896, which conceded to her first privileges in the 
North of this province, — principally the right to build the 
Trans-Siberian Railway across the Chinese territory to Vlad- 
ivostock. 

(2) From 1896 to the Boxer Uprising, 1900. During this period 

Russia obtained the cession on lease of Port Arthur and the 
right to prolong the Railroad to this port by a branch which 
traverses all Manchuria. 

(3) From 1900 to the agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria, 

1902. Boxer uprising gave Russia the pretext and occasion 
to conquer Manchuria and establish herself there firmly. 

(4) From 1902 to the outbreak of War (Feb., 1904). Convention 

signed with China for evacuation of Manchuria — followed by 
period of negotiations — in which Japan distinguishes herself 
by her opposition to Russia and brings on the War. — Ac- 
cording to M. Rey, on Causes of Russo-Japanese War in 
Revue General de Droit International Public, V, XII, 215-ff. 



Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1901/,) 83 

Siberian Railway to the Pacific, with the end in view (her 
long cherished hope) of securing an ice-free port on the 
Pacific. 

Railroads in the Far East have been the forerunners and 
occasions of war. Russia was trying to grasp a port that 
was not hers. She under-estimated the fatal consequences 
of such an action. 

If Russia had confined her aggressive movements to Man- 
churia alone, the present history of the Far East would 
doubtless have been far different. But, to secure her ends, 
she made similar encroachments in Korea, particularly in 
interfering in this peninsula after the China-Japanese War. 5 

Korea had been tributary to both China and Japan for 
centuries. She claimed independence at various times. In 
1875, the Koreans fired upon a Japanese man-of-war and 
in redress were forced to open trade with Japan and re- 
ceive a Japanese minister at the Korean Court. 

China unwillingly gave up her suzerainty over Korea, 
1875-85. She now agreed with Japan that if events should 
necessitate Chinese or Japanese troops in Korea and either 
sent troops, the other should be notified. In 1894 on the 
abduction and assassination of a Korean rebel, Chinese and 
Japanese troops were sent. Reforms in the Korean govern- 
ment were now urged by Japan. 6 China refused to consent 
to these reforms. Japan gave her ultimatum, following 
up with the capture of the Korean capital and king. 7 Both 
empires then prepared for war and in July, 1894, the con- 

6 See Hershey, "Int. Law & Dip. of Rus.-Jap. War, p. 36. 

8 In 1868 Japan, making up from feudalism to the modern type of 
government determined to reassert her former claims upon Korea. The 
Koreans insolently refused this vassalage. Japan recognized Korea's 
independence in 1876 but new ports were opened to Japanese trade in 
1880. 

1 1t was Korea's opposition to the "open door" policy which led to the 
intervention of Japan and China and the stationing of Chinese and 
Japanese troops in Korea. Another insurrection in Korea in 1894, 
brought Chinese and Japanese troops face to face again and was fol- 
lowed by the Chino-Jap. War in 1895. 



84 The Causes Of War 

flict began. 8 Peace was made in March, 1895. China ceded 
Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa to Japan. 

The terms of peace of the Chino-Japanese War having 
given Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with an important ice- 
free port, the outcome of the war afforded Russia an op- 
portunity to administer a severe blow to Japan and in- 
gratiate herself with China. This was accomplished by Rus- 
sia leading in a Russo-French-German "recommendation" 9 
to Japan not to take possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. 
Backed by France and Germany, she intervened with a 
threat, saying that Japan's possession of the peninsula 
would be a "perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the 
Far East." 10 Japan, under this pressure, gave up the 
peninsula to China. She relinquished all her claim Novem- 
ber 8, 1895, for a consideration of 30,000,000 taels. This 
was one of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War — It was 
another wound to Japanese pride that was to be avenged 
later at the expense of Russia. It simply hastened the 
struggle, however, for war, sooner or later, was inevitable. 

8 As Hazen gives it, "The immediate cause was the relations of the 
two powers to Korea." 

"The Recommendation is as follows: "The imperial Russian Govern- 
ment having examined the terms of peace demanded by Japan of China, 
consider the contemplated possession of the Liaotung peninsula by 
Japan will not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, 
but will also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeop- 
ardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, the Imperial 
Government, in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan, hereby counsel 
the Government of the Emperor of Japan to renounce the definitive 
possession of the Liaotung peninsula. Lawrence, p. 11. 

10 "The insincerity of the powers in talking about the integrity of 
China and the peace of the East was not long in manifesting itself. 
The intervening powers immediately set about reaping their reward. 
Russia secured the right to run the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian 
railroad across Manchuria, a province of China, to Vladivostock, and 
to construct a branch line south from Harbin into the Liaotung penin- 
sula, with a terminus at Talienwan. At the end of a certain time, and 
under certain conditions this railroad was to pass into the possession 
of China, but meanwhile Russia was given the right to send her own 
soldiers into Manchuria to guard it. This was the beginning of Russian 
control of Manchuria. She poured tens of thousands of troops into that 
Chinese province and gradually acted as if it were Russian. She also 
acquired extensive mineral and timber rights in the province. Hazen, 
"Europe Since 1815," p. 697. 



Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (WOJ^) 85 

The establishment of the Russo-Chinese bank was another 
event which offended Japan. The treaty of 1896 between 
China and Russia opened up all the harbors of China to 
Russia. 

In January, 1898, she got control of the Liaotung Penin- 
sula for twenty-five years through pressure and a threat of 
war on England if England refused it. In the words of Mr. 
Rose, "Port Arthur was to become the Gibraltar of the Far 
East." u What did this mean? 12 It meant that the Czar 
of Russia had compelled China to cede to his already enor- 
mous empire the very peninsula whose acquisition by "little 
Japan," had been pronounced by the European powers to 
be an unwarrantable disturbance of the balance of power in 
the East. No greater insult could have been given the 
Japanese government and people. 13 There is no questioning 
the fact that mis-government in Korea was a real menace to 
the peace of the East. By the natural course of events it 
would offer a ready prey to Russia whenever she should 
choose to lay hands on it. 

For a long time in Japan there had been a strong war 
party in favor of overrunning Korea and repeatedly with 
difficulty it was kept down. 

The Queen of Korea, in 1895, believed that the welfare 
of her country depended on continued association with China 
and the preservation of Chinese standards of civilization. 

The Japanese became complicated in her murder, October, 
1895. The king took refuge in Russian legation at Seol 

"Rose, II, p. 317. 

u "That Russia did not look upon her possession as merely a short 
lease, but as a permanent one, was unmistakably shown by her conduct. 
She constructed a railroad south from Harbin, connecting with the 
Trans-Siberian. She threw thousands of troops into Manchuria; she 
set about immensely strengthening Port Arthur as a fortress, and a 
considerable fleet was stationed there. To the Japanese all this seemed 
to prove that she supposed ultimately to annex the immense province of 
Manchuria, and later probably Korea, which would give her a large 
number of ice-free harbors and place her in a dominant position on the 
Pacific, menacing, the Japanese felt, the very existence of Japan." — Rose. 

18 Rose, II, p. 317. 



86 The Causes Of War 

and Japan had a terrible indemnity to pay, for the Russo- 
Japanese war had this murder as a remote cause. Russian 
influence had taken the place of the Japanese and all that 
Japan had done in the past was undone. Korea was rapidly 
becoming a Russian possession when the Russo-Japanese war 
broke out and Japan thus recovered her control over 
Korea. 14 

Japan now realized, if never before, the ultimate object 
of Russia and that war was the only recourse left to the 
island nation, if she was to be an important factor in Oriental 
affairs. 15 

"In 1898 an agreement was signed by Russia and Japan which put 
Japan on an equal footing with Russia and Korea. But rivalry between 
the two nations, Russia and Japan, continued and Russia undoubtedly 
was the aggressor. Russia pressed continually for further leases in the 
country. This was a source of great anxiety to Japan. Russian soldiers 
were actually occupying the country, not simply protecting Russian 
interests. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria 
by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and 
interests of Japan. If Russia was established on the flank of Korea it 
would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire. 
Korea is an important outpost of Japan's line of defense, and Japan 
considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and 
safety." Hershey, pp. 52-3, quoting from correspondence between Japan 
and Russia, translated by Asakawa, p. 29. 

15 As Lawrence remarks, "It is a matter of life and death for Japan 
to keep Korea out of the hands of any strong and aggressive state. 
F. J. Lawrence, "War and Neutrality in the Far East," p. 1. 

Russia was disposed to maintain that the question of negotiation 
between her and China concerning Manchuria and Korea were not of a 
nature to be submitted to other nations. In fairness to her it must be 
conceded that there was some ground for Russian position and attitude 
in the Far East, and for her delay in withdrawing her troops from 
Manchuria. This, however, does not excuse her for repeated breaches 
of trust with China and the other powers concerned. The Russian posi- 
tion is perhaps nowhere better stated than by Count Lansdorff (on 27th 
of January, 1902), Sec. Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 929. He says: "The 
imperial government of Russia has no intention of dealing a blow to 
the principle of the 'open door' as she understands it, and Russia has 
not the least intention, at this moment to modify her political stand on 
this point. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in 
China, the agreement of a private character relative to those concessions 
would not be different from those concluded at other times by many 
other foreign corporations. But, would it not be truly strange if the 
Door which is opened to certain nations were closed to Russia, whose 



Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1904) 87 

Articles were now prepared by the Japanese Govern- 
ment as the basis of understanding. The essential features 
were: 

1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, 
and to maintain the "open door" in these countries, and 2, a 
reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in 
Korea and of Russia's special interests in Manchuria. 

Russia's reply after eight weeks was substantially as fol- 
lows: 

1. The mutual engagement to respect the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 

2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating 
interest in Korea. 

3. Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to 
Korea. 

4. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the ter- 

frontiers join those of Manchuria, when she has been forced by recent 
events to send her troops into this province to reestablish order in the 
evident and common interest of all nations? It is true that Russia has 
conquered Manchuria, but she maintains her firm determination to 
restore it to China and to recall her troops as soon as the necessary 
measures are taken to avoid an outbreak of trouble in the neighboring 
territories. It is impossible to deny that an independent state has the 
right to accord to others such concessions, and I have some reason to 
believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not exceed — 
those which have been so often formulated by other foreign Societies. 
I judge that, in these circumstances, it would not be easy for the im- 
perial government to refuse to Russian societies — that which is given 
by other governments to Societies and syndicates of their own nation- 
ality." — M. Rey, in Causes of Russo-Japanese War in Revue General 
De Droit International Public, XII, 267. 

"Russia was not disposed to abandon Manchuria and it was manifest 
that she was seeking only pretexts for putting off the date of evacua- 
tion."— Rey, p. 276. 

La Russe h'a pas le droit d'abandonner ses interests en Manchourie 
et ne peut sortir de la voie qu'elle s'est trac'ee. Elle ne pourra retirer 
ses troupes de Manchourie que lorsqu elle sera convaincue qu'il n'existe 
plus de danger pour ses possessions et commencera le peuplement de la 
zone de son cheinen de fer guand elle le jugera a propor. — Rey, p. 216, 
French translation of one of the many official Russian statements on 
this affair. 



88 The Causes Of War 

ritory of Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel 
as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting 
parties shall introduce troops. 

5. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral 
as in all respects outside her sphere of interests. 

In the meantime, Russia's aggression, both in Manchuria 
and Korea, was increasing daily. 

The Boxer uprising in China in 1900 "added fresh causes 
of quarrel to those already in existence." The Chinese 
authorities in Manchuria attacked the "foreign" Russian 
officials and settlers there. In a very short time the whole 
province was in Russian military occupation. 

"It will thus be seen that in these counter-proposals Rus- 
sia not only reduced Japan's demands regarding Korea, but 
imposed new conditions upon Japan in that country. But — 
most significant of all — she quietly ignored the most im- 
portant part of Article I of the Japanese proposals, viz., 
that part which stipulated for a mutual agreement to re- 
spect the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Chinese Empire and to maintain the 'open door' in China and 
Korea," 16 . . . "if not indeed to preserve her status as an 
independent state for the future. 

"It became to her as clear as daylight that the new po- 
sition she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over 
China could be maintained and even her independence must 
be guarded only by an armament powerful enough to give 
her a voice among the first powers of the world." 17 

Russia's methods were practically without scruple. Neither 
the 'Russian Court nor the officials and army in Manchuria 
and Korea could be relied on for the fulfillment of their 
promises to China, Japan, Korea or any of the European 
nations. She withdrew her troops from the southwest of 
Mukden province by October 8, 1902. On the date set for 

le Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War, 
p. 56. 

"Idem, p. 9. Quoted from Asakana's "The Russo-Jap. Conflict," pp. 
79-80. 



Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (190£) 89 

her withdrawal from the remainder of the province, how- 
ever, April 8, 1903, she was still in full occupancy and it 
was evident that not even a nominal withdrawal was in- 
tended." 18 

Russia's persistent failure in the face of repeated promises 
to withdraw her troops from China after the Boxer upris- 
ing led directly, we may say, to the outbreak of hostilities 
with Japan. 19 

"The inspiring force which moved some 40,000 men gladly 
to lay down their lives on the hills around Port Arthur was 
the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face 
of Russia, the gauntlet which she had there so insolently 
flung down as to an inferior race." 20 

Russia's demands of China in 1903, among other things, 
included the closing of Manchuria against the economic en- 
terprises of all foreigners except Russians and the opening 
of no new treaty-ports without Russia's consent. 21 

The final year of negotiation (1904) had come. After 
three successive overtures of the Japanese government to 
Russia, the views of the two governments were apparently 
as irreconcilable as ever. Japan made still a fourth at- 
tempt to obtain a favorable reply from Russia, and its pro- 
visions were as follows: 

1. Suppression of the clause (in Article 5) requiring 
Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical pur- 
poses. 

£. Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning the 
establishment of a neutral zone. 

3. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral 
as being outside her sphere of interest, provided that Rus- 
sia will engage (a) to respect the territorial integrity of 
China and Manchuria, (b) to recognize the treaty rights, 
including those of the settlement of Japan and other Powers 

18 Hershey, Int. Law & Dip. of Russo-Jap. War, pp. 33-4. 
"See Rose, pp. 318-19. 
"Rose, p. 319. 
a Idem, p. 35. 



90 The Causes Of War 

in Manchuria, (c) to recognize Korea and its littoral as be- 
ing outside her sphere of interest. 

4. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in 
Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures 
necessary for the protection of those interests. 

The Russian reply to this last proposal of Japan was not 
returned until Feb. 7, 1904, the day after diplomatic rela- 
tions between the two countries had ceased. Thus we see 
that Russia's persistent delay in withdrawing her troops 
from Chinese territory in the year after the Boxer uprising 
led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. 

Japan "had expended much blood and treasure in order to 
secure a predominating interest in the Korean peninsula. 
. . . The rapid growth of Russian power in the Pacific 
coasts, the enforced cession of Saghalien in 1875, and of the 
Liaotung Peninsula with the hard-won Port Arthur 20 
years later, had aroused profound distrust of Russian poli- 
cies in the minds of Japanese statesmen." 22 

Without attempting to give all the factors that bore upon 
the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan, we 
may reduce the fundamental causes of the war to two, viz. : 
(1) Russia's determination to secure if possible, an ice-free 
port on the Pacific, with Russian control of Manchuria and 
Korea — mainly a political interest; (£) Japan's equal de- 
termination that this should not be accomplished — mainly 
an economic interest and question of ultimate self-preserva- 
tion. 

28 C. M. Hist., XII, p. 577. 



CHAPTER X 



CAUSES OF THE BRITISH-BOER WAR 

THE American press and people in general have been 
inclined to lay the blame of this war almost entirely on 
the British. 1 They have done this more or less blindly, 

1 British occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town 
was surrendered to the English. In the London Convention of 1814, the 
Dutch surrendered to the English Crown their claims to Cape Colony 
and some other adjacent territory, for a consideration of £6,000,000 ster- 
ling. British immigration to South Africa began about the year 1819. 
In 1825 an Executive Council was appointed to assist the Governor of 
the colony. In 1828 the Hottentots received equal rights in the law 
(courts) with the Europeans. In the years 1833-5 the abolition of 
slavery was accomplished. This was accompanied by disturbances that 
assumed serious proportions. Discontent with the British rule had not 
been wholly lacking before; as a result of the liberties given them in 
1828, the Hottentots had broken loose from several restraints imposed 
upon them formerly, by the English administration; there had been 
considerable friction before the Dutch were ready to surrender Cape 
Colony, in 1814; but these were as nothing compared with the storm that 
arose in 1834. "The great wrong which stirred the Dutch to the depths 
was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1834." Green: "Causes 
of South African War," p. 5. And Doyle, who has written perhaps the 
best account of the causes and events leading up to the final war, says: 
"The emancipation of slaves in 1834 fanned the smouldering discontents 
into a flame." Doyle: "The War in South Africa," p. 5. 

There were two reasons for this outburst, (1) A very inadequate sum 
was appropriated for the slave-owners in return for the loss of their 
slaves. (2) The money was paid over in London, and because of this 
fact, the colonists received but little of it. This worked a real hardship 
to the Boer farmers. It meant beggary to a number of them. The war 
of 1834-5, waged by the British against the Kaffirs, was very unjust to 
the latter, and they were almost immediately restored to their former 
homes. Many of the Boer farmers now determined to leave the colony, 
and migrate farther inland, away from the domination of the British. 
The first trek was in 1836. The long journey, with its perils and hard- 
ships, broke up all local self-government and the science of cooking, etc., 
and put these Boers back into their medieval ancestral type of govern- 
ment and individual liberty. This backward step in civilization is no 
small factor in explaining the failure of the British to conciliate the 
Boers, and the gradual growth of a hostile spirit that was to culminate 
in war of the two races. 

In 1848 Sir Harry Smith was sent out as Governor of the Colony. He 

91 



92 The Causes Of War 

through prejudice, or without a sufficient knowledge of the 
facts. There are not lacking, however, in this country as well 
as in England, eminent authorities who justify for the most 
part, if not altogether, England's action and policy in South 
Africa. Indeed, opinion seems to be pretty evenly divided, 
among those who are in a position to judge wisely and im- 
partially. Green, in his "Causes of the War in South 
Africa," is decidedly favorable to Great Britain. He con- 
tends and rightly, that the rule of Great Britain was a 
distinct advance and uplift for the Boers as well as the 
natives ; that the Boer and not the English administration 
was the oppressor of the natives, and that it was liberty only 
for himself that the Boer sought ; Doyle, 2 who can hardly be 
denied the merit of making a studied attempt to be fair and 
unprejudiced in his account, feels that it is his duty as 
well as his right, to defend his country against much of the 
abuse that has been heaped upon it, and to vindicate for the 
most part, her policy. Among other things he says : "That 
to no one of the British states has she ever had a more 

declared the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British Territory. 
This led to war. England was victorious, but had to give up the Orange 
River Sovereignty, because the Home government did not sufficiently 
support the Governor. Sir Geo. Grey was the next governor, 1854-9. 
His was a wise rule. The franchise was made liberal and representative 
government was established. Meanwhile, the Boer government in the 
Transvaal had become very chaotic. Finances were in a deplorable 
condition. The people were oppressively taxed. However, in 1857 the 
Transvaal Republic was launched. This was followed by civil war, 
which dragged on for some time. In 18T1 the discovery of diamonds 
and the foundation of Kimberly opened a new era for this troublesome 
and disputed territory. The year 1872 marks the beginning of respon- 
sible government in the original Cape Colony of South Africa. Cecil 
Rhodes came over in 1871. 

Diamond region (around Kimberly) was claimed by (1) Orange Free 
State; (2) Transvaal Republic; (3) an individual, named Waterboer. 
Waterboer placed himself under the British government, which pres- 
ently erected the country into a crown colony (in 1871). Later investi- 
gations found that Waterboer had never enjoyed any right to the terri- 
tory. The British government, claiming that a strong power was neces- 
sary to preserve the peace and govern the people offered the Free State 
£90,000 sterling for its claim to the colony. This was accepted, and 
the controversy was closed, although a sense of un justice continued to 
rankle in the breasts of many of its citizens. Bryce, pp. 148-49. 

3 Doyle, A. C: "The War in South Africa." 



Causes of the British-Boer War 93 

incontestible right," than to this, both by the right of con- 
quest and the right of purchase ; that England had the same 
kind of a problem the United States would have had if the 
Dutch of Pennsylvania had moved West and set up a differ- 
ent form of government from that of the United States, and 
United States had come in contact with this foreign govern- 
ment in her westward expansion. Mr. James Bryce, whose 
opinion always carries weight and merits the greatest con- 
sideration, while admitting on the one hand evils of the Eng- 
lish rule, her many mistakes and blunders, on the other hand 
in the general policy and administration of the English 
rule, justifies his government. He states that the Boers had 
gone backward in civilization; were separated for two cen- 
turies from European culture and political systems ; that 
they would not work the gold when they found it, had an 
aversion for commerce, industrial pursuits, and finance, and 
absolute incapacity for such pursuits ; that into this con- 
dition it was that there came the swarm of gold-seekers after 
1884. Sanderson, another English author, while excusing his 
country still less than Bryce, still cannot lay the blame of 
the war upon his government, although he does hold Cecil 
Rhodes somewhat responsible. 

On the other hand, there are both moderate and violent 
partisans of the Boers' cause and actions. Of the former 
class the French author Despagnet is a good example. He 
dismisses from the very first any of the alleged grievances 
of the British as real causes of the war. On what he con- 
siders as the fundamental cause, he comments as follows : 

"It is in the general schemes of English politics for several 
years that we are to seek the true motives of the war and 
this war itself is only one manifestation, the most grave it is 
true, of the end pursued by Great Britain since she has 
become dominated by aspirations of quasi-universal su- 
premacy disguised under the name of imperialism." This 
very expression is used by another Frenchman (Peyronnard) 
in his "Des Causes de la Gueire, quoted fr. R. G. C. I, 



94 The Causes Of War 

VII, p. 85, It is his opinion that the war was not 
only not justified by any of the alleged grievances, but not 
even explained by them. Continuing, he says : "Is it, then, 
a war of races : — that of the Anglo-Saxon against the Dutch 
in South Africa?" "No!" answers Mr. Westlake: "It is a 
war for an ideal." That ideal is the English policy of lib- 
eral government, of equality of rights to all as against the 
Boer regime of domination and privilege. 3 (The author 
[Despagnet] gives it as his view that it can hardly be be- 
lieved that England would go into such a war merely for an 
ideal.) 

Another claim of some English authors is — according to 
Despagnet — that, Great Britain, having once acquired au- 
thority in certain regions, finds herself obligated to de- 
fend the interests which she has developed there, and it is 
natural and just that the neighboring districts become tribu- 
tary to her, because they will grow normally or naturally 
into the sphere of her influence. 

The real policy he insists is found in the triumph of the 
imperialistic idea in England and the principal cause of the 
war is the pressure of financiers and speculators engaged in 
the gold mines. He holds D'Israeli chiefly responsible for the 
imperialism-political evolution as he designates it, of Eng- 
land, that brought on her conquests in South Africa. 

The German press and people, as we would naturally ex- 
pect, were rather violently opposed to Great Britain in this 
war. The extreme sentiment is voiced by the historian, Theo- 
dore Monsen, in giving what he considers as the feeling in 
Germany toward England, and particularly on the British- 
Boer War. Among other things he says: 

"The radical defects of the English system, the trampling 
on nations subjugated and despised, and the prevalence of 
money interests . . . has become too evident .... As far 
as I know, every German is at heart with the Boers, and 
that not because their cousinship is a little closer than the 

8 See Westlake, The Transvaal War, pp. 1 to 5. 



Causes of the British-Boer War 95 

English, but partly because the hate against your country- 
men has reached fearful . . . dimensions ; partly because 
this war is not only a calamity . . . but an infamy." What 
a joke this statement is, considering Germany's treatment 
of her colonies ! 

In our study of the motives and immediate and remote 
causes of this war, we find that there is quite a complexity 
of interests and provocations, some quite vague and flimsy 
and others more clearly manifest and certain. 

It is Mr. Doyle's opinion that it was a dangerous ven- 
ture for Great Britain to change the habits of this most 
conservative Teutonic stock of people. If she had not 
tried this, conciliation might have succeeded (beginning with 
1814.) He holds England responsible for the war in the 
following respects: 

1. Severe and injudicious punishment of Dutch farmers. 
Dutch could not forget it. 

2. Emancipation of slaves, 1834, "fanned the smolder- 
ing discontents into a flame." 

3. The Boers moved into Natal to get away from the 
British, but when they got there, they found that the English 
had preceded them in occupation — by sea. An unwelcome 
information indeed. (In leaving Natal, the Boers left what 
they had fought the fierce Zulus to gain and could not leave 
it but with a sense of deep injury to themselves.) 

4. Delay in promised reforms after the annexation (in 
1877) and an unsuitable governor, 4 — Sir Owen Lanyon. 

Montague White, former Consul General of South Afri- 
can Republic in London, classifies the causes of the English- 
Boer War substantially as follows: 

1. Discontented and irreconcilable element in Johannes- 
burg — one of the most important factors. 

£. Conservative Dutch farmers intensified in their re- 

4 On the conduct of the Boers as a republic, he says: "Can it be won- 
dered at, that South Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that 
the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown 
in England for the hour of revenge?" 



96 The Causes Of War 

sistance by 65 years of bitter experience with Great Britain. 

3. Sudden inrush of a mining, commercial and speculative 
community. 

4. Clumsy diplomacy. 

5. Greed for gold-capitalism. 

6. Lust for empire (yellow press of London its mouth- 
piece). 

7. Thirst of revenge — remembering defeats and outrages 
upon Englishmen. — N. A. Rev. 170 : 225-ff. 

Captain Mahan, U. S. N. (N. A. Rev. 170, pp. 313-4), 
in discussing the causes of the English-Boer War, holds Eng- 
land responsible in two respects, viz. : 

1. Her insistence that a large alien population in the 
Transvaal be relieved from grievous political and social 
wrongs. 

2. England's claim of the right of suzerainty in this 
matter. 

Causes of the war in South Africa are classified by Mr. 
Green as follows: 

British rulers in various ways annoyed the old inhabitants, 
as for example — 

1. The injudicious introducing of English language 
prematurely into the courts and public offices before the 
people were able to understand it. 

2. Their early military rule was sometimes arbitrary. 

3. Missionaries were a constant source of trouble to 
the Boers because they taught the natives the equality of 
all men before the law, and since they were the only friends 
the poor blacks had, they made it a point of conscience to 
report to London every act of injustice which came to their 
knowledge. 

4. The g*eat wrong which stirred the Dutch to the 
depths was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 
1834— 

a. Insufficient compensation for them. 

b. Paid over in London so that colonists received 



Causes of the British^Boer War 97 

but little of it and this meant beggary to many of the 
colonists. 

The Boers held that emancipation was the crowning 
wrong, that slavery was sanctioned by the Old Testament 
and that people might as well take away their oxen as their 
slaves. This emancipation and squandering of the slave- 
holders money in London led to the "Great Trek" in 1836. 

5. Lack of tact of Great Britain in annexing Transvaal 
republics in 1877. Great Britain was too hasty in her ac- 
tion. 

6. Finally the indiscretion of Britain with regard to 
Transvaal independence. Krugar had been in England and 
had heard Gladstone condemn the high-handed annexation 
of the Transvaal. When Gladstone came into power, how- 
ever, he allowed the annexation to remain as an accomplished 
act. The Boers were bitterly disappointed in his action and 
an insurrection followed, in which the Boers won many noted 
victories. 5 On the other hand we have the Boer injus- 
tices. . . . 

7. Their denial of fundamental and necessary rights and 
privileges to outlanders such as water-supply, sewerage, 
street lights, pavements and proper police; independent 
courts of justice ; rights to plead in English ; English schools, 
etc. These Outlanders, already a majority ruled by a tyran- 
nical and ignorant minority of Boers, thus led to the for- 
mation of the Transvaal National Union, the object of which 
was to agitate reform in 1892. 

8. The Jameson raid in 1895 was a capital blunder. This 

5 Internal independence was restored to the people of the Transvaal 
in 1881 and reaffirmed in 1884. The British in South Africa were indig- 
nant at this action which they called surrender to the Boers. They 
urged complete conquest and control to all South Africa by England. 
This the mother country had scruples against doing, and seemed in the 
ever-increasing probability of a European war, to be unwilling to do. 
The Boers saw nothing in this action but cowardice and from this time 
on they treated the British government as infamous, planned to be 
wholly independent of them and to drive them and their language out 
of all South Africa. 



98 The Causes Of War 

gave Kruger the pretext to say that the Union and even 
the British Cabinet sought to gain its end by force and 
not by reason. It alienated the sympathies of all Dutch 
descent throughout South Africa. 

9. Green is very emphatic in stating that this was a 
war of race opposition and the clash of the two civilizations. 
He says, "It was as if two centuries had run against each 
other." The African Dutchman lived a different life from 
the Europeans — and as a consequence there was no fusion 
in the Transvaal. 

Professor Naville of Geneva considers the corrupting ef- 
fect of a flood of wealth that came without labor to be the 
chief cause of the war. It was, at least, the final cause, 
though not the greatest. If the cause just mentioned might 
have been eliminated, there would not have been the two 
bitter contending forces to fly at each other. There might 
have been a blending of German and English, as there was 
in New York. 

The Causes of the Final Quarrel 

After the discovery of gold in abundance in 1886, there 
was "not a wrong which had driven the Boer from Cape 
Colony which he did not now practice upon the Uitlanders. 
The Pretoria government^ for example, became a most cor- 
rupt oligarchy. 

The wrongs of the Uitlanders he sums up as follows : 

1. Heavily taxed, they provided seven-eighths of the 
revenue of the country. 

2. Despite this prosperity they had brought, they were 
deprived of the right to vote and could by no means influ- 
ence the disposal of the great sums which they were pro- 
viding. 

3. Had no voice in choice or payment of officials. Men 
of the worst private character might be placed with com- 
plete authority over valuable interests. 



Causes of the British-Boer War 99 

4. Had no control over education — though paid the 
taxes. 

5. No power of municipal government — very unsanitary 
and corrupt cities. 

6. Despotic government in the matter of the press and 
the right of public meetings. 

7. Disability from service upon a jury. 

8. Continual harassing of the mining interests by vexa- 
tious legislation. 

(a) Dynamite monopoly. 

(b) Liquor laws — Kaffirs habitually drunk. 

(c) Incompetence and extortions of State-owned 
railroads. 

(d) Surrounding Johannesburg with tolls from 
which the towns had no profits, etc. 6 

Distinct from all the former definite wrongs, it was a con- 
stant irritation to freeborn and progressive men, accus- 
tomed to liberal institutions that they should be despotically 
ruled by corrupt, narrow-minded bigots and buffoons, as 
eighty per cent of their rulers were. 

In defense of the Boers it may be said that if they had 
allowed the Uitlanders privileges and citizenship they would 
soon have usurped the government and they themselves would 
again have been obliged to leave their homes or become mere 
dependents. 

The argument of the Boers would be more valid if they 
had received no benefit from the incomers. The foreigners' 
thrift made the Boers, themselves, rich. "Had President 
Kruger given the franchise generously to the Uitlander, his 
pyramid would have been firm upon its base and not balanced 
upon its apex." 

It was a settled animosity of Kruger and the leading Boers 
against the Uitlanders and the British in general that pre- 

•The salary list had become twenty-four times what it was when Uit- 
landers arrived, and five times the total revenue then in 1899. 



100 The Causes Of War 

vented any compromise or understanding with them. No 
little part of this was due moreover to sheer ignorance on 
the part of the Boers. 

Everyone must admit that Cecil Rhodes, in his zeal for 
the growth of the British power in South Africa, was some- 
what unscrupulous in the use of means to gain that power. 
"He would rather carry a strong position by storm than 
trust to the slower and safer methods of investing and starv- 
ing out the foe." 7 He was responsible for the Jameson Raid, 
in 1895, which is the blackest spot on English rule in South 
Africa, and did more than anything else to turn all the 
Dutch descent against the British and determine to drive 
them out of Africa. While no doubt Jameson went in (at 
that moment) without his authority, Jameson's work was a 
part of Rhodes' larger plan. 

Dr. Jameson took matters into his own hands, it is true. 
This action, however, only revealed Rhodes' deeper scheme 
of taking away the independence of the Transvaal Republic. 
This incident "stopped all prospects of voluntary reform in 
Transvaal, led Orange Free State into active sympathy with 
her and plunged all South Africa into a turmoil of race 
hostility which culminated finally in the British-Boer War. 

The grievances of the Uitlanders became heavier than ever 
after the Jameson raid. 

A petition to the Queen of England, signed by 21,000 Uit- 
landers, was now gotten up. The petition was answered 
and the war and final crisis came. This petition reads as 
follows : 

"The condition of your Majesty's subjects in this State 
has indeed become well-nigh intolerable. 

"The acknowledged and admitted grievances of which your 
Majesty's subjects complained prior to 1895, not only are 
not redressed, but exists today in an aggravated form. They 
are still deprived of all political rights, they are denied any 
voice in the government of the country, they are taxed far 
7 Sanderson, p. 284. 



Causes of the British-Boer War 101 

above the requirements of the country, the revenue of which 
is misapplied and devoted to objects which keep alive a con- 
tinuous and well-founded feeling of irritation, without in 
any way advancing the general interest of the State. Mal- 
administration and peculation of public moneys go hand-in- 
hand, without any vigorous measures being adopted to put a 
stop to the scandal. The education of Uitlander children is 
made subject to impossible conditions. The police afford no 
adequate protection to the lives and property of the in- 
habitants of Johannesburg; they are rather a source of 
danger to the peace and safety of the Uitlander population. 

"A further grievance has become prominent since the be- 
ginning of the year. The power vested in the Government by 
means of the Public Meetings Act has been a menace to 
Your Majesty's subjects since the enactment of the Act in 
1894. This power has now been applied in order to deliver 
a blow that strikes at the inherent and inalienable birth- 
right of every British subject in, namely, his right to peti- 
tion his Sovereign. Straining to the utmost the language 
and intention of the law, the Government has arrested two 
British subjects who assisted in presenting a petition to 
Your Majesty on behalf of four thousand fellow-subjects. 
Not content with this, the Government, when Your Majesty's 
loyal subjects again attempted to lay their grievances be- 
fore Your Majesty, permitted their meeting to be broken 
up, and the objects of it to be defeated, by a body of Boers, 
organized by Government officials and acting under the pro- 
tection of the police. By reason, therefore, of the direct as 
well as the indirect act of the Government, Your Majesty's 
loyal subjects have been prevented from publicly ventilating 
their grievances, and from laying them before Your Ma- 
jesty. 

"Wherefore Your Majesty's humble petitioners humbly be- 
seech Your Most Gracious Majesty to extend Your Ma- 
jesty's protection to Your Majesty's loyal subjects, resident 
in this State, and to cause an inquiry to be made into 



102 The Causes Of War 

grievances and complaints enumerated and set forth in this 
humble petition and to direct Your Majesty's representative 
in South Africa to take measures which will insure the speedy 
reform of the abuses complained of, and to obtain substantial 
guarantees from the Government of this State for the rec- 
ognition of their rights as British subjects." 8 

With regard to the government of South Africa by the 
British, it is a fair statement of the situation to say that 
while a few of the governors were arbitrary and narrow and 
bigoted, most of them were not. The local administration on 
the whole was quite efficient. In 1877, the South African Re- 
public was annexed to the British Crown by Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone. The majority of the Boers were against this, but 
seeing its advantages, would have become reconciled, had not 
the English government followed it up, as Mr. Bryce says, 
with three "capital blunders": (1) Failure to grant the 
local autonomy Shepstone had promised. (The Volksraad 
was never convoked, the constitution was never promul- 
gated.) (2) The selection of a successor to Shepstone, — a 
military officer who was personally very unpopular, would 
not "mix" with the Boers, and was wholly incapable of 
dealing with the delicate political work at hand. (3) Re- 
moval of the two native dangers the Boers had feared: (a) 
Extinguishing of the Zulu Kingdom; (b) Reduction of 
Sikuhum's strongholds and establishment of peace in the 
northeast. 

8 All over South Africa was heard the one cry of oppression by the 
Boer government, and that those who would be free must themselves 
strike the first blow. That war was at hand, that arms were stored away 
for that purpose and the visitor invited to see them was a matter of 
common knowledge. The Marquis of Loure in an article in the North 
American Review, March, 1900, rather sides with the British. While ad- 
mitting that the thirst for gold will lead any people to extremes, he 
says that the Boers had an ancient and narrow form of government 
with a hateful intolerance of all free institutions of the Anglo-Saxon 
type. The conflict is only the inevitable one between progress and stag- 
nation. He says, "We who are sowers of freedom have a right to reap 
the harvest and we prefer to have the envy and malice rather than the 
contempt of those who have not plowed the straight furrows we have 
made." P. 311. 



Causes of the British-Boer War 103 

"Against the wish of every wise Boer, against the wish 
of every loyal colonist, in spite of addresses, in spite even 
of deputies sent to London, the English government insisted 
wantonly and wilfully in 1852-4 on founding two independent 
Boer States to mar the unity of one African dominion and 
built up with deliberate carefulness all the pain, anxiety and 
danger that we have to face today; such was the beginning 
of our trouble in South Africa." 9 

This is only one example of the numerous administrative 
blunders that the English government made in South Africa, 
Mr. Curt (quoted above) further remarks: "Democratic in 
principle the Boer republics are, in fact, limited oligarchies" 
— and says that today (1900) it is "the clash between that 
most modern of all communities, a gold-field population and 
the most antique and intolerant government in the world." 

Now, after considering these different views and opinions, 
some of them, indeed, all but absurd, what conclusion are we 
to come to ! It is evident, to begin with, that we cannot ac- 
cept without modification the statements of either the Eng- 
lish on the one hand, or of the Germans on the other. The 
Germans and French charge the whole trouble to English im- 
perialism and greed for gold. The British insist that they 
had to protect the rights of their subjects in South Africa, 
and that the discovery of gold, and the consequent inrush of 
immigrants, an event which could not be foretold, was respon- 
sible for the war. Now, laying aside all the little events, pre- 
texts, and grievances, and admitting that the Boer control in 
South Africa in the period 1877-1900 was mediaeval, tyranni- 
cal, and wholly uncalled for and unjust, the real causes of 
the war, it seems to us, may be summed up as follows : 

(1) Colonial expansion policy of Great Britain. (And 
she has more of an excuse for this policy than any other 
nation except possibly Japan, because it has been, and its 
maintenance is, vital to her existence as a great world 
power. ) v 

9 Henry Curt, in North American Review. 170, p. 205. 



104 The Causes Of War 

(&) The incompatibility of the English liberal political 
system with the oligarchical government and rude, unpro- 
gressive social life and customs of the Boers. (This seems to 
me the great fundamental cause of the whole struggle. But 
for this, a great South African nationality might have de- 
veloped, blending together all the discordant elements, with- 
out war, and without the race antagonism that prevailed.) 

(3) The discovery of gold, and the consequent exploita- 
tion of the mines by English capitalists and financiers. This, 
however, was more the nature of a mere event, than an under- 
lying cause. 



CHAPTER XI 

CAUSES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) 

THE causes of the Spanish- American War, like those of 
all other wars between different races or systems of 
government, can be understood and explained only by a 
study of the diplomatic relations of the two countries along 
with their political and economic (especially commercial) 
systems, as well as the essential inherent characteristics and 
peculiarities of each people. 

Admiral Chadwick, in his excellent volume, "Relations of 
United States and Spain-Diplomacy," characterizes these 
relations as "the story of more than a hundred years of 
what has been really a racial strife." He says, "The chief 
cause was in the absolute racial unlikeness itself, and this 
racial temperament still has an influence over the relations 
of men — more potent — than any other force in humanity." x 
The war was but a final episode in a century of diplomatic 
ill feeling. 2 There was a great difference in the civilizations 
and the political traditions of the two countries ; but, "it 
was more than antiquity, more than an old civilization, which 
produced the differences which made it impossible for the 
North- American Anglo-Saxon to live near his Spanish neigh- 
bors without friction." 3 

The author's hypothesis that this hundred years of diplo- 
matic struggle between the United States and Spain "was 
really a racial strife" is not altogether correct. It does not 
explain all. It is unquestionably true that lack of mutual 
sympathy and understanding contributed in "no slight de- 

1 Introduction, p. 4r. 

a Ibid., p. 3. 

• Introduction, p. 3. 

105 



106 The Causes Of War 

gree" to the outcome, but economic considerations are also 
very important (e. g., the struggle over the right to navi- 
gate the Mississippi River and the "greed of American 
and Spanish protectionists" which was at one time at the 
bottom of the Cuban revolt) in 1895. 

Professor Hershey, in his review of Mr. Chadwick's book, 
observes that it is justly pointed out (in Mr. Chadwick's 
volume) . . . that at the time this message (McKinley's 
final war message to Congress) was sent in, Spain had prac- 
tically yielded to all the American demands which were offi- 
cially presented to her. She had revoked the order of re- 
concentration, and had, at the eleventh hour, granted the 
required armistice to the Cuban insurgents. In short, Presi- 
dent McKinley surrendered to the war advocates at the 
very moment he had won an apparent victory for peace. Mc- 
Kinley's weakness was not in his failure to yield to those 
demanding peace, but in not insisting on "the absolute inde- 
pendence of Cuba as the sine qua non of peace." 4 Mr. 
Chadwick deals with the causes of the war, as we would ex- 
pect, from the standpoint of diplomatic relations. But the 
reviewer observes that "diplomatic relations do not tell the 
whole story of the causes of any war." 5 He indicates that 
a study must also be made of the "economic, social and gen- 
eral political relations between the two peoples or races." 5 

The reviewer agrees with Chadwick that it was a good 
and wise thing "to cut this Gordian knot" with the sword; 
and adds — "what misery and bloodshed might have been 
avoided if it had been cut by General Grant in 1873, or, per- 
haps better still, by Sec. Webster in 1850." 

Why did not Cuba gain her liberty from Spain in 1825, 
along with the continental Latin- American states ? The an- 
swer is, the United States prevented her. That the United 
States interfered in the Latin-American attempt to help 
Cuba to independence in 1825 and prevented that action, is 

* Hershey in N. A. Review, 16 ; pp. 148-50. 
"Hershey in Review of Chadwick's Book. 



Causes of the Spanish-American War (1898) 107 

explained by the fact that there was in this country the fear 
that the freedom of slaves in Cuba, following her inde- 
pendence from Spain, would set the South on fire; — which, 
indeed it would have done. To quote Berrien, of Georgia, in a 
debate in Congress at this time : "When we look to the situa- 
tion of those islands, to the commanding position they oc- 
cupy with reference to the commerce of the West Indies, we 
cannot be indifferent to a change in their condition. But 
when we reflect that they are in juxtaposition to a portion of 
the Union where slavery exists — that the principle of uni- 
versal emancipation must march in the van of the invading 
force, and that all the horrors of a servile war will too 
surely follow in its train — these merely commercial consid- 
erations sink into insignificance. . . . We cannot allow 
their (European) principle of universal emancipation to be 
called into activity in a situation where its contagion from 
our neighborhood would be dangerous to our quiet and 
safety." 6 And Chadwick sums up the situation in these 
words : "American slavery was thus the bulwark of what 
remained of Spanish dominion in the Americas." 7 Henry 
Cabot Lodge goes so far as to say that "the War of 1898 
was the price the United States paid for having kept Cuba 
in bondage at the dictates of our own slave power." 8 

Far be it from us to underestimate the high and noble 
purposes of the people of this country, and their sympathy 
for the suffering Cubans; yet, it is not altogether without 
justice that Europeans look upon this war as one of aggres- 
sion on the part of the United States, with the ultimate 
end in view of annexing Cuba, or at least, of so controlling 
her government and destiny as to best secure the interests of 
the United States. We are not prepared to say nor do we 
believe, that the action of our government and people was 
due mainly to a motive of self-interest. But let us re- 

• See Benton, Abridgement of Debates, VIII, 421 & ff. 

'Chadwick, p. — . 

•Lodge, "War with Spain," p. 6. 



108 The Causes Of War 

count a bit of American history, with the opinions of some 
noted Americans on this subject, and let them speak for 
themselves. J. Q. Adams, than whose opinions on such sub- 
jects no American's are more important, once said: "There 
are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if 
an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot 
choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from 
its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of 
self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American 
Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cart her off 
from its bosom." The View of Jefferson in his time is very 
interesting: "Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy 
any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly con- 
fess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interest- 
ing addition which could ever be made to our system of states 
. . . yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, 
but by war, ... I have no hesitation in abandoning my first 
wish to future chances" 9 

Buchanan, Secretary of State, made this statement in 
1848 : "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should 
be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease 
to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce. 
. . . Human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial conse- 
quences which would result to every portion of the Union." 10 
This was in the administration of Polk. "Successive later 
administrations pushed the project of purchase to the very 
eve of the Civil War." Buchanan was the chief advocate. 11 
In 1875 (President Grant) the situation was similar to that 
of 1898. Had Grant yielded to Congress, there would have 
been war 12 (due largely to Spanish outrages such as Vir- 
ginius affair). And in 1876: "The President . . . desires 
... to express the desire of the United States to maintain a 
firm, solid and enduring peace with Spain and to remove 

9 Jefferson's writings, X, 315. 
"See Chadwick, p. 221. 
"Chadwick, p. 233. 
"See Chadwick, p. 80. 



Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 109 

every disturbing question . . . desires to disabuse the mind 
of the Government and people of Spain of the existence of 
any desire on the part of the government of the United 
States for the acquisition of Cuba." 13 

Several wrote that the United States "have constantly in- 
dulged in the belief that they might hope some day to acquire 
those Islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by just and lawful 
means, with the consent of their sovereign." Thus we see 
that the annexation of Cuba to the United States has been 
looked upon as an ultimate probability by most prominent 
American statesmen ; but they have been content to wait for 
its realization. Jefferson believed Cuba would finally "give 
herself to us." Popular disapproval of the "Ostend Mani- 
festo," however, proved that Cuba was not to be taken by 
force of arms with the will and consent of the American peo- 
ple as a whole. 14 

The incapable administration of the government by the 
Spanish officials in Cuba was the cause of most of the fric- 
tion between the United States and Spain with regard to 
Cuba. If Spain had granted Cuba a liberal government, all 
the moral support that the Cubans got from the United 
States would have been much more difficult, if not impossible 
to secure. The Spanish government, at home, however, came 
at least to see the futility of the officials' arbitrary means 
of punishment. But the officials in Cuba could never be 
brought to that realization. "It was their tenacious hold- 
ing to this view of sudden and severe vengeance 15 which . . . 
more than all else — the effects of reconcentration excepted, 
finally brought on war in 1898." 16 The Spanish govern- 

13 See Chadwick, p. 389. 

"The United States government, in the course of the 19th century, 
repeatedly made it understood that this nation would intervene to pre- 
vent Spain transferring Cuba to any other European power. See Moores 
Digest of Int. Law, VI, p. 450. Also p. 464, on the American opinion 
on annexation of Cuba to U. S. and p. 83, Vol. VI, on unselfish motives 
of U. S. 

15 An immediate cause. 

"Chadwick, p. 473. 



110 The Causes Of War 

ment could not control these officials. Conditions were in 
quite as deplorable a state at home as in Cuba. In the in- 
competence of Spain to deal with revolted Cuba and her own 
officials there undoubtedly was one of the causes of the war. 
The distracted and anarchical condition of Spain for sixty 
years made efficient government in Cuba impossible. The 
United States had been on the point of intervention in 1875, 
as we have seen. The Spanish character, however, had much 
to do with this. It is characteristic of the Spaniard to pro- 
ceed to immediate and summary punishment without a resort 
to trial or jury. 17 

We all know the story of the blowing up of the Maine. It 
cannot be denied that this incident was one of the immediate 
causes of the war, and that the American people were in- 
flamed against Spain as never before. But it cannot justly 
be claimed that the Spanish government was responsible for 
or connived at, this deed of horror. It is more likely that it 
was the work of irresponsible Spanish individuals incited per- 
haps, by Spanish officials in Cuba. 18 The Spanish govern- 
ment expressed deep sympathy for this disaster, as also did 
the Spanish navy department. We have no valid reason to 
question the sincerity of this action. 

There was unquestionably an uncontrollable desire for 
war in the United States. (But it was Congress which really 
forced the country into war.) 19 The Spanish government 

"Admiral Chadwick takes the position that the suffering in Cuba 
(1896-8) was due as much to the insurgents themselves as to the Span- 
iards. He says that especially was unemployment due to the Cubans 
themselves; that the great error of the Spanish government in connection 
with the reconcentration was its "disregarding precautions which should 
have been taken to feed the people thus herded together," that it was 
this that caused the rapid growth in the United States of a hostile feel- 
ing to Spain. That, "there is no denying the force of the Spanish argu- 
ment" (charging responsibility for the suffering mainly to the insurgents) 
— and adds, "nor could mere injury to commerce be made a just ground 
for intervention." Dr. Hershey, in his review of this book, takes excep- 
tion to this statement, and says that there is no question but that the 
Spanish were far more to blame for these sufferings tlran were the 
insurgent forces of the island. 

18 See Benton, Int. Law & Diplomacy. Spanish- American War, p. 76, 
and Chadwick's "Diplomacy" on this. 

19 Benton, pp. 92-3 for the stated causes for going to war. 



Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 111 

was slowly but surely receding from her hostile position and 
war would have been averted but for the Maine disaster and 
the publication of the letter of the Spanish minister. 

Woodford, the United States minister in Spain, was con- 
fident that we could have peace if the United States would 
wait a little, that all her and Cuba's demands would be 
granted. Every reason leads to the belief that all just claims 
could have been readily adjusted . . . yet "this (blowing 
up of the Maine) was without doubt the very event which 
was regarded by the masses of the Americans as justifying a 
resort to war out of pure revenge." 20 

The United States' grounds for intervention were: 

1. In the cause of humanity. 

2. For the protection of the lives and property of Ameri- 
can citizens in Cuba. 

3. In defense of commercial and financial interests in- 
volved. 

4. For self-preservation. 

5. For the Maine disaster. 

The movement of the American squadron gave the Spanish 
government much concern. "The display and concentration 
of naval forces near Havana in the waters of the Peninsula 
(Spain) and the persistency with which the Maine and the 
Montgomery remained in the Greater Antilles are causing 
increasing anxiety and might, through some mischance, bring 
about a conflict," are the words of Senor Gullon of the 
Spanish government, to Senor Duprey de Leme, Spanish 
Minister to the United States. (Feb. 8, 1898). 21 

The more distant and remote causes are summed up by 
Lebrand as follows: 22 

1. Cuban's desire for freedom, autonomy, like the other 
Latin-American countries. 

2. The desire of the United States to own or control 
Cuba — a natural desire. 

20 Benton, p. 106. 

"See Chadwick, p. 538. 

22 Le Brand's "Spanish- American War and the Law of Nations," p. 19. 



112 The Causes Of War 

S. The nature of the Spanish government of Cuba and 
the Cuban insurrections. 

4. Geographical situation of Cuba, including her com- 
mand of the Carribean and Gulf Sea-coasts. 

Spanish statesmen felt that Spain could not renounce 
Cuba — Cuba and the Philippines, the last of her great colo- 
nial empire (in the Occident and in the Orient). Without 
these they felt that Spain could not long exist — they said as 
much. 23 

Mr. Lodge notes the following causes : — 

1. Sympathy for the oppressed and suffering Cubans. 

2. American resentment against dominion of Europe in 
the New World. 

3. Case of the Virginius (1873). An American vessel 
captured in high seas, taken to a Cuban port and about fifty 
of her crew shot. The United States accepted money and 
war was avoided, but the question of moral insult was un- 
settled. 

Captain Mahan asserts that "the avowed purpose and 
cause" of the United States* action was not primarily for 
"redress of grievances (such as blowing up of Maine and exe- 
cutions of American citizens) against Spain, but to enforce 
the departure of the latter from Cuba. But, we may well ask, 
what motives led us to wish to drive Spain from the Western 
world? Was not the United States, after all, looking largely 
to her own ultimate interests ? Did we not need the control, 
if not the actual possession, of Cuba in order to make com- 
plete the chain of United States predominance (in command- 
ing the key to the Carribean Sea and Gulf region) in the 
New World?" 

Mr. Lodge's opinion coincides almost exactly with Cap- 
tain Mahan's, on the purpose of the war. He says that what 
the United States desired above everything else — her purpose 
in going to war, was to drive Spain out of Cuba, and Con- 
gress was very careful to frame its resolution so as to make 
that point explicit. 

83 See Le Brand, p. 19. 



Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 113 

Summing up, then, we may say that the causes of the 
Spanish-American war in 1898 were: 

1. Remote and fundamental. 

2. Immediate (which approached from some points of 
view but not in all respects, mere pretexts). 

(a) The remote and one of the two fundamental or 
underlying causes was unquestionably the incompatibility of 
the Spanish and American race temperaments, and political 
institutions and ideals. It was impossible that the two ever 
should become blended or reconciled. Other considerations 
and events, such as the United States intervention in Cuba, 
with the slave problem of that time, the grievances the United 
States had against Spain on account of the outrages on 
Americans by the Spanish officials in Cuba, particularly the 
Virginius affair, were only occasions for bringing to the 
front this incompatibility of the two races, or were of the 
nature of mere pretexts for hostility. All these differences 
and difficulties could ultimately have been settled by peace- 
ful means, and would have been, had the United States been 
dealing with another such nation as England or Germany. 

(b) The economic situation in Cuba undoubtedly con- 
tributed its share in causing this war; but important as it 
was, it was by no means the fundamental cause. It cannot 
be separated from the other causes. 

(c) The incompetence and inability of the home gov- 
ernment in Spain made possible the abuses of her officials 
in Cuba, and these two things together were important fac- 
tors in the United States' intervention. This cause is more , 
or less blended, however, with the first, or fundamental cause ' 
above mentioned. 

(d) The sympathy of the American people for the suf- 
fering Cubans — the cause of humanity. This was indeed an 
important cause — it swept away the whole American people 
in a great flood of enthusiasm for the war, and was indeed, a 
fundamental as well as an immediate cause of the war. 

(e) The attitude of the McKinley administration (not at 
first as Secretary Alger observes, but after the pulse of the 



114 The Causes Of War 

nation had been felt, and the war fever detected) with its 
almost utter disregard of genuine diplomacy. 

(f ) The blowing up of the Maine, after all has been said, 
can be taken as little more than an occasion or mere pre- 
text. 

(g) The long desire of at least a portion of the Ameri- 
can people to see Cuba become a part of the United States 
no doubt added no inconsiderable momentum to the rising 
tide of war spirit in the United States. Nor can we say that 
the United States was greatly to blame for this. It was 
(1) a natural self-interest; (£) it was seen that Cuba would 
be better off under our flag. 

(h) In connection with the necessary interests of the 
United States in Cuba as Lebrand observes, there is, of 
course, the geographical cause. Cuba is "only a few hours 
sail from the United States, but several days from Spain; 
it is to the interest of the United States to possess or at 
least control an island which is so prominent at the entrance 
to the enclosed waters of the Gulf." This interest was soon- 
er or later bound to clash with that of Spain. 



CHAPTER XII 

CAUSES OF THE FRANCO-PEUSSIAN WAR (1870) 

SHELDON AMOS (in his book on Remedies for War) 
sums up the causes of the Franco-Prussian War as 
follows : 

1. Growth of Prussia and Germany with Bismark's de- 
termination to secure a United Germany. 

2. Alleged intervention of France in nominating Hohen- 
zollern as successor to the Spanish crown. 

3. Political schemes of the Emperor Napoleon III. 

4. Antipathy existing between French and German 
people. 

5. Territorial acquisition on both sides. 

6. Enormously developed military institutions. 

7. Alleged ill-treatment of the French Ambassador of 
Berlin. 1 

Among these, however, he recognizes only three important 
causes: "In some cases, as in the Franco-German War of 
1870, it is difficult even for contemporaries to decide to 
which of the three causes — that is, (1) natural efforts after 
increased liberty and security proportioned to the growth 
and the consolidation of the internal resources of one of the 
Belligerent States, or resistance, by anticipation, to future 
aggressions or direct ambition and political acquisitiveness — 
the war is to be attributed." 2 

Writers differ materially in giving the causes and ex- 

1 This certainly is as complete a list of causes for this war as could 
be found by anyone, no matter how much study he should put on an 
investigation of the causes; but it is true and sound despite its com- 
plexity. 

•Amos, pp. 70-71. 

115 



116 The Causes Of War 

planations of this war. Saliers, a French author, claims 
that France had been "caught in 1870 in the dream of uni- 
versal peace," and that that explains her being wholly unpre- 
pared for the war with Germany. 3 The English historian, 
Rose, on the other hand, says that French feeling against 
Prussia had been growing for years before 1870, and that 
France's counting on Austria as an ally against Prussia 
(in revenge for the events of 1866) explains, in part at least, 
the Franco-Prussian War. 4 Signobos avers that for such 
"unforeseen" facts (as war of 1870) no general cause can be 
discerned in the intellectual, economic, or political condition 
of the continent of Europe." 5 Another historian gives these 
causes : 

1. Bismark's policy of a United Germany — made this 
war necessary — naturally raised the apprehensions of Na- 
poleon III, and caused the French to prepare for and ex- 
pect war. 

£. Question of succession to the throne of Spain stirred 
France into a ferment rapidly as news could fly. A Hohen- 
zollern (Leopold von Hohenzollern) had been elected, and 
had given his consent. France could not possibly allow the 
government of Spain to fall into the hands of Prussia, which 
her acceptance of this ^election would mean. 6 

We will here give the causes the historian. Rose, assigns 
for this war: 

1. France counting on Austria as an ally against Prus- 
sia. 

2. Bismark realized that it would take war to solve the 
problems of reunion, which was impossible in time of peace. 

3. The question of the Spanish succession now furnished 
this casus belli. 

Mr. Rose here gives Gramont's (the French Minister) 
statement in the Chamber of Deputies, which is as follows: 
"We do not think that respect for the rights of a neighbor- 

8 Saliers, pp. V and VI in Preface, "La Guerre." 

4 See Rose, I, Chap. I. 

5 Signobos, p. 847. 
°C. M. H., XI. 



Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 117 

ing people (Spain) obliges us to allow an alien Power (Prus- 
sia) by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles 
V to succeed in upsetting to our disadvantage the present 
equilibrium of forces in Europe, and|imperil the interests and 
honor of France. We have the firm hope that eventually it 
will not be realized. To hinder it, we count both on the 
wisdom of the German people and on the friendship of the 
Spanish people. If that should not be so, strong in your 
support and in that of the nation, we shall know how to 
fulfill our duty without hesitation and without weakness." 7 

The statements of various prominent men on this war 
are significant and throw light on the different views : 

"The war of 1870 was the personal work of Bismark, pre- 
pared by Napoleon Ill's personal policy." 8 

"The responsibility rests for the most part on one man — 
Bismarck himself. The nation was not back of such aggres- 
siveness, though, when once committed to war, it could be 
depended on to carry it through. 9 At least, he caused these 
wars (1866-71) to occur when they did." 10 

"The occasion was the purchase of the Belgian railroads 
by the French Eastern Company in February, 1869. The 
Belgian government forbade the sale. The French govern- 
ment attriuted this check to Bismark." n 

The proposition made to the Reichstag, Feb. 24, 1870, to 
admit the Grand Duchy of Baden into the northern Confed- 
eration, renewed the agitation against Prussian and German 
unity. 

"The story of the Franco-German dispute is one of na- 
tional jealousy, carefully fanned for four years by news- 
paper editors and popular speakers until a spark sufficient 
to set Western Europe ablaze. This was true alike on the 
part of Germany and France." 12 

'Rose, "The Devel. of the European Nations, 1870-1900," p. 46. 
•Signobos, "Political History of Europe Since 1814," p. 847. 
9 C. M. Hist., XI, p. 432. 
10 Ibid., p. 434. 
"Signobos, p. 806. 
"Rose, I, 56. 



118 The Causes Of War 

The immediate cause, however, all must agree, was due 
to Prince Bismarck. The French Minister Daree, who 
favored peace, was replaced early in 1870 by Gramont, an 
enemy of Prussia. Napoleon's plan for the invasion of 
Southern Germany which had been discussed with Archduke 
of Austria, fell through and peace seemed assured, when 
Bismarck's publishing of the telegram from King William 
set everything on fire and caused France to declare war on 
Prussia. 

A note had been addressed from Paris to the Prussian 
government saying that the coming of Hohenzollern to 
Spain was regarded by France as a provocation and menace 
from Prussia and that France could not "suffer the empire 
of Charles V to be restored." 13 The French minister at 
Berlin was ordered to press for an immediate renunciation 
of Prince Leopold's claims. He was informed that the 
matter was one for Prince Leopold and the Spanish people, 
but that the King would communicate with Leopold's father 
on the subject. An explicit order from King William to 
Prince Leopold was demanded by France; in the meantime, 
it was announced from Madrid that Leopold had withdrawn 
his candidature. The matter seemed again settled, but 
this did not satisfy Napoleon. He demanded that Prussia 
promise to guarantee that no such attempt in favor of a 
Hohenzollern should ever again be made. King William ab- 
solutely refused to so bind himself. The French ambassador 
was finally informed that he could not be received by the 
King. 

The telegram published by Bismarck, shortened by him 
for the purpose, conveying the impression that King William 
had treated the French ambassador with disrespect, aroused 
all France. This led immediately to the French declaration 
of war against Prussia. The telegram cut down was as fol- 
lows: 

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary 
^ 8 See Signobos, p. 807-11. 



Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 119 

Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to 
the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Govern- 
ment of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems further de- 
manded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize 
him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound 
himself for all future time never again to give his consent if 
the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Ma- 
jesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French 
ambassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de- 
camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to com- 
municate to the ambassador." 

The French people could see in this action of Bismarck 
nothing but the basest insult, notwithstanding that historians 
who have carefully examined the dispatch and compared it 
with the original telegram of King William of Prussia have 
claimed that it was not at all such — that the abbreviated 
form had not the incendiary language in it that the original 
had. 14 A perusal of the two shows that there is some basis 
for this claim. 1 " 5 There is no question, however, that 
Bismarck wanted war, and that the French government 
were almost as eager. Both the German and French people, 

"See Rose, p. 49-50. 

"The original telegram is as follows: "His Majesty writes to me: 
'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand 
from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize 
him to telegraph at once that I hound myself for all future time never 
again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candi- 
dature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor 
possible to undertake engagements of this kind a tout jamais. 

" 'Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he 
was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself he could see 
clearly that my Government once more had no hand in the matter.' His 
Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty, hav- 
ing told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has 
decided, with reference to the above demand, upon the representation of 
Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but 
only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp: 'That his Majesty 
had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Bene- 
detti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say 
to the ambassador.' His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether 
Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once com- 
municated both to our ambassadors and to the press." 



120 The Causes Of War 

on the other hand, shuddered to think of the horrors of such 
a war between the two great powers. 

Prussia's monster crime, however, was not the war, — it 
was the stealing of the French provinces of Alsace and Lor- 
raine. 



CHAPTER XIII 



THE UNITED STATES 



Fundamental and Immediate Causes of Our Conflict xvith 

Germany 

IN our series "The Causes of War," we have dealt with 
man's motives for war in the past; the European back- 
ground of the great conflict just closed; the causes of this 
war for each of the individual nations involved ; — in the 
meantime showing the nature of recent German diplomacy; 
the autocratic government and military caste that were re- 
sponsible, in the Kaiser's dominions, for the universal devas- 
tation and bloodshed; and finally, in a general way, with 
America's reasons for entering the cause of the free nations 
in the supreme struggle of democracy and right against au- 
tocracy and might. Now, in our series of articles on the 
"Outline and Study of the World War" we shall state our 
own cause more specifically, and follow up with the study of 
the military and other events of the war, the preliminary 
peace problems of the peace conference — all with the view 
to making this material most available and suitable to the 
needs of our readers, as they deal with the war and current 
history. 

It is to be hoped that the lively interest in the reading and 
study of current history which has been stimulated by the 
war will continue in these equally critical and unsettled times 
of world reaction and reconstruction, and that the great 
services of the leading weekly and monthly magazines and 
periodicals will not be forgotten. 

Following is an outline on the United States and her causes 

121 



122 The Causes Of War 

and interests in the world war. This outline has been used 
throughout the schools of Fort Smith as a basis for the study 
of this war, as our government urges upon our schools today, 
— and is recommended by teachers and school officials in a 
good many systems. Practically all references are available 
in any community. 

WAR STUDY OUTLINE FOR SCHOOLS 

/. Why We Were At War With Germany 

A. Fundamental Causes. 

1. Democracy versus autocratic power. (This world 

cannot remain permanently half free and half en- 
slaved by autocratic power.) 

2. The moral ground of humanity versus the principle 

that "might makes right" with Germany's conse- 
quent cruelties and barbarous warfare. 

3. U. S. championship of international law, the sacred 

obligations of treaties, the rights of neutrals, and 
of small states. 

4. U. S. has also gone to war to uphold her own honor 

and respect among the powers of the earth, and to 
prove the sincerity of her professed principles. 

B. Immediate Causes. 

1. Germany's domineering diplomacy and attitude 
toward our Monroe Doctrine. 

a. Admiral Diederich and Admiral Dewey in Ma- 

nila harbor in 1898. (See World's Work, 
June, 1916.) 

b. The Samoan incident. (See World's Work, 

June, 1916.) 

c. The Kaiser, Roosevelt, and Venezuela, 1902. 

d. Utterances of the Crown Prince and others with 

regard to U. S. and Monroe Doctrine. (See 
"Out of Their Own Mouths.") 



The United States 123 

e. German spy system in America. (Pres. Wilson's 

Speeches.) 

f. Germany's aggressions in South America and 

Mexico. 

g. Von Zimmerman's proposal to Mexico and 

Japan for partitioning U. S. among them. 

2. German submarine blockade. 

a. Interference with legitimate American com- 

merce. 

b. Destruction of American lives and property. 

c. Shameless violation of our rights as neutrals, 

(rights she had solemnly promised to respect, 
but whose violation she now celebrated pub- 
licly in numerous places). 

d. Great loss of food needed for suffering peoples. 

3. Atrocities in Belgium, Poland, Northern France, Ser- 

bia, Roumania — showing Germany's deliberate 
policy toward her helpless, innocent victims. 

4. Similar effect on American opinion was caused by the 

Zeppelin raids on the unprotected and innocent in 
London and other English towns. 

5. Nefarious plotting of German agents in the U. S. with 

working men, banks, anarchists, bombs, traitors, 
pan-Germans, etc. (Hundreds of cases unearthed 
by U. S. secret service, showing millions of dollars 
spent in this country by Germany to foment strife 
and influence our neutrality while Germany was 
still professing friendship and peaceful relations 
with the U. S.) 

II. Danger of Failure to This Coimtry 

1. Germany threatened to make us pay for all the cost 
of the war to her. (A staggering indemnity, just 
as she had already collected from every country 
she had conquered.) 



124 The Causes Of War 

% The Kaiser, Crown Prince and Princes of Germany 
have scoffed at the idea of democracy (have 
boasted of the submarine as the "argument of 
kings" against democracy). 

3. The Kaiser claims to be king by divine right, and to 

be God's agent on earth. (Read from his addresses 
to soldiers, history teachers, — in Munich, etc., etc., 
1891, 1897, 1900, 1909, 1914, 1916, 1917. See 
Teacher's Journal^ June, 1917, World's Work, 
June, 1917. Review of Reviews' December, 1917. 
"Out of Their Own Mouths," etc.) 

4. The German police system was more severe than ever 

were the quartering of the British soldiers of King 
George on the American colonies. (We did not 
stand it then, we must not run the risk of it now.) 
See West's Modern World. 

5. Germany curbed freedom of speech and of the press, 

and suppressed the individual, and made him just 
a link in the machinery of the government, which 
was controlled by a privileged autocratic class 
above him. In Prussia, men voted according to 
wealth, not universal suffrage. In one district in 
Berlin three men paid one-third of the taxes, had 
one-third the vote of all the district of the city. 

6. If we had lost this war, we should have lost the guar- 

antee of everything that Washington and his com- 
patriots fought for, and "government of the 
people, by the people, for the people," would have 
perished "from the earth," for generations to come, 
if not for centuries. 

III. The Duty of Every American to Support the War 

1. It is our duty to know, first of all, the justice of our 

country's cause. 

2, We should have the courage to hold up that cause 

wherever it is assailed for — 



The United States 185 

3. Sedition and treason are continually being sown 

throughout our land, and must be met and put 
down. — This is still true. 

4. To be worthy of the country that has given us the 

blessing of liberty, we must support with a will all 
the movements among the people to aid in this 
work, such as — 

a. The War Y. M. C. A. work. 

b. The Red Cross Work. 

c. The food production conservation campaigns. 

d. The Liberty Loans. 

e. Every other war agency with which we come in 

contact. 
An equal duty now devolves upon us to support with all 
our power the principles for a just and lasting peace, that 
our peace delegates are striving for at Versailles. 

IV. Some Reliable References On the War and Its Issues 

A. Magazines and Periodicals. 

a. World's Work, June, 1917. "Germany's Long 

Road to Democracy." 

b. World's Work, June, 1916. "The Mailed Fist 

in American History." 

c. Review of Reviews, December, 1918. Editorials. 

d. Everybody's (continuing throughout 1918). 

Brand Whitlock's Story of Belgium. 

e. World's Work (continuing throughout 1918). 

Mr. Rathom's exposals of the working of the 
German spy system in U. S. French Strothier 
on same. 

f. Independent, October 20, 1918. "Peace with 

Victory." Ex-President Taft. 

g. History Teachers' Magazine, January, 1918. 

Critical outline, notes and references on the 
causes, issues and events of the Great War, by 
Professor Harding, of Indiana University. 



126 The Causes Of War 

B. Books. 

a. "Evidence in the Case," J. W. Beck, Assistant 

Attorney General, U. S. 

b. "Ambassador Morganthau's Story," in book 

form. 

c. "Out of Their Own Mouths." From German 

sources. 

d. "The German Terror in France." 

e. "My Four Years in Germany," Ambassador 

Gerard. 

f. "With the Turks in Palestine," Alexander 

Aaronsohn. 

g. "England and Germany," by Cramb, written be- 

fore the war. 
h. "Germany and the Next War" — Bernhardi. 

C. Library Pamphlets and Booklets. 

a. "Plain Words From America," Prof. Johnson, 

of Columbia University. 

b. Speeches of General Smuts, formerly Boer Gen- 

eral against England. 

c. "Why the War Must Go On." 

d. "List of Neutral Ships Sunk by Germans." 

e. "Deportation of Belgian Women." 

f. "The New German Empire." 

g. "The Red, White and Blue Book," U. S. Official 

Documents. 

h. The U. S. Official Bulletin. 

i. "Sixteen Causes of War," Prof. A. C. McLaugh- 
lin, University of Chicago. 

j. "The Great War." 

k. "Democracy Today," Lake Classic Series, Scott 
Foresman Co. 

1. "Ireland and Poland." 

m. "When the Prussians Came to Poland," by an 
American woman who lived at the time of the 
German invasion. (Good sized volume.) 



The United States 127 

n. "Their Crimes." 

o. "Microbe-Cultures in Bukharest." 

p. "Why Italy is with the Allies." 

q. "Character of the British Empire." 

r. French, English, Russian and Italian "Official 

Books." 
s. "The Union of Two Great Peoples," W. H. 

Page, U. S. Minister to England. 

The above references are not meant to be complete, nor 
the only reliable ones, but they form a working basis for the 
proper study of the war, and for that reason were selected. 
The military events will be outlined and commented on later. 



CHAPTER XIV 

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY 

THE foregoing outline is not exhaustive, — it is not in- 
tended to give all the good material that may be found 
and read with profit ; but it is intended as a brief guide and 
course for the ordinary student and the busy teacher who 
may not have time for a more extensive study. For the 
person who wishes to supplement this reading by a further 
study, there is an excellent collection of noteworthy and 
authentic volumes to be found in the average public library, 
or the library of any first rate college or university. For 
a list of these books see Prof. Harding's outline and bibli- 
ography in the January (1918) numb«r of the History 
Teachers' Magazine, — the article that we have referred to 
once or twice previously. This article is also one of the 
"War Information Series," published by the Committee on 
Public Information. 

Let us now take up the Imperial German government's 
policy and plan of conquest in the beginning of the war, as 
shown by our previous study of the causes of the war. The 
first acts of the Imperial German government, in conjunction 
with the prearranged plan of her military general staff, were 
in accord in every particular with her policy as instigator of 
the war. (Here again I would refer the readers to Mr. 
Beck's excellent volume, "The Evidence in the Case.") A 
new verification of this fact is found in the recent publication 
of the German Prince Lichnowsky's arraignment of the Ger- 
man government in the years immediately preceding the war, 
and particularly, the Kaiser's responsibility for the catas- 
trophe. (Prince Lichnowsky's complete diary may be found 

128 



German Diplomacy and Strategy 129 

in "Current History" magazine, published by the New York 
Times ; also in U. S. "War Information Series" is similar 
positive proof. See "Conquest and Kultur," January, 1918, 
pp. 133-35. 1 

Apparently the German government's original plan was 
to localize the war, if possible, between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia, if by threats it could prevent Russia — before Rus- 
sia's great army expansion was completed — from coming to 
the aid of her Serbian fellow-Slavs. Greater importance at- 
taches to this demonstration of militant Pan-Germanism at 
this particular time, from the fact that Russia was still 
staggering from the effects of the Russo-Japanese War and 
the seething revolution in her empire. If not successful in 
localizing the conflict, then the Kaiser and his lords would 
proceed to bring on a general European conflict, — which 
they knew was most likely in any event — for every one knew 
that a general conflagration would then be inevitable. Really, 
however, the Kaiser and his government desired a war with 
Russia, and that speedily, in order that they might forever 
crush the eastern empire's military strength and threat to 
German expansion. Thus would the Teuton war lords rea- 
lize their dream of near-Eastern supremacy. So, in spite of 
the Czar's earnest and sincere attempt to avoid war, and his 
unbroken pledge not to be the aggressor, Germany forced 
war upon Russia. And if Russia, then France would be in- 
volved, as a matter of course, because of her treaty obliga- 
tions. The military plan was to crush France in the very 
first weeks of the war, then turn upon Russia and prostrate 
her before her great, unwieldly army and empire could be 
harnessed for effective combat. In order to be doubly sure 
of speedy success in the west, the Kaiser would take France 
by surprise by striking through Belgium — this to be a wholly 
unexpected movement, because of the French, German and 

1 Reference to the Prince's revelations is also found in April 4, 1918, 
number of the Nation. All who have not should read this amazing rev- 
elation from a German source. 



130 The Causes Of War 

English solemn agreement to respect the neutrality of Bel- 
gium. And that France was wholly surprised is shown by the 
fact that her army was concentrating on the Alsace-Lorraine 
front, where alone a German attack might be anticipated. 
Then, with their initial success, perhaps the Germans could 
frighten off unready England for a while, and dictate the 
terms of a victorious Teuton peace before Great Britain 
should be ready to fight. England's honorable entry into the 
war, however, was a disappointment to Germany, and her 
"contemptible little army," like Belgium's resistance to tyr- 
anny, helped in the delay to German arms that made the 
first battle of the Marne a defensive victory, and a victory 
for democratic civilization. Despite German protests of sur- 
prise, however, even the British nation's entry into the con- 
flict was not altogether unexpected, for the Kaiser's plans 
had deep roots, and had provided for England's entry — so 
confidently in fact, and in so many ways, — that William II 
with his military lords had counted, in that event, upon 
crushing his traditional enemy of the seas, and becoming 
master of Europe just that much sooner. To assure our- 
selves of this let us recall the constant German toasts to the 
"inevitable day" — the day when the German navy should 
dominate the seven seas, instead of the Union Jack. Al- 
though this general plan was kept from the German people 
it was universally known and its execution awaited by the 
army and navy officials. 

These new enemies might prolong the war for six months 
or even a year, to be sure, but what of that? So much sooner 
would "Kultur," by force of arms, be realized as the guid- 
ing force of mankind. Welcome, even, if the net of war 
should be spread beyond the seas, as well as involving other 
European nations. The German army was invincible and 
the German people disciplined, ready and unconquerable, in 
the eyes of the military masters. Let us not forget the Teu- 
ton slogan : "In Paris within three weeks, in London within 
three months, and in New York within three years !" There 



German Diplomacy and Strategy 131 

are varying versions of the dates set by the military authori- 
ties of the Kaiser for the above victories, but these state- 
ments come too directly, and from too many sources for it 
to be doubted that such expressions were common among the 
officers of the German army and navy and high, responsible 
government officials. This plan, with the policy and doctrine 
it involved, therefore, comprehended even the United States 
of America, should we champion international law against 
the lawless submarine, or dare uphold the rights of humanity, 
of small states or even uphold our own honor or dignity as a 
nation. German victory was a necessity, and "necessity 
knows no law!" Or, again, as one official put it, "The Ger- 
man people are right because they number 87,000,000 souls !" 
Yet William II of Germany thought he understood President 
Wilson and the peace-loving American people well enough to 
be safe in acting on the presumption that we would never 
be counted among his active enemies in war. Our entry into 
the struggle was his greatest surprise and disappointment. 
Uncle Sam did not give him his chance to demonstrate that 
(in his own words) "I will stand no nonsense from Uncle Sam 
after this war," or that, with a stronger fleet he "would take 
Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck," as he once told a mem- 
ber of the American embassy in Berlin. 

One other major part of the Teuton plan must not be over- 
looked, and that is, the "Hun policy of f rightfulness." That 
this policy was a part of the German military doctrine even 
before the war has been abundantly proven. With a con- 
stantly increasing ferocity it had been developing since before 
1900. The first exhibition to the world on a large scale was 
in the Boxer uprising incident (1900), wherein the Kaiser 
charged his troops to make the German name feared and the 
German sword felt, as was that of Atilla and the Huns 1,500 
years ago. The following statement from that speech might 
well have made the whole world shudder with apprehension: 
"Quarter will not be given, no prisoners will be taken. Use 
your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no 



132 The Causes Of War 

Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance! Be as 
terrible as the Huns !" — William II, to the German Chinese 
expeditionary force, July 27, 1900. 

The Kaiser and the German people instead of resenting 
this characterization "Hun" by the allied world, should ac- 
cept and love it, for their "beloved majesty" himself invented 
the phrase and applied it literally to his own troops ; and we 
may be sure, it will last with them a thousand years, as the 
Kaiser predicted ! 

With the ordinary "Hun" practice of frightfulness the 
reader is too familiar to warrant us in an exposition of them 
here. I will merely mention them in passing. 

1. Submarines. 

(a) Firing upon helpless survivors in the water. 

(b) Sinking neutral merchant and passenger ships, 
with their crews, without warning. 

(c) Shelling undefended town (larger ships also 
did so). 

(d) Sinking hospital and Red Cross ships, with 
wounded, etc. 

2. Airships and Airplanes. 

(a) Bombing undefended towns and cities, and 
murdering non-combatants — innocent women, 
old men and children. 

(b) Bombing Red Cross hospitals, Y. M. C. A. 
huts, etc., back of the lines — contrary to all 
former practices in war. 

3. Artillery. 

(a) Utter destruction of churches, cathedrals and 
other buildings of non-military character ex- 
empt by the usages of war from mutilation 
and destruction. These contain many of the 
most priceless treasures of civilization. 

(b) The long-range guns firing on Paris — of no 
military advantage to Germany, but the 



German Diplomacy and Strategy 133 

frightfulest suffering, grief and apprehension 
on civilians in their defenseless condition. (75 
deaths at Easter worship, etc.) 

4. Infantry. 

(a) Treachery in the ordinary practices of war- 
fare. 

(b) Driving women and children in front of them 
in advance upon enemy, so that enemy must 
fire upon its own people, if it would check Ger- 
man onrushes. 

(c) Wearing Red Cross insignia, to obtain ad- 
vantage of unsuspecting foe — concealing ma- 
chine guns, etc., on army stretchers. 

5. Army in Retreat. 

(a) Utter destruction of everything — desolation, 
and poisoning wells, etc. 

All the above, however, are small and merciful in compari- 
son with the Hun policy of starvation. Few American citi- 
zens realize to what extent, and with appalling results, this 
terrible weapon has been wielded by the German military 
command in the occupied region of the countries overrun by 
the Teuton armies. I shall not attempt to describe this mon- 
ster crime upon humanity, but merely mention the facts that, 
(1) in the past four years Germany has starved to death, in 
conjunction with her allies, more enemies than they all have 
killed in war; (2) the greater percentage of these victims 
are women and children, the hope of the future generation; 
(3) after thus bringing these peoples face to face with star- 
vation, she has used this extremity as an excuse before the 
world for deporting the ablebodied, men and women, into 
Germany, there to be forced to work in support of the Hun 
armies against their own people; (4) The German officers 
and troops deliberately took the food out of the mouths of 
these starving people, and used it to their own hearts' con- 
tent; (5) it was hunger, starvation, that forced Roumania 



134* The Causes Of War 

to make peace with the Central Powers; (6) most of the 
factories of the occupied districts were stripped of their ma- 
chinery, m order to force starvation and non-resistance upon 
the industrial classes, the best citizens; (7) this all has vir- 
tually crushed most of the small nations of Europe; (8) this 
devitalization is bound to affect the off-spring of the sur- 
vivors for generations to come; and (9) there are 30,000,000 
of these innocent victims of Teuton greed and lust for power, 
— think of it, 30,000,000 ! This is the greatest suffering the 
world has ever known, and may justly be considered the 
"darkest page in human history . . . wrought deliberately 
by a single nation to further its own ends !" 2 

2 For a more detailed statement of this "food war" of "Kultur" against 
humanity, see the article "Forerunners of Famine," by Frederick C. 
Walcott, of the United States Food Administration, in the April (1918) 
number of the National Geographic Magazine. 



CHAPTER XV 

OUTLINE OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE TERMS 

OUTLINE of the World War 19U-1918 
I. The Year 19U m the War. 

A. Declarations of war and beginnings of hostilities. 

1. After assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, 

heir-apparent to the Austrian throne (June 28, 
1914), and Austrian ultimatum to Serbia (July 
28), Austria declares war on Serbia (July 28). 

2. Germany, in support of Austria, declares war on Russia 

(Aug. 1). 

3. Germany begins war on France (Aug. 3). 

4. Germany invades Belgium (Aug. 4). 

5. Following German violation of Belgian territory, Great 

Britain declares war on Germany (Aug. 4). 

6. Montenegro joins Serbia against Austria-Hungary 

(Aug. 8). 

7. Japan declares war on Germany (Aug. 23). 

8. Turkey declares war on Russia (Oct. 30). 

9. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey (Nov. 

5). 

B. Military events. 

1. In the Balkans. 

(a) Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia — suc- 
cessfully resisted by Serbians (Aug.-Dec, 
1914). 

2. In the West. 

(a) Invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg and Lorraine 
by Germany (mentioned above), with Paris 
as the immediate objective (Aug. 3-Sept. 5). 
135 



136 The Causes Of War 

(b) First Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10), saves 
Paris, Joffre and Foch gaining a defensive 
victory, and hurling the right wing of the 
German army back from the Marne to the 
Aisne (with aid of Gen. French's English 
army). 

(c) Entrenchments, followed by first battle of the 
Aisne (Sept. 15-28), and the first battle of 
Ypres, for the Channel ports (Oct.-Nov»). 

3. In the East. 

(a) Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia (success- 
ful) and German East Prussia (the latter 
shattered by Hindenburg's victory at Tannen- 
burg, Aug. 25-31). 

(b) German-Austrian invasion of Russian Poland. 

(c) Turkish expeditions against Russians in Black 
Sea regions and against Great Britain in 
Egypt (Nov.-Dec), the latter a complete fail- 
ure. 

4. In the Orient. 

(a) Japanese siege and capture of Tsing-Tau 
(Sept. 1-Nov. 6). German isles in Pacific 
taken by Japanese and British fleets. 

5. In Africa. 

(a) Togoland and Kamerun occupied by English 
and French troops (fall and early winter of 
1914). 

(b) German Southwest Africa invaded, and Ger- 
man East Africa attacked, by British and 
other colonial troops. 

C. Naval engagements. 

1; German Cruisers seek safety in Dardanelles (Goeben 
and Bresleau). Turks forjed to buy them — Ger- 
many leads Turkey into war. 
% Battle of Heligoland (really a British victory). 
3. Battle off Chile, S. A. — Admiral von Spee (Ger.) sinks 
Admiral Craddock's (Eng.) little fleet (Nov. 1). 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 137 

4. Battle off Falkland Islands — Admiral Sturdee (Eng.) 
sinks Von Spee's fleet (Dec. 8). 1 

II. The Year 1915 m the War. 

A. Declarations of War. 

1. Italy breaking away from triple alliance with Austria 

and Germany, declares war on Austria (May 23). 

2. Bulgaria (entering on Germany's side) declares war 

on Serbia (Oct. 14). 

3. England declares war on Bulgaria (Oct. 14), as result 

of Bulgaria's move against Serbia. 

4. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria (Oct. 19). 

B. Military campaigns. 

1. In West. 

(a) Allied offensive in France (Jan.-April) dead- 
lock, unbroken by battles of Neuve Chapelle, 
Champagne, the Labyrinth, and Lens, in 
Artois. 

(b) German offensive — second battle of Ypres: — 
in the Argonne — (May-July) — deadlock un- 
broken. 

2. In the East. 

(a) Austro-German invasion of Poland checked 
before Warsaw by Russians (Feb.). 

(b) After reaching Carpathians Russians expelled 
from Galicia by Von Mackensen; Germans 
having come to the aid of worsted Austrians 
(May- June). 

(c) Von Hindenburg's drive through Poland and 
northern Russia, to swamps before Riga — 
Russian ammunition and other supplies give 
out (Aug.-Sept.). 

3. In the Balkans. 

(a) Austro-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia — Serbia 
crushed, overrun, and occupied (Oct.-Nov.). 

*Long before this time German commerce had been driven from the 
ocean. 



188 The Causes Of War 

(b) Allies fail at Gallipoli, and establish base at 
« Saloniki, in Greece (Feb. -Dec.). 

4. In Asia. 

(a) Turks invade Persia — opposed by Russians — 
German plan of "Mittel Europa," Berlin to 
Bagdad control clearly revealed. 

(b) British expedition in Mesopotamia frustrates 
the realization of this plan. 

5. In Africa. 

(a) All Germany's colonies in Africa taken by 
Allies, except part of German East Africa. 

(b) Egypt and Suez canal safe from capture by 
Turks or Germans. 

C. Naval Engagements. 

1. Dogger Bank (Jan. 24), German squadron badly 

crippled, in attempt to surprise British fleet. 

2. British and French naval attack on Dardanelles (Mar. 

18-May 27), in conjunction with Allied army, fails. 
This failure was a surprise to the Germans and 
Turks as well as to the Allies, and Ambassador 
Morganthau tells us, could have succeeded, if the 
Allies had only known the condition of defense at 
this early stage. Later, when their armies tried 
so hard, it was impregnable, due to guns, fortifica- 
tions and other supplies that had come from Ger- 
many. 
8. Small Russian victories on Baltic and Black seas. 

4. Internment (in neutral ports) or destruction of Ger- 

man commerce destroyers. (The Emden and other 
commerce destroyers had wrought great havoc 
with neutral and Allied shipping.) 

5. German submarine sinkings become a menace to Allies. 

III. The Year 1916 in the War. 
A. Declarations of War. 

1. Germany declares war on Portugal (Mar. 9). 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 139 

2. Austria declares war on Portugal (Mar. 15). 

3. Italy declares war on Germany (Aug. 27). 

4. Roumania declares war on Austria-Hungary (Aug. 

27) — thus coming in finally with the Allies. 

5. Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, declare war on Roumania 

(Aug.-Sept.). 
B. Military Operations. 

1. In the Balkans. 

(a) Montenegro and northern Albania overrun by 
Bulgarian and Austrian armies ( Jan.-Feb.). 

(b) Allied army at Saloniki, Greece, takes offensive 

and captures Monastir, in Southern Serbia, 
from Bulgarians (Nov.) — checked from fur- 
ther advance by subsequent downfall of Rou- 
mania and Russia. (Italian, French, Serbian, 
Albanian, English all in this army.) 

(c) Roumania (after espousing cause of Allies) 
rashly attempts to overrun Transylvania- 
Austrian territory claimed by Roumania — is 
invaded and crushed by the combined drives 
of Von Mackensen and Von Falkenhayn 
(Aug.-Dec). Her complete prostration, how- 
ever, would not have occured but for the 
treacherous betrayal by the Russian pro-Ger- 
man war minister Stunner. This, indeed, was 
the major cause of Roumanians downfall. 

2. In the East. 

(a) Russian (Grand Duke Nicholas) attack upon 
Turks in Armenia, and capture of Erzerum, 
Trebizond and Erzingan (Jan. -July). 

(b) Second Russian invasion of Galicia (June 4- 
Aug. 15) — after capture of 350,000 Teutons 
Russians are halted before Halicz, having ex- 
hausted their ammunition and other supplies. 

3. On Italian front. 

(a) Austrian invasion of Italy (May- June) — Aus- 



140 The Causes Of War 

trian territory in Trentino recovered, and 
2S0 sq. mi. of Italian territory captured, but 
Austrians fail to gain Venetian plain, 
(b) Italian counter-offensive (June-Aug.) — re- 
gains most of territory just captured by Teu- 
tons and reaches Gorizia, only a few miles 
from Trieste; but is definitely checked on 
Carso plateau. 

4. In Asia. 

(a) After an expedition undertaken without suf- 
ficient support, Gen. Townshend's (Br.) army 
surrenders to Turks at Kut-el-Amera, al- 
though it had advanced to within 18 miles of 
Bagdad (April 28). 

(b) Three separate Russian expeditions against 
Bagdad routed by Turks (Jan.-May, July 
and Aug.). 

5. In the West. 

(a) First battle of Verdun (Feb.- July) — German 
Crown Prince sacrifices 500,000 men, but fails 
to take Verdun. "Ills ne passerent pas!" 

(b) Anglo-French offensive on the Somme (July- 
Nov.). Only slight gains of territory by 
Allies. 

(c) French counter-offensive at Verdun (Oct.- 
Dec). Recapture in a few days, territory 
that the Crown Prince had fought desperately 
for months to obtain. 

6. In Africa. 

(a) All but a small mountainous part of German 
East Africa, the last German colony in Af ricay 
overrun by British and Belgian colonial 
troops. 
C. Naval Operations. 

1. Battle of Jutland (May 31) — German attempt at sur- 
prise of British fleet fails, but both sides lose sev- 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 141 

eral vessels. Germany more cautious with her fleet 
after this. 
% German submarines and commerce raiders inflict great 
damage on British, French and neutral shipping, 
and involve Germany in trouble with U. S. Ger- 
many promises (with some reservations) not to 
sink American ships without warning (a hollow 
promise, as afterward shown). 

IV. The Year 1917 in the War. 

A. Entry of United States into the war (April 6, 1917). 

1. Causes (see Chapters VII and XIII). 

2. Vast Preparations by United States. 

(a) Army and navy programs. 

(b) Selective draft (June 5). 

(c) Airplane program. 

(d) Merchant shipping program. 

3. Financing the War. 

(a) Liberty loans — Loans to the Allies. 

(b) Taxes. 

(c) War Savings Stamp campaigns, prepared for 
the year 1918. 

4. President Wilson's leadership and War messages. 

5. The President's fight for unrestricted powers of ad- 

ministration. 

6. Effect on Allies of United States' entry into the War. 

7. Fighting German propaganda and spies in United 

States. 

B. Other declarations of war. 

1. United States declares war on Austria-Hungary (Dec. 
7). 

8. Cuba declares war on Germany (April 7). 

3. Panama virtually enters war against Germany (April 

V- 

4. Brazil declares war on Germany (Oct. 26). 

5. China declares war on Germany and Austria (Aug. 14). 



142 The Causes Of War 

6. Greece, after deposition of King Constantine, declares 

war on Germany and Bulgaria (July 2). 

7. The following nations, in addition to all the Allied and 

associated states, either broke off diplomatic rela- 
tionship with Germany or declared war on her: 
Argentina (Pres. of Argentina refused to sign the 
break voted by the national legislature), Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, Uru- 
guay, Ecquador. 
C. Military Operations. 
1. In the West. 

(a) Second battle of the Somme. (British ad- 
vance to within range of Bapaume (Jan.- 
March), followed by German withdrawal to 
"Hindenburg line," from Somme to Rheims, 
the French joining with British in driving the 
Germans back to this line. Teutons had thus 
abandoned one-fourth of the territory they 
had held in France). 2 

(b) Battle of Arras (April- June) British threaten^ 
the coal city of Lens, but fail to capture it. 
Only a few sq. mi. of territory won. 

(c) Battle of the Aisne — French offensive — Sois- 
sons to Rheims (April-No v.) — drives the Ger- 
mans back beyond Chemm-de-Dames, with 
about 35,000 prisoners. 

Most wanton destruction marked the path of the Germans 
in retreat. Much as had been heard before, and witnesses, 
in Belgium and France, of the German atrocities, this fiendish 
desolation was a shock to the civilized world. 

(d) Messines ridge, blown up and occupied by 

British, in Belgium, near Ypres (June). 

2 This reversal taught the Allies the absolute necessity of unity of com- 
mand and unity of counsel among the Allies, and led directly to the 
Inter-Allied Council at Paris and to the appointment of Gen. Foch as 
Generalissimo of all the Allied armies on the West and Italian fronts. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 143 

(e) German attack on Ypres (July) — captured 
only about 1,200 prisoners. 

(f) Battle of Flanders — around Ypres — (July- 
Dec). English and French take all the high 
ground beyond Ypres. 

(g) French second counter-thrust at Verdun 
(Aug.-Sept.) — gains back remainder of ter- 
ritory German Crown Prince had taken at 
such cost the year before. 

(h) Battle of Cambrai (Nov.-Dec). 

(1) General Byng (Br.), without artillery 
preparation, advances on 35 miles front, 
capturing many villages, and advancing 
from 10 to 20 miles. 

(2) German similar counter-stroke gains back 
half the territory Gen. Byng had just 
captured. 

(i) American expeditionary force, under Gen. 
Pershing — 

(1) First United States troops land June 
26-27. 

(2) First American troops in action, October. 

(3) No heavy righting in 1917 on American 
sectors. 

2. In the East. 

(a) Russian winter offensive — checked by Germans 
(Jan.). 

(b) Russian summer offensive — under Kerensky 
and the new Russian republic. Captures 
Halicz and threatens Lemburg, when part of 
Russian forces mutiny, and break the power of 
the Russian drive. Followed by Russian de- 
mobilization and rule of the Bolsheviki. 

3. In Italy. 

(a) Italian campaign (July-Oct.). Progressing 
successfully, if slowly, when abruptly stopped 
by- 



144 The Causes Of War 

(b) Austro-German counter campaign (Oct. -Dec). 
By tactics similar to those used against Ser- 
bia and Roumania, with the additional vicious 
campaign of "propaganda" which disconcert- 
ed one of the Italian armies, the Teutons were 
able to drive the Italians back to the Piave 
river and take nearly 300,000 prisoners. But 
with speedy help from the British and French, 
with Gen. Foch in command, Italy was saved 
from threatened disaster. 

4. In Asia. 

(a) British Mesopotamian campaign (Feb.-Oct.). 
British recapture Kutel-Amera (Feb.) and 
capture Bagdad (March). 

(b) Russian aid to British in this sector stopped 
by Russian revolution. 

(c) Hejaz revolts, and declares independence of 
Turkey. 

(d) General Allenby (Br.) captures Jerusalem 
(Dec. 10). 

5. In the Balkans. 

(a) Complete collapse of Roumania (Jan.-Feb.), 
due to betrayal of Roumanians by Russia's 
Pro-German war minister Sturmer. 

(b) Saloniki armies of Allies powerless because 
of Russian revolution in hands of Bolsheviki ; 
but an army of 300,000 Greeks being trained 
to aid Allies in 1918. 

6. In Africa. 

(a) German East Africa, last German colony com- 
pletely overrun by Allies. 

7. Naval Operations. 

(a) Battles in Gulf of Riga — inconclusive. 

(b) Submarines — German renewal of unrestricted 
submarine warfaVe (Feb. 1) brings United 
States into the War, while it threatens in the 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 145 

spring and early summer months to starve 
England and France into surrender. 

V. The Year 1918 in the War. 
A. Military operations. 

1. In the East. 

(a) While Brest-Litovsk peace treaty is being 
made by Germany and the Bolsheviki, German 
invasion of Russia in violation of the treaty 
continues. ( Jan.-March.) 

(b) Finland, after declaring independence of Rus- 
sia, fights Bolsheviki "Reds," to gain it. 
Later Fins helped by German troops. 

(c) At least five civil wars going on in Russia: 
Fins vs. Bolsheviki; Ukraine vs. Bolsheviki; 
Bolsheviki and nobility of Esthonia ; Cossacks 
and Bolsheviki on the Don; Bolsheviki and 
Tartar on the Volga. (Feb.-March.) 

2. On Italian front. 

(a) Italians hold against repeated assaults of 
Austro-Germans (Jan.-Feb.), on Piave. Aid 
is given Italians by British and French, and 
finally, by American troops. 

3. On Western front. 

(a) Great German offensive (made possible by sur- 
render of Russia and release of half a mil- 
lion German troops from the Eastern front) 
begins against British in the West. (March 
21.) In 10 days Germans advance on an aver- 
age of 15 miles and reach a point within 12 
miles of Amiens — Battle front from Arras to 
La Fere. In last days of battle French come 
to aid of British. Germans had advanced to 
within 60 miles of Paris, and captured about 
1,000 sq. mi. of territory. Disaster to Brit- 
ish fifth army. 



146 The Causes Of War 

German long range gun bombards Paris 
(March 23, for week). 

(b) Second phase of German drive. 

(1) Battle of Amiens. With reinforcements 
of men and guns Germans renew drive 
upon Amiens. Allies drenched with poi- 
son gas from new, more deadly German 
shell. Americans (probably 100,000) — 
participate in this fight, and save Amiens 
(April 30). 

(c) Third phase of German offensive. 

(1) Battle line shifts further north, and Ger- 
mans advance and occupy Armentieres in 
Belgium and Messines ridge, near Ypres. 
(Broke Portugese line here.) Mt. Kem- 
mel falls to Germans. 

(d) Fourth phase (on the Aisne), (May 27-June 

i). 

(1) Germans cross Aisne, May 27. 

(2) Germans cross Vesle, May 28. 

(3) Germans reach Soissons, May 29. 

(4) Germans reach the Marne, May 30. 

(5) Americans halt Germans at Marne (June 
1 ) — Cross Marne and bring back German 

prisoners (June 19). 

(e) Fifth phase— (between Montdidier and Noy- 
on (June 9). 

(1) Germans achieve only slight gains on 60 
mile front. 

(f) Final German drive (Soissons to Rheims, July 
15-18). 

(1) Germans definitely halted within three 
days. 
4. Great Allied counter-offensive (started by Americans 
July 15). Americans captured Chateau-Thierry 
and drove Germans back across Marne. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 147 

(a) Americans strike apex of German Rheims- 
Soissons pocket. 

(b) French and Americans drive in sides of 
German pocket (July 18 through month of 
August), until the whole salient is obliterated. 
Fought Germans back continuously for seven 
weeks. 

(c) French, British and Americans launch ter- 
rific offenses in quick succession, all the way 
from Rheims to the North Sea (Aug.-Sept. 
10). A few of the details of their speedy suc- 
cesses are: 

(1) Australians occupy Perronne (Sept. 1). 

(2) British and French advance on 90 mile 
front, from Cambrai to Soissons, cap- 
turing Ham, Guiscard, Chauny, as some 
of leading objectives. 3 

(3) The first all-American army under ex- 
clusive American command in a dashing, 
brilliantly executed offensive completely 
wipes out the St. Mihiel salient (which 
the Germans had held for four years) in 
twenty- seven hours (Sept. 12-13). 

(d) British and French drive forward on both 
sides of St. Quentin and capture 10,000 pris- 
oners Sept. 18. — French take St. Quentin Oct. 
1. 

(e) American army assigned the difficult Argonne 
region begins (Sept. 26) the great final battle 
of the Argonne forest and country — advance 
continually until the very last hour of the 
war, on Nov. 11. 

(f) Similar Allied and American successes are 

•Allied armies capture 112,000 Germans in July and August. For 
complete account of the American participation in the war, July 15 to 
Nov. 11, see General Pershing's report to the Secretary of War in Jan., 
1919, number of Review of Reviews. 



148 The Causes Of War 

achieved all way north to region of the Bel- 
gian coast. (Oct.) 

(Here things were happening so rapidly over the various 
fields of conflict and in so many different departments of 
activity that we leave the Western front for a short time, 
to chronicle some of the major events in these other fields.) 

5. On the Eastern Front. 

(a) Germans advance toward Petrograd (Feb.). 

(b) Turks take Trebizond (Feb. 25). 

(c) Germans complete their conquest in Finland 
(May 3). 

6. In the Balkans, — Greeks attack Turks in Macedonia, 

(May 30) ; 1,700 prisoners. 

7. On Italian front, — Italians begin beating back Austro- 

Germans beyond Piave (Jan.), soon followed by 
Austrian offensive 1,000,000 strong which crossed 
the Piave, but is soon driven back (June- July). 

8. In Asia. 

(a) British take Jerico (Feb. 22), Damascus, 
and destroy Turk army (Sept.-Oct.). 

(b) Japanese, British and American (marines) 
troops land at Vladivostok (April 5-7), to 
oppose Germans and Bolsheviki. 

(c) British, in 700 mile march from Bagdad take 
Baku (oil fields.) 

B. Naval Operations. 

(a) British bombard and sink Goeben and B res- 
lean in Dardanelles (Jan. 20). 

(b) British attack Zeebrugge and Ostend sub- 
bases (April 23), effectively dam up one and 
all but destroy the other. 

C. In northern Europe (Russia), Allied and American 

troops land at Archangel, against Germans and 
Bolsheviki. 

D. In the Orient — American troops from Philippines land 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 149 

at Vladivostok (Aug. 15), to cooperate with Jap- 
anese and other Allies. 
E. Serbian (reorganized army) drive in Balkans defeats 
Bulgars and advances 60-70 miles — other Allies co- 
operate, and straighten line (Sept.-Oct.). 

WAR AND PEACE 

I. (1918) Concluded. (We shall go back to the first week 
in October, so as to connect up the last allied movements in 
the field better than we were able to the last month, before 
hostilities ceased.) 

A. The Crushing allied Drive (Oct. -Nov. 11). 

1. Germans evacuate Lens (coal center in France) (Oct. 

3. Austrian naval base at Durazzo destroyed by 
Italian, British and American ships (Oct. 3). 

2. French fleet take Bierut, Syria (Oct. 7). 

3. Cambrai falls (Oct. 7) to British. 

4. Americans clear Argonne forest of enemy (Oct. 11). 

Serbs occupy Nish same day. 

5. French take Laon and La Fere (Oct. 12). 

6. Belgians take Roulers (Oct. 13). 

7. Italians enter Durazzo, Albania (Oct. 14). 

8. Germans evacuating Brussels (Oct. 15); Bohemia in 

hands of revolutionists. 

9. Americans take Grand Pre. British enter Lille (last 

important stronghold of Germans in northern 
French except Valenciennes) (Oct. 16). 

10. Ostend, Zeebrugge and Thiult (sub-bases of Germans) 

occupied by Allies (Oct. 17). 

11. German army driven to border of Holland, — 15,000 

Germans cut off are interned in Holland (Oct. 21). 

12. British take Valenciennes (Oct. 22). 

13. Italian drive on Piave started — one of the greatest 

offensives of the war. Continues for only ten days y 
when 500,000 Austrians are taken prisoners and 



150 The Causes Of War 

250,000 horses and $1,000,000,000 fall into hands 
of Italians. Italians had only one regiment of 
Americans and five divisions of British and French, 
to help them; so the Italians must be given the 
credit for the biggest single military victory of the 
war. Half the Austrian forces of 1,000,000 men, 
were captured. This overwhelming disaster ex- 
plains Austria-Hungary's immediate suit for an 
armistice and speedy surrender (Nov. 4). 

14. British take Aleppo (in Turkey) and U. S. first army 

completes capture of 20,000 Germans (Oct. 26). 

15. British take Kerkuk (155 miles northwest of Bag- 

dad) (Oct. 27). 

16. Turks evacuate Baku (Oct. 29). 

17. French and Serbian cavalry reach Belgrade, thus 

freeing Serbia of Teutons (Nov. 1). 

18. Revolt of German sailors and soldiers at Kiel (Nov. 

6) presages revolution in Germany. 

19. U. S. troops take Sedan (Nov. 7), — where the Prus- 

sian army took prisoner the Emperor Napoleon 
III, with 200,000 troops, in 1870, and sealed their 
triumph of that year over France. 

20. Belgians reach Ghent; British, Mons; French reach 

Belgium (Nov. 11.) 4 

B. We shall now take up the armistice terms as imposed upon 
the chief Central Powers, Austro-Hungary and Germany, 
with a brief prelude of the political events that followed in 
rapid succession in the Central Powers during October and 
the first days of November. 

1. (a) Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates (Oct. 4), 
after Bulgaria's collapse in Macedonia. His 
son Boris takes throne. 

4 The allied advances continued everywhere along the Western front, 
with increasing speed, until the hour of 11:00 a. m., November 11, when 
the German military command had agreed to accept the Allied terms 
for an armistice as finally directed by the authority of Marshal Foch. 
Practically all of France and western Belgium was cleared before hos- 
tilities ceased. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 151 

(b) Bulgaria in revolution — King Boris quits 
(Nov. 2). 

(c) Turkish (War) cabinet resigns (Oct. 8). 

(d) Emperor Charles attempts reforms in Austria- 
Hungary, to save his empire (Oct. 18), but 
is too late. (Collapse of Austria-Hungary 
comes as result of Italian successes in last 
week of October.) Abdicates Nov. 11. 

(e) Von Hertling, last war chancellor of Germany, 
falls from Power (Oct. 3), and is replaced by 
Prince Maximilian, a man of peace (Oct. 4). 

(f) Kaiser consents to electoral reform (Sept. 
30), but too late. 

(g) During October German states carry out 
sweeping reforms, weakening Kaiser's war 
powers, granting suffrage reform, etc., but all 
too late. 

2. (a) New German Chancellor (Maximilian of Ba- 

den) asks for armistice and peace negotia- 
tions (Oct. 4). 

(b) President Wilson replies to German note of 
Oct. 4, on Oct. 7, refusing peace by negotia- 
tion. 

(c) Karl Liebnecht (anti-war Socialist), pardoned 
by Kaiser (Oct. 9). 

(d) Wilson calls for independence of Czechs and 
Jugo-Slavs from Austria-Hungary, as reply 
to Austria's plea for peace (Oct. 19). 

(e) German note accepts Wilson's terms of peace 
(Oct. 21). 

(f) Wilson refers German note of Oct. 21 to 
Allies (Oct. 28). 

(g) Turkey signs armistice (Oct. 31) ; Allied fleet 
sails for Constantinople. 

(h) Armistice with Austria-Hungary signed (Nov. 

3). 
(i) Kaiser refuses to abdicate (Nov. 8), but is 



152 The Causes Of War 

shown he must, and renounces Imperial and 
Prussian crowns (Nov. 9). 
(j) Germany (under Socialist ministry) accepts 
Allied terms of armistice, and hostilities cease 
(Nov. 11). By this date all four of the 
Central Powers had surrendered to Allies, on 
Allied terms. 

ARMISTICE TERMS 

II. Armistice Terms. 

1. Bulgaria. Surrenders to Allies on Sept. 30. 

(a) Bulgarian army to demobilize immedi- 
ately. 

(b) Arms, ammunition and supplies to be 
turned over to Allies. 

(c) All Greek and Serbian territory to be 
evacuated by Bulgarian troops. 

(d) All means of transportation, including 
the Danube, be opened to Allies for op^ 
erations against Austria and Germany. 
(By this action Turkey was completely 
cut off from her two remaining allies, 
Austria and Germany, and with con- 
tinued defeats, was soon upon her knees 
begging for peace.) 

8. Turkey surrenders to Allies (Nov. 1). Terms 
similar to those imposed on Bulgaria. 

3. Austria-Hungary surrenders to Allies (Nov. 
4). 5 

(a) Demobilize her armies and call home all 
Austria's troops helping Germany. 

(b) Withdraw all Austrian forces from in- 
vaded territories, leaving all war sup- 
plies, and even coal, to be disposed of by 
Allies. 

8 Because of their importance, and the relation they are certain to bear 
to the final peace terms we give the conditions that were imposed upon 
Austria-Hungary and upon Germany more in detail. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 153 

(c) Virtually one-half Austrian artillery and 
equipment on Austrian soil to be sur- 
rendered. 

(d) All Germans in Austria to leave within 
fifteen days or be interned. (Bulgaria 
had acted similarly with Germans and 
Austrians at earlier date.) 

(e) Allied and U. S. forces to take possession 
of all military points which they consid- 
ered needful. 

(f) Allies to have use of Austrian railroads 
to operate against Germany. 

(g) Austria surrendered all German submar- 
ines in Austrian waters, together with 
fifteen best Austrian submarines, three 
Austrian battleships, three cruisers, nine 
destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, and 
other naval vessels to be selected by the 
Allies. 

(h) All war vessels not surrendered to Allies 
to be concentrated and disarmed under 
Allied direction. 

(i) Austria-Hungary returns all Allied pris- 
oners of war, but Allies not to return 
Austrian prisoners. 

(j) Austria must not destroy property in her 
retreat. 

(k) Allied war and merchant vessels to have 
free navigation of all Austrian waters, 
including Danube (Allies to take pos- 
session of Danube fortresses, to guaran- 
tee its free navigation), for use against 
Germany. 

(1) Allied blockade of Austria and her allies 
subject to will of Allies. 

(m) All aircraft of Austria and her allies 



154 The Causes Of War 

left in Austria to be put out of commis- 
sion, and kept by Allies until after war 
ends with Germany. 

(n) All Austrian naval bases to be occupied 
by Allies, and all naval supplies or craft 
of Allies held by Austria to be sur- 
rendered. 

(o) Austria-Hungary to keep no army except 
as a police force to maintain order. 

(p) Italian claims (that which Italy went to 
war to gain) provinces held by Austria- 
Hungary before the war to be returned 
to Italy. Here the exact boundary mas 
laid out, with great precision, evidently, 
to mark out the boundary settlement in 
the final peace terms. 

(q) Local government (civil) to be reinstated 
in Austrian countries, but under Allied 
oversight and control. 6 
4. Germany's Terms of Armistice. (Surrendered 

to Allies, November 11.) 
I. Military clauses on Western Front. 

1. Immediate evacuation by Germany of in- 

vaded countries — Belgium, France, Al- 
sace-Lorraine, Luxemburg — to be com- 
pleted within fifteen days days from sig- 
nature of armistice. German troops not 
out by that time become prisoners of war. 
Allies to occupy territory as Germans re- 
treat. 

2. Repatriation, to be completed within four- 

teen days, of all inhabitants of above 

•The seventeen armistice points given above show how complete was 
the surrender of the Austro-Hungarian government. These armistice 
terms, which are not yet a peace, are more complete and humiliating than 
the "unconditional surrender" of any previous sovereign nation in mod- 
ern times. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 155 

mentioned countries, including hostages 
and persons under trial or convicted. 

3. Surrender of 5,000 guns; 30,000 machine 

guns ; 3,000 minen-werfers ; 2,000 aero- 
planes. 

4. Evacuation by German armies of all terri- 

tory on left bank of Rhine — these coun- 
tries to be administered by local authori- 
ties under Allied and U. S. control, or 
armies of occupation. A neutral zone 
east of Rhine to an average of about 35 
kilometers, from borders of Holland all 
the way to Switzerland, to be reserved, 
as safeguard, until peace. Germans have 
19 days from Nov. 11, to evacuate Rhine 
territory. 

5. Civilians in above territory to be left un- 

disturbed, with no damage to property or 
persons. Military establishments of all 
kinds to be turned over to Allies intact. 
Stores of food, etc., to be left for 
civilians. 

6. Five thousand locomotives, 50,000 wagons, 

10,000 motor lorries to be delivered to Al- 
lies, together with all railways of Alsace- 
Lorraine. All barges taken from Allies 
to be restored to them. 

7. Allied and U. S. armies to have right of 

requisition in all occupied territory. Up- 
keep of troops of occupation in 
Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) 
charged to Germany. 

8. German command must reveal all mines, 

fuses, etc., and assist in finding and 
destroying them ; also all poisoned wells, 
etc. 



156 The Causes Of War 

9. Immediate return of all allied and U. S. 

prisoners of war without reciprocity on 
Allies' part. 

10. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed 

from evacuated territory to be cared 
for by Germans, who will be given medical 
material required for same. 

II. Eastern German Front, 

1. Immediate evacuation by all German troops 

and German agents, of any territory 
which before the war belonged to Russia, 
Roumania or Turkey, and withdrawal 
within borders of Germany. 

2. German troops to cease all requisitions 

and seizures for German use, from said 
territories. 

3. Abandonment of treaties of Brest-Litovsk 

and Bucharest and supplementary treat- 
ies. 

4. Allies to have free access to territories 

evacuated by Germans on eastern front, 
in order to convey supplies of food, etc., 
to population, or for any other purpose. 

III. Unconditional Capitulation in East Africa 
within one month. 

IV. General Clauses. 

1. Repatriation of all allied and U. S. citi- 
zens whatsoever, not included in clause 9 
above. 

% Reparation for all damages done. Imme- 
diate restitution of the cash deposit of the 
National Bank of Belgium, restitution 
of Russian and Roumanian gold taken by 
Germany, same to be held in trust by 
Allies until final peace. 

V. Naval Conditions. 

1. Notification to neutrals by Germany that 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 157 

freedom of navigation in all territorial 
waters is given to naval and mercantile 
marines of allied powers. 
8. All naval and marine prisoners of war of 
Allied and associated powers to be re- 
turned, without reciprocity. 

3. Surrender to Allies and U. S. of 160 sub- 

marines. All other submarines to be 
paid off, disarmed and placed under su- 
pervision of U. S. and Allies. 

4. The following surface vessels to be surren- 

dered: six battle cruisers, ten battleships, 
eight light cruisers, fifty destroyers of 
most modern type. All other surface 
warships to be concentrated in German 
naval bases designated by Allies, and 
placed under supervision of Allies and U. 
S. All vessels of auxiliary fleet to be 
disarmed. 

5. All mines and obstructions laid by Ger- 

mans outside German territorial waters 
(this means the German war zone) to be 
swept away by help of Germans. 

6. Freedom of access to Baltic sea to be given 

to naval and merchantile marine of Allies 
and U. S., with their right to occupy 
German fortifications to guarantee same, 
and right to sweep all German territorial 
waters, with German aid. 

7. Allied blockade of Germany to continue 

and all German ships at sea liable to cap- 
ture. 

8. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and 

immobilized in German bases specified by 
Allies and U. S. 

9. In evacuating Belgian coast and ports Ger- 

many shall abandon all merchant ships, 



158 The Causes Of War 

tugs, lighters, cranes and harbor ma- 
terials, and inland navigation materials, 
stores and supplies of all kinds. 

10. All Black Sea ports to be evacuated by 

Germany, all Russian war vessels seized 
by Germany to be handed over to Allies 
and U. S. 

11. All Allied merchant vessels to be restored 

No destruction of ships or materials be- 
fore evacuation, surrender or restoration. 

12. German notification to world (especially 

Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland) 
that all restrictions on trading with Al- 
lies and associated countries, are re- 
moved. 

13. No transfer of German shipping to any 

neutral after signature to armistice. 

VI. Duration of armistice, 30 days, with option 

to extend. 

VII. Limit for German reply to armistice terms 
— 72 hours. 7 

The above, therefore, were the conditions that Germany 
accepted to gain an armistice, — a mere cessation of hostili- 
ties — not peace. 

A brief perusal of the above, and a comparison of the 
armistice terms imposed upon the Central Powers indi- 
vidually will reveal the fact that those Germany was obliged 
to meet were the most drastic of all, as indeed they should 
be. Moreover, they were the most specific and humiliating 
in all history ; and came only four months after the Kaiser 
boasted last July of German victory and the "shining Ger- 
man sword," as he was sacrificing 500,000 more of his sub- 

7 Slight changes were made in several of these armistice conditions 
before they were finally signed by the official German delegates, but were 
of a technical and very minor character, and did not at all alter the 
nature or severity of their application. 



Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 159 

jects in a struggle that every people but his own by that 
time realized was a hopeless one for him and all he stood for. 
Thus ends the "divine right" rule of the Hohenzollerns, and 
the "divinity that doth hedge about a king." 

The peace problem is quite a different issue. We shall 
take it up in our next chapter, and continue, as the 
peace conference sits. Yet, there are several clauses in the 
armistice terms that are meant to be permanent, such for 
example, as the giving up of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, 
the boundary marked out between Italy and the former 
States of the Austrian empire, the renunciation of Constan- 
tinople by Turkey, reparation for damages done, abandon- 
ment of all German official propaganda in Russia and the 
Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc. The exactness of the armistice 
terms and the permanent character of several of them, as 
well as the promptness with which they were submitted to the 
German commissioners after their application for them on 
November 7, shows that the men who framed them and the 
responsible statesmen back of them, had been shaping them 
for some time before hostilities ceased. Their effect there- 
fore was instant. 



CHAPTER XVI 

OFFICIAL PEACE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

WHILE we are awaiting the final consummation of the 
armistice conditions and the preliminaries of peace, 
we may well give our attention at this time to the study of 
the movements for peace up to the present. Accordingly, we 
shall take up these developments, as shown by the statements 
of war aims of the belligerents by the official representatives 
of those belligerents, or from semi-official sources. This will 
also include peace proposals from neutrals, as well as the 
principles of peace and peace terms, set forth from time to 
time by the United States and the allied nations, and by the 
Central Powers. 

Aside from the above movements there have been various 
efforts at peace, it is true, such as the peace propaganda by 
the Socialists, certain German-Americans, the Pan-German 
peace campaign, the "peace at any price" clique, etc. ; but 
these latter have all been so ill-advised, so absurd, or so un- 
American and abortive, that we need not consider them in this 
connection. Moreover, the crises in which they figured have 
all passed, and we may let that phase of the subject rest in 
oblivion. There is one outgrowth of these factors that will 
not rest, however, but has constantly become more menacing, 
— and that is, the Bolshevik movement in Europe and the 
principles of the I. W. W. in America. This condition 
among a considerable portion of the earth's people today is 
nothing less than a mental state and the philosophy of an- 
archy, and as such it must be met and put down. This state 
of anarchy is the other extreme from autocracy, and because 
it is actually being accomplished in governmental affairs in 

160 



Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 161 

Russia and threatening the other nations, must be met, if 
necessary, by force, and speedily suppressed. We shall have 
more to say of this lawless element later, but at present, let 
us return to our subject in hand. 

We are all rejoicing beyond our fondest hopes, at the 
happy termination of the war, the armistice conditions, and 
the political revolution in Germany since November 11, as it 
is natural and right we should be. But a word of warning 
is still in place, and indeed necessary, from the very fact 
that the war was over before many of us had fully grasped 
what it meant. There are still so many of us who have not 
realized the true nature of this war, and the significance of 
the issues involved, and the character of the government and 
political ideals of our chief adversary, that there is still 
danger of this country settling back into pre-war condi- 
tions and habits of thinking, and yielding up important in- 
ternational prestige and guarantees that alone can safe- 
guard the principles of democracy in the future. The war 
for democracy as intelligent Americans understand it, is 
not yet won, despite the defeat of the military masters of 
Germany. No greater mistake could be made than to think 
so. The real fight that affords the opportunity for the 
demonstration of democracy to the world, has just begun. 

We can, we must, make our final peace only with the legally 
and justly constituted representatives of the German people, 
not with any temporary revolutionary faction. We must 
know that these representatives have the unquestioned right 
and the unquestioned power to speak for the German nation 
as a whole, whatever that may prove to be. And the only 
way to be sure of that, is to act for final peace when, and not 
untilwhen,theGermanpeople,in a legal and democratic man- 
ner, have elected and established a democratic government 
with duly chosen delegates to speak for them in the peace 
conference of the nations. This demand is not vengeance on 
a defeated foe, it is simply justice and common sense. Ger- 
many has done much since the close of hostilities to further 



162 The Causes Of War 

the settlement of peace, but what she does with herself in 
the next few months will determine very largely the period 
and nature of peace deliberations at Versailles. 

It shall be our plan in this article to discuss the peace ad- 
vances and proposals in connection with our own govern- 
ment's part in them, and with President Wilson's speeches 
and diplomatic notes as a basis; for in studying his com- 
munications directly or indirectly, with the various belliger- 
ents, and their answers, and vice versa, we are taking note of 
all the important official action in the direction of peace 
on either side of the conflict. 

The President's first public utterance on the subject of 
peace after this war, is found in his address "America First," 
delivered before the Daughters of American Revolution, at 
Washington, D. C, October 11, 1915, and is as follows: 
"Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted 
principles of international law, only upon those things which 
remind nations of their duties to each other and deeper than 
that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity." This 
was said a year and a half before the United States entered 
the war. Thus early did the president speak out for a peace 
that would guarantee justice and the principles of humanity. 
From the first he was far more certain and consistent in his 
conception of the part America should take in the peace 
problems than he was as to the stand we were to take in the 
war; and that but proves that he was more a man of peace 
than he was of war, — as the average American was, — until 
the very last minute of neutrality. 

His first approach to a detailed statement of peace terms 
is found in his address before the United States Senate (Jan. 
22, 1917), on "A World League for Peace," still two months 
and a half before our entry into the war. After stating 
that "in every discussion of the peace that must end this 
war it must be taken for granted that a world league to 
enforce peace shall be formed, making impossible such a 



Official Peace Discussions and Negotiation* 163 

world catastrophe again," he continues. "It is inconceiv- 
able that the people of the United States should play no part 
in that great enterprise (peace) .... To take part in such 
a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought 
to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of 
their policy and the approved practices of their government 
ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high 
and honorable hope that it might . . . show mankind the 
way to liberty ... to add their power to the authority 
and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice 
throughout the world. 

"The treaties and agreements which bring it (the war) to 
an end must embody terms which will create a peace .... 
that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace 
that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of 
the nations engaged. 

"If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be 
a peace made secure by the organized major force of man- 
hind. 

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recog- 
nize and accept the principle that Governments derive their 
just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no 
right anywhere exists to hand people about from one sov- 
ereignty to another as if they were property. 

"... There should be a united, independent and au- 
tonomous Poland. . . . 

"So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now 
struggling toward a full development of its resources and 
powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great high- 
ways of the sea. . . . No nation need be shut away from free 
access to the open paths of the world's commerce. 

"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be 
free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, 
equality and cooperation. 

"... And the question of limiting naval armaments 



164 The Cannes Of War 

. . . opens up the question of the limitation of armies and 
of all programs of military preparation. . . . There can 
be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great 
preponderating armies are henceforth to continue here and 
there to be built up and maintained." 

By an analysis of the above statements we find that Presi- 
dent Wilson before the United States entered the war de- 
clared indispensable the following conditions of peace: 

1. A peace must be built up on the principles of interna- 

tional law and of humanity. 

2. There must be a World League to enforce peace. 

3. The United States must play a part in this peace. 

4. The peace must not be in the interest of any particular 

nation or group of nations, but must win the ap- 
proval of mankind. 

5. This peace must be built upon the principle that gov- 

ernments derive their just powers from the consent 
of the governed — a democratic peace. 

6. Poland must be reunited and given independence. 

7. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations. 

8. There must be a limitation of military and naval 

preparations and "all programs of military prepa- 
ration." 

Let us keep these points in mind, and see, as we proceed, 
how President Wilson has explained, enlarged upon and sup- 
plemented them, since January, 1917. We should ako note 
whether he has remained consistent in all essentials with his 
first utterances on this subject. 

On the occasion of his first war message to Congress 
(April £, 1917), the President made it clear that he still 
had the same ideas as to our part in and demands concern- 
ing the terms of peace and agreements of the nations in 
their league to enforce peace after the war. These are his 
words: "My own thought has not been driven from its 
habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the 



Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 165 

last two months (February and March, 1917), and I do 
not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered 
or clouded by them. I have exactly the same thing in mind 
now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 
22nd of January, last." 

He throws further light upon his idea of the League to 
Enforce Peace, however, by this further statement: "A 
steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except 
by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic gov- 
ernment could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe 
its covenants." 

Thus he adds one more condition to the eight listed above, 
namely : 

9. It must be a league of democratic nations. 

This of course implies that if the Central Powers are to 
join this league they must be genuinely transformed into 
democratic nations and governments. 

In his Flag Day address (June 14, 1917), the President 
makes this statement concerning the nature and purpose of 
the war and the peace that is to follow: "The great fact 
that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People's 
War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government 
amongst all the nations of the world . . . the German peo- 
ple included." This is abundant proof that if the President 
abides by his former conviction we shall never make a final 
peace with Germany until we are certain it is a democratic 
Germany with which we deal. And that, let me repeat, and 
no less the American people must demand, if this war is not 
to be in vain. 

We shall next give our attention to President Wilson's 
reply to the Pope's peace proposals (Aug. 27, 1917). The 
Pope's proposals as the President summarizes, are substan- 
tially as follows : 

1. That the nations "return to the status quo ante bellum" 
— (political condition before the war). 



166 The Causes Of War 

% That there be a "general condonation, disarmament, 
and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the 
principle of arbitration." 

3. That by a similar concert freedom of the seas be es- 
tablished. 

4. That the territorial claims of France and Italy, prob- 
lems of the Balkan States, restitution of Poland, etc., "be 
left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible," 
after the war. 

The President then proceeds with convincing force to 
point out that : 

(1) It is manifest that no part of this (Pope's) program 
can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the 
status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it ; 

(2) The status quo ante is not a basis upon which a firm 
and just peace can be established, for: 

(a) The object of this war is to deliver the free people 
of the world from the condition it was put in by the status 
quo ante of Germany before the war. The scathing indict- 
ment of Germany follows : "a vast military establishment 
controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having 
secretly planned to dominate the world, . . . delivered its 
blow fiercely and suddenly ; stopped at no barrier either of 
law or of mercy ; swept a whole continent within the tide of 
blood, not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of inno- 
cent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and 
now stands . . . the enemy of four-fifths of the world." 

(b) To deal with such a power according to the Pope's 
plan would "involve a recuperation of its (the German gov- 
ernment and military system) strength and a renewal of its 
policy," and compel a permanent hostile combination of na<- 
tions against it. 

These were plain, blunt words, but they were as true and 
convincing as they were plain, and they have helped much to 
revivify the Allies and to defeat Germany, and make the vic- 
torious peace of freedom's cause triumphant. 



Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 167 

In this speech there is just one more condition of peace 
that President Wilson contends for, — and it is the tenth 
one we have, before the great official peace communications 
and notes came to the United States from the Central Pow- 
ers after the United States entered the war. It is this : 
10. There should be no exclusive economic leagues against, 
or in favor of, any nation or group of nations after 
the war. There must be equal economic opportune 
ity for all nations. 
Next, we shall take up the "peace drives" of 1917, by 
the Central Powers, the Bolsheviki, and certain elements in 
some of the Allied countries. 



CHAPTER XVII 

peace negotiations (Continued) 

r t 1HE German ambassador informed me that a confer- 
•*■ ence had been held in Berlin m the early part of 
July, (19H), at which the date of the war was fixed. This 
conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wan- 
genheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. 
Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there, and so was Grand Ad- 
miral Von Tirpitz. With them were the leaders of German 
finance, the directors of the railroads, and the captains of 
industry. . . . Each was asked if he were ready for the 
war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who 
insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell for- 
eign securities and arrange their loans. (Two weeks more 
would make it the last of July, as actually happened.) 

"The Italian Ambassador at Constantinople announced 
that Baron Wangenhevm said the same thing to him, Italy, 
at that time being a member of the Triple Alliance. . . . 
All the details of the meeting were still (Aug. 26, 1914) fresh 
in Baron Wangenkeim\s mind." — Henry Morgenthau, for- 
mer American Ambassador to Turkey, in the New York 
World, Oct. 14, 1917. 

The above quotation from an official source is worth read- 
ing again and again, and fixing definitely in mind. Once 
more let me repeat, most assuredly we cannot admit Ger- 
many into the League of Nations until she has a genuine con- 
stitutional government and has repudiated everything that 
her former imperial and militaristic government has stood 
for — until she repents in sackcloth and ashes for the colossal 
weight of crime that she has heaped upon suffering humanity, 

168 



Peace Negotiations (Continued) 169 

under the leadership of her war lords and lords of trade and 
industry, who, as above shown in 1914, are still the real 
masters of Germany. 

There is as much reason to study the causes and nature 
of the war now as there has been at any time during its 
progress, for the simple reason, as we pointed out once be- 
fore, that we must know the cause of a disease in order to 
apply the remedy. And now, as the Supreme Council of the 
Nations is preparing the remedy, it is incumbent upon them 
and upon the peoples to whom they are responsible and whom 
they represent, to have the causes clearly and constantly in 
mind, if broken humanity is to be healed of its wounds in the 
future. At one and the same time we are face to face with the 
world's greatest opportunity and its greatest danger. That is 
why today witnesses the world's greatest crisis, and a great 
forward or great backward step is inevitable. Because of 
these facts the writer is adding a number of additional war 
study pamphlets to the list given a few months ago. Some 
have been referred to before, others have not, but none as 
definitely as they are now. 

Published by the Committee on Public Information : 

I. War Information Series 

No. 21 "America's War Aims and Peace Program." — 
Carl L. Becker, Cornell University. 1 

No. 14. "The War for Peace."— Arthur D. Call, Secre- 
tary American Peace Society. 

No. 13. "German Militarism and Allied Ideals." — Stuart 
P. Sherman, University of Illinois. 

No. 13. "The War Message and Facts Behind It."— 
Annotated text of President Wilson's War Message, April 
2, 1917. 

No. 14. "Why America Fights Germany." — John S. P. 
Tatlock, Stanford University. 

1 All quotations in this article without names of authors mentioned are 
taken from "America's War Aims and Peace Program." 



170 The Causes Of War 

No. % "The Nation in Arms," — Secretaries Lane and 
Baker. 

No. 16. "Study of the Great War." — Topical Outline, 

Samuel B. Harding, Indiana University. 

II. The "Red, White and Blue" Series 

January, 1918. "Conquest and Kulture." — Notestein 
and Stoll. 

March, 1918. "German Treatment of Conquered Terri- 
tory." 

January, 1918. "German War Practices." 

March, 1918. "War, Labor and Peace," — President 
Wilson. 

September, 1917. "The President's Flag Day Address." 

, 1917. "The Battle Line of Democracy." — Prose 

and Poetry of the World War. 

, 1918. "War Cyclopedia." — Reference Hand-book 

on the War. 

Germany' s First Peace Proposal 

At the close of our last chapter we were dealing with the 
Pope's peace message of the summer of 1917 and President 
Wilson's answer, rejecting the papal terms. The reader 
will recall that we proposed a consideration of the peace 
moves of the Central Powers next, and United States official 
negotiations with them. 

"The first official proposal for peace came from Germany, 
at the close of the year 1916, at a time when, in Germany's 
eyes, victory for her army was already at hand. In the west 
the Allies had no more than held the German line; while in 
the east the Central Powers had gained the aid of Turkey 
and Bulgaria, had overrun Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and 
had inflicted serious reverses upon the British in Mesopo- 
tamia. . . . During the first two years then closing, the 
fortunes of war were decidedly with Germany and her allies. 



Peace Negotiations (Continued) 171 

Under these circumstances the German government offered to 
discuss peace, confident that if the Allies accepted the offer 
she could get what she wished; while if they refused it, it 
could be made to appear that they were responsible for pro- 
longing the conflict." This was the offer contained in the 
German note of Dec. 12, 1916, and forwarded to the belliger- 
ents through the neutral powers. The substance of Ger- 
many's proposals at this time was as follows: 

(1) Though ready to continue the war (forced upon 
them), yet "prompted by the desire to avoid further blood- 
shed and make an end to the atrocities of war," all the Cen- 
tral Powers "propose to enter forthwith into peace nego- 
tiations." 

(2) These propositions "have for their object a guaran- 
tee of the existence, honor and freedom of the development" 
of the Central Powers and are "appropriate terms for the 
establishment of a lasting peace." 

(3) Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her 
enemies, which aim at her destruction. 

It was not an offer of terms, but an offer to stop the war 
if the Allies would agree to Germany's terms, whatever they 
might be. For the Allies to have accepted this proposal and 
a peace conference at that time would have been nothing 
less than an unconditional surrender to Germany. 

Reply of the Entente Governments 

The French denounced the proposal as a trap, and Lloyd 
George, speaking for Great Britain, stated that it would 
be nothing less than "putting our heads into a noose with the 
rope end in the hands of the Germans." Quoting Lincoln's 
words, he further stated, "We accepted the war for an ob- 
ject, a worthy object. The war will end when that object is 
attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that 
time." In his speech Lloyd George also spoke of "complete 
restitution, full reparation and effective guarantees," and 



172 The Causes Of War 

that the Allies "refuse to consider a proposal which is empty 
and insincere.'' 

The Allied answer amounted to this: 

(1) "Reparation for violated rights and liberties." 

(2) "Recognition of the rights of nationality." 

(3) "Free existence of small states." 

In this it will be seen that Great Britain and France were 
championing the rights of nationality and of small states 
as early as 1916 in the war, as sine qua non of peace. 

It was about this time (December 18, 1916, to be exact) 
that President Wilson addressed his first feeler and peace 
note to the belligerent powers. The main features of this 
communication are: 

(1) Each side professes to be fighting defensive war. 

(2) Each side professes to be the champion of small na- 

tions, and — 

(3) Each side professes to be "ready to consider the for- 

mation of a League of Nations to insure peace and 
justice throughout the world;" and therefore, 

(4) "The objects for which both sides are fighting, stated 

in general terms, seem to be the same" ; therefore, 

(5) Each side might state in definite terms what would 

satisfy them and their people, or in other words, 
what they are fighting for. 

(6) The President is justified in making this request be- 

cause the United States is "as vitally interested as 
the Governments now at war," in the "measures to 
be taken to secure the future peace of the world." 
So, we see, in his first general communication to the war- 
ring countries President Wilson declared that the United 
States must have a part in the settlement of world peace. 
This, we must remember was four months before our entry 
into the war. But the emphasis the President put upon the 
part United States must play in the determination of peace 
was lost sight of in the violent criticism that was voiced in 
Great Britain and France, as well as in some portions of our 
own country, from the fact that he did not distinguish in 



Peace Negotiations (Continued) 17S 

this note between the different aims and states of the Allied 
and Central Powers in the war. And many still believe that 
in stating that in general terms the objects of both sides 
seem to be the same, President Wilson was justly offending 
the Allied powers and stretching the attitude of neutrality to 
wholly unjustifiable bounds. However that be, this note of 
inquiry elicited answers from the Allies that were far more 
definite terms than had ever been stated before. 

The Central Powers in their united reply merely stated 
that they were "ready to meet their antagonists in confer- 
ence to discuss terms of peace." This was conclusive proof 
that the Central Powers did not desire the world and much 
less their own people to know for what aims of conquest and 
domination] their autocratic governments were sacrificing 
them by the millions. Such always is the secret diplomacy 
of irresponsible kings and greedy, unscrupulous militarists. 

The Entente (Allied) Powers, as President Wilson pointed 
out, "have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in 
general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply 
details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of repara- 
tion which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a 
satisfactory settlement." To quote further from this ad- 
dress to the Senate (January 22, 1917), "We are that much 
nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the 
present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the 
international concert which must hereafter hold the world 
at peace." And as the President here stated, he had brought 
the peace settlement just that much nearer, by revealing to 
the world the essential democracy of the Allies' cause as 
against the sinister, secret, Machiavellianism of the Central 
Powers. And just to that extent, also, he was preparing 
the United States for the day soon to come, when she must 
vindicate her right to be called a democracy by throwing 
in her powerful aid with the other liberal governments of the 
world to save to the world the cardinal American principle of 
"government by the consent of the governed." 

This speech of President Wilson (Jan. 22, 1917), as weD 



174 The Causes Of War 

as his reply to the Pope (Aug., 1917), was treated in last 
month's article, and therefore will not be further analyzed 
here. 

"The general effect of these events was to bring into 
clearer light the fundamental issues of the war," especially, 
after the Russian revolution which overthrew the Czar 
(March, 1917), and the entry of the United States into the 
war (April 6, 1917). Sixteen more states now declared 
war on Germany or severed diplomatic relations with her. 
This all brought on an internal crisis in Germany, with the 
upshot that the Reichstag on July 11 refused to vote war 
credits for the time being, and repudiated the annexationist 
scheme of the war party (which was in power). Bethmann- 
Hollweg resigned the imperial chancellorship, and the Reichs- 
tag resolutions were published to the world. They are 
worth noting in this connection: 

(1) Germany fights in self-defence, to preserve her ter- 

ritories. 

(2) The Reichstag is for peace and "lasting reconcilia- 

tion among the nations." 

(3) It is against "forced acquisitions of territory, and 

political, economies and financial violations." 

(4) It rejects all plans for an economic blockade and 

the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after 
the war. 

(5) The freedom of the seas must be assured. 

(6) The Reichstag will work for international arbitration 

— "jurisdictional organizations." 
From the above points it is easily seen that the Reichs- 
tag was moving for peace; it was answering to the world 
what the Kaiser and his government and army disdained to 
answer. It was the voice of the German people that the 
Reichstag had heard, — their reaction to the democratic 
peace terms that President Wilson and the peoples and gov- 
ernments of the Allies had forced upon their attention. But 
what did the voice of the German people or the resolutions 



Peace Negotiations (Continued) 175 

of the Reichstag amount to, at that stage of the war? 
Kaiser Wilhelm with his war lords rode rough-shod and 
defiantly over the German people and their representatives, 
brandished again his "shining sword," and with God's help, 
promised a German junker's peace. And the people and the 
Reichstag were not again heard from until the last days of 
the war. The "shining sword" had so dazzled them that 
they were again ready to follow their "God's anointed"; 
and the collapse of Russia confirmed their belief in victory. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (Concluded) 

IN our last chapter we gave some space to a consideration 
of the German-Bolshevik peace developments and their 
effects on peace negotiations throughout the world. A fur- 
ther examination of this conspiracy is necessary to a proper 
conception of its nature and results, especially, upon Russia 
and upon German honor before the world. 

Brest-Litomk Conference and Peace Treaty 

Winning support, as it did, among Socialists and certain 
labor and pacifist elements everywhere, this abortive peace 
offensive of the Bolshevists and Germans constituted for 
months a distinct danger and threat to the Allies and the 
cause of democracy. Tremendous pressure was brought to 
bear upon the Allied governments to "negotiate peace" 
with their enemies. But the defiant refusal of the heads of 
the Allied and American governments to surrender the 
principles for which they fought soon brought all effective 
opposition to an end, as their peoples became aware of the 
nature of these German-Anarchist schemes. 

The exact nature of the Russian surrender to the German 
government is revealed in the following statement in the 
introduction to "War Information Series" No. 20, (Oct., 
1918): "The documents show that the Bolshevik revolu- 
tion was arranged for by the German Great General Staff 
and financed by the German Imperial Bank and other Ger- 
man financial insitutions. 

"They show that the treaty of B rest-Lit ovsk was a be- 

176 



Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 177 

trayal of the Russian people by the German agents, Lenine 
and Trotsky; that a German-picked commander was chosen 
to 'defend' Petrograd against the Germans ; that German 
officers have been secretly received by the Bolshevik govern- 
ment as military advisers, as spies upon the embassies of 
Russia's allies, as officers in the Russian army and direc- 
tors of the Bolshevik military, foreign and domestic policy. 
They show, in short, that the present Bolshevik government 
is not a Russian government at all, but a German govern- 
ment acting solely in the interests of Germany and betray- 
ing the Russian people, as it betrays Russia's natural al- 
lies, for the benefit of the Imperial German government 
alone." 

Not only did the Allied countries and United States sus- 
pect all this treachery and later find it out for a fact, but 
there were even Germans who admitted it. "A German 
politician, writing in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung of Aug. 
27, 1918, stated: 'We have brought about treaties of peace 
at Brest and Bucharest (with Roumania) which correspond 
to our interest, but not to our principles as we presented 
them in the peace offer.' 9 — War Information Series £1, p. 26. 

The Final Developments Before the Armistice 

On July 4, 1918, President Wilson reiterated his state- 
ment that there could be no peace while the Imperial Ger- 
man Government, which was responsible for the war, re- 
mained in power. And he laid down the "ends for which the 
associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must 
be conceded them before there can be peace: 

(1) "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere 
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice dis- 
turb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently 
destroyed, at least its reduction to a virtual impotence. 

(2) "The settlement of every question, whether of terri- 
tory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of politi- 



178 The Causes Of War 

cal relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not 
upon the basis of material interest or advantage of any 
other nation or people which may desire a different settle- 
ment for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. 

(3) "The consent of all nations to be governed in their 
conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor 
and respect for the common law of civilized society that 
governs the individual citizens of all modern states in their 
dealings with one another; to the end that all promises and 
covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or 
conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impun- 
ity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foun- 
dation of a mutual respect for right. 

(4) "The establishment of a League of Nations that will 
check every invasion of right-^-affording a tribunal — to 
which all must submit, and by which every international re- 
adjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the 
peoples directly concerned, shall be sanctioned." 

In his New York address of Sept. 27 (1918), the Presi- 
dent once more declared that he could not make peace with 
the governments of the Central Empires on any sort of 
bargain or compromise whatsoever, since we cannot accept 
their word for anything. In this address he speaks more 
definitely and in detail on the matter of a League of Nations. 
Without reserve he declares that the League must be formed 
— not before nor after the peace is made, but in the peace 
council itself; also, that the League is the "most essential 
part of the peace settlement itself." And, as we all know, 
he won his point in the Peace Council at Versailles by hav- 
ing the constitution of the League drawn up as the very first 
permanent work of the Conference. Whether the necessary 
two-thirds majority of the United States Senate ratifies 
this constitution or not, the evidence throughout the world 
at present is, that the peoples of the nations are looking 



Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 179 

forward with confidence that the League of Nations will be 
established as a remedy for war in the future. 

The President throws still further light upon his concep- 
tion of the League of Nations by the following "particulars" 
which he states in this same (Sept. 27) speech: 

(1) "The impartial justice meeted out must involve no 
discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and 
those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a jus- 
tice that plays no favorites 

(2) "No separate or special interest of any single nation 
or group of nations" can be made if such "is not consistent 
with the common interest of all. 

(3) "There can be no leagues or alliances or special cove- 
nants and understandings within the general and common 
family of the League of Nations. 

(4) " . . . No special, selfish, economic combinations 
within the League and no employment of any form of boycott 
or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by ex- 
clusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the 
League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and con- 
trol. 

(5) "All international agreements and treaties of every 
kind must be made known to the rest of the world." 

As has been pointed out by several students of President 
Wilson's speeches, his program for the peace of the world is 
found in his fourteen points of January 8, 1918, his four 
points of July 4, and his five points of September 27, 1918, 
(just noted above). These three pronouncements, taken 
together, are known as his twenty-three peace points. 

Analysis of President Wilsons Program 

We shall now make a brief analysis of the above twenty- 
three points, as enunciated by President Wilson. Some he 
has repeated, expounded, or enlarged upon a number of 



180 The Causes Of War 

times. Others he has modified somewhat, due to fundamental 
political changes in the governments or political condi- 
tions in the Central Powers ; but, in their spirit and in their 
essentials these points remain the same. We may state 
their essence as follows : 

1. A peace must be built up on the principles of interna- 

tional law and of humanity. 

2. There must be a World League to enforce peace. 

3. The peace must not be in the interest of any particu- 

lar nation or group of nations, but must be in 
the common interest of all, large and small states 
alike. 
4s. This peace must win the approval of the people of the 
nations — of the major force of mankind. 

5. It must be built upon the principle that governments 

derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed — a democratic peace. 

6. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations, great 

and small. 

7. There must be a limitation of military and naval arma- 

ments, "of all kinds of military preparation." 

8. There must be a reunited and independent Poland — 

along the line of nationality. 

9. Alsace-Lorraine must be returned to France. (His 

statements amount to this.) 

10. Italy must receive Italian provinces of the Trentino 

and Trieste (Italia Irredenta), in so far as these 
regions are unquestionably Italian. 

11. All German occupation and political domination in 

any part of former Russia must cease (i. e. as 
Russia was in 1914). 

12. There should be no exclusive economic leagues in 

favor of, or against, any nation or group of na- 
tions, after the war. 

13. There must be absolutely no secret treaties, covenants 



Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 181 

or international agreements between any nations 
or group of nations, but all treaties, etc., must 
be published to all the world. 

14. Open minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial 

claims must be secured, with the interests of the 
peoples concerned uppermost in mind. (This de- 
veloped into a mandatory for the German colonies, 
and perhaps others, in the League of Nations.) 

15. Restoration of Belgium, with full sovereignty, and 

reparation, by Germany. 

16. Peoples of Austria-Hungary must be given autonomy 

— self-government. (This was changed later to 
complete independence for Czecho-Slavs and Jugo- 
slavs, after President Wilson recognized their in- 
dependence ; and he made the acceptance of this 
change a condition of acceptance of an armistice 
with Austria-Hungary.) 

17. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro must be left to 

determine their own future, and Serbia must be ac- 
corded "free and secure access" to the Adriatic. 
All the Balkan states' differences must be settled 
along "historically established lines of allegiance 
and nationality." 

18. Turkish portions of the Ottoman empire should be 

left for the Turks, unmolested ; but in parts where 
non-Turkish populations predominate such peo- 
ples should be given complete self-government 
within their provinces. 

19. Specifically, there must be no bargaining of nations 

at the peace table, — one nation granting another 
some such advantage in order to secure a corres- 
ponding advantage for itself, etc., but each part 
of final settlement based on the "essential justice of 
that particular case," 

20. That all well-defined national aspirations be accorded 

the utmost satisfaction possible without adding new 



182 The Causes Of War 

elements of discord, as well as (in 19 above) "abso- 
lutely no handing about or division of peoples as 
if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game" 
(such as in division of Poland in eighteenth cen- 
tury). 
21. The relationship of nations with one another to be 
governed by exactly the same code of morals and 
principles of conduct as that which obtains between 
individuals in all modern civilized society. (Just 
the opposite to Gen. Von Bernhardi's German doc- 
trine in his "Germany and the Next War.") 

A consideration of the above twenty-one more or less 
separate propositions will show that President Wilson has 
set forth (notwithstanding the many criticisms of their "in- 
definiteness," valid criticisms to a degree) the most complete, 
definite and comprehensive peace program that has come 
from any source, despite the fact that the details in many 
respects are lacking. Moreover, since all the Central Pow- 
ers accepted President Wilson's peace program as a basis 
for an armistice and peace negotiations, it was certainly 
imperative that the author of this program, above all others, 
be present at the Congress of Versailles, to interpret his own 
propositions. Such a consideration should silence once for 
all the opposition to and criticism of, his leaving the United 
States in the interest of humanity and peace — for his own 
country and the world alike. Opposition to some of his 
principles is valid, and the inalienable right of his fellow- 
citizens; but opposition to the part he is playing in the 
peace negotiations is a totally different thing, and is in- 
excusable, from every point of view. It is right, and it is 
to be hoped that such action may react disastrously upon 
these critics. 

There are three of the abo^e propositions, however, that 
the writer would call the reader's attention to, in particular. 
One is the demand for "absolute freedom of the seas." No 



Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 183 

one knows just what that means, and there are conflicting 
opinions as to what it might mean in the League of Na- 
tions. An able statement of the difficulties involved in this 
point — as well as others — is given by Joseph H. Odell, in 
Nov. 6, 1918, issue of the Outlook. ("The President's Four- 
teen Points.") 

The second point is the President's plan for the disposal 
of Turkey. In an early chapter of the series on the Causes 
of War the writer made this statement (in 1917) : "Turkey 
must leave Europe, where she has never had a right to be. 
Turkey is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never 
has been. She has always existed unnaturally, by a criminal 
subjection of peoples who otherwise would long since have 
been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If there ever 
was a chimerical state, it has been the Ottoman Empire. 
Her whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine and mur- 
der." All evidence and disclosures of her action during the 
war, which have recently been thoroughly exposed, serve only 
to justify this demand and make it doubly insistent. The 
writer would refer the reader especially to Ambassador Mor- 
ganthau's story, just published in book form — the part deal- 
ing with Armenia, Syrian and Greek massacres and cruel- 
ties, as well as the nature of the Turkish Government. 

The third point is concerning the "breaking down of 
economic barriers." What shall this "breaking down of all 
economic barriers" between nations include? Does it in- 
volve the doing away with all protective tariff between na- 
tions? If so what about war materials? The present 
League of Nations Constitution urges government owner- 
ship or control of all war materials or their production. 
Certainly, unless the League of Nations becomes a permanent 
preventive of war, the United States cannot be dependent, 
upon any foreign power for war materials and manufactures. 
It must protect these industries sufficiently to build them 
up to a safe war basis, in readiness for any time of danger. 
Tremendous difficulty will also be experienced in bringing 



184 The Causes Of War 

all the protective tariff nations to the point of giving up this 
commercial privilege in favor of their own industries. This 
point presents a veritable Chinese puzzle ; and it may prove 
to be a puzzle that is unsolvable. Yet, something along 
this line should by all means be done, to prevent the benefits 
of a great portion of the world's commerce going to certain 
great commercial nations and privileged classes in those na- 
tions, to the detriment of all others — small, non-commercial 
nations in particular. Part of the difficulty may be over- 
come by a free commercial rivalry among the nations ; but 
great international "trusts" and monopolies must also be 
regulated. Something toward a solution might be obtained 
by government ownership of those industries that might need 
protection. Certainly this last is one possible solution, since 
government ownership is one of the biggest industrial issues 
the world over, to-day. 

The above situation, while presenting difficulties for the 
League of Nations, on the other hand is only one of the 
many instances that demand this effective League as the only 
alternative to a virtual race-suicide through war in the fu- 
ture. It is scarcely worth while discussing an international 
court of arbitration if there is to be no League of Nations 
behind it. The present League may not be permanent, may 
not include all the world — and may not be satisfactory in a 
number of respects — so. much can scarcely be expected from 
it — but it must lead finally to a permanent league of the 
nations of the earth. No other outcome is thinkable. This 
final League may not be realized in our day, but our day 
must make it possible and start it on its way. This is the 
supreme duty and privilege of the present generation. I 
shall have more to say of this League in a later chapter. 

There is one feature of the final negotiations between the 
German Government and President Wilson, leading directly 
to the Armistice and German surrender of Nov. 11 that is 
very significant — in the light of political development in 
Germany since. And that is, that President Wilson by his 



Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 185 

unshakable demand that the German people must speak for 
peace rather than the Imperial German Government alone, 
whose word he could never take for sincerity — that the 
President himself in this demand in Germany's hour of disas- 
ter, drove the Kaiser from his throne, and the German 
princes from theirs. In other words, it was President Wil- 
son, together with the overwhelming victories of Allied arms 
in the last days of the war, and not the German people as a 
democracy, that drove the Hohenzollerns from power. And 
for that very reason the German nation cannot yet be ac- 
cepted as a true democracy. Nations do not change their 
fundamental ways of thinking so soon, and never primarily 
by force. Germany has a splendid chance to develop a great 
democracy ; but let us not be too hasty in receiving her with 
open arms, as a regenerated criminal. 



CHAPTER XIX 



THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 



AFTER so much has been written and said on the sub- 
ject of the "League of Nations," and especially, as it 
is being so widely discussed pro and con, at present, the 
writer would hardly feel justified in adding a chapter on this 
question to the present treatise on the War, were it not for 
two phases of the momentous peace problem which have not 
been so widely discussed, and which have been more or less 
neglected or ignored. These two phases are: (1) the Ger- 
man attitude and point of view on the matter of a League 
of Nations or International Arbitration, and (2) the 
progress of this League idea among the Allied Powers in the 
years just preceding the War. 

And now, to take up the German attitude first. Few per- 
sons, among those who have not given the matter close study, 
realize how thoroughly the great German teachers and writ- 
ers, political and military, dominated the thought and molded 
the convictions of the German nation. True, we have been 
told in our War Information campaign, that the German 
people had no will of their own, followed blindly their leaders, 
because they had been taught and felt that they had to fol- 
low them, etc. But, not until we begin to investigate this 
phenomenon for ourselves do we realize how the leaders, 
as those mentioned above, furnished the very moral, political 
and military gospel for the nation — and that not alone 
because they molded the thought of the people, but because 
they worked and thought along with the nation, and in some 
instances took counsel of the people and their temper. That 
there was a very strong undercurrent of the common people 

186 



The League of Nations 187 

against all this new militant doctrine, is true; but such an 
undercurrent did not and could not mold the character of the 
German nation. 

Because of the almost unlimited influence of these literary 
and political "lights," therefore, we shall examine briefly 
their teachings and attitude toward peace and a "society 
of nations" as the best means of answering our first question 
above. Note these quotations : 

"They (Governments) usually employ the need of peace 
as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. 
This was the position of affairs at the Hague Congresses, 
and this is also the meaning of the action of the United 
States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried 
to conclude treaties for the establishment of arbitration." — 
(von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War.") 

"Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the ef- 
forts of President Taft a great step forward in the path to 
perpetual peace." (Idem. p. 17.) 

"This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations 
anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage. 
... It has always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted 
ages that have played with the dream of perpetual peace." 
— (H. von Treitschke, greatest German historian.) 

Frederick the Great, who is very much quoted in recent 
years in Germany and considered as the greatest of the Ger- 
man rulers, and is idolized as no other among his people, 
once said : "In matters of state, when a man stops to con- 
sider he is a Christian, he is lost." 

"War is a biological necessity of the first order." — (Von 
Bernhardi.) 

"So long as there are men who have human feelings and 
aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an 
enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests 
come into being, and occasions for making war arise." — 
(Bernhardi.) 

"The extra-social and super-social structure which guides 



188 The Causes Of War 

the eternal development of societies, nations and races, is 
war" — (Claus Wagner.) 

"War is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in 
nature." — (A. W. Von Schlegel.) 

"Between states the only check upon injustice is force, and 
in morality and civilization each people must play its own 
part and promote its own ends and ideals. No power exists 
which can judge between states and make its judgment pre- 
vail." — ( Bernhardi. ) 

"Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new 
territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its pos- 
sessors — that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a 
law of necessity. — (Ibid.) 

"Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as 
to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War 
gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on 
the very nature of things." — (Ibid. p. 23.) 

"The knowledge therefore, that war depends on biological 
laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it 
from international relations must be demonstrably unten- 
able"— (Ibid, p. 24.) 

"To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, 
and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individ- 
ual leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a 
whole, struggle, the. most essential vital principle, would 
be ruled out. Any action in favor of collective humanity 
outside the limits of the State and Nationality is impossi- 
ble. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Uto- 
pias. " — (From Schleiermacher, quoted by Bernhardi.) 

"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State 
from social petref action and stagnation." — (Kuno Fischer.) 

"War is elevating, because the individual disappears be- 
fore the great conception of the State What a per- 
version of morality to wish to abolish heroism among men!" 
— (Treitsche. Trietsche is referred to by scores of German 
writers and speakers as their great historian-philosopher.) 



The League of Nations 189 

"States which from various considerations are always ac- 
tive in this direction (peace) are sapping the roots of their 
own strength. The United States of America in June, 
1911, championed the ideas of universal peace m order 
to be able to devote their undisputed attention to money- 
making and the enjoyment of wealthy and to save the three 
hundred million dollars which they spend on their navy; they 
thus incur a great danger, the loss of all chance of contest 
with opponents of their own strength. . . . If they ad- 
vance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for 
such a policy." — (Bernhardi.) 

"This law (the law of Christian love) can claim no sig- 
nificance for the relations of one country to another, since 
its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. 
. . . Christian morality is personal and social, and in its 
nature cannot be political." — (Ibid.) 

"Proposals are made from time to time — to settle the dis- 
putes which arise between the various countries by Arbitra- 
tion Courts, and to render war impossible. The politician 
who — honestly believes in their practibility must be amaz- 
ingly short-sighted. . . . Where does the power reside 
which insures the execution of this judgment when pro- 
nounced ?" — (Bernhardi. ) 

"In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, 
declared in 1908 that the High Court of International Jus- 
tice established by the Second Hague Conference would be 
able to pronounce definite and binding decisions by virtue of 
the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The pres- 
ent leaders of the American peace movement seem to share 
this idea. A general arbitration treaty between two coun- 
tries affords no guarantee of permanent peace. . . . If these 
relations change . . . then every arbtriation treaty will burn 
like tinder and end m smoke.** — (Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, in a speech to the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.) 

"The efforts directed toward the abolition of war must 
not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must 



190 The Causes Of War 

be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race." — (Bern- 
hardt "Germany and the Next War," p. 34.) 

"By Courts of Arbitration . . . the weak nation has the 
same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The 
whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the 
natural law of development, which can lead only to the most 
disastrous consequences for humanity generally." — (Ibid.) 

"A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the 
political world when national character and military tradi- 
tion act and react upon each," says Bernhardi. "These are 
the words of Clauswitz, the great philosopher of war, and he 
is incontestably right" — (Ibid.) 

"God will always see to it that wars recur as a drastic rem- 
edy for the human race," says Treitschke; and like him, 
Bernhardi declares, "Our people must learn to see that the 
maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a 
policy." 

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's 
power by successful and deliberately planned wars," says 
Bernhardi ; and with regard to Frederick the Great the same 
author, agreeing with Treitschke, declares that "None of the 
wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of 
them did he postpone as long as possible. He had always 
determined to be the aggressor." 

"The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a 
political means has always led to happy results. . . . The 
lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which 
have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have 
had the happiest results." — (Bernhardi, p. 43.) 

"The end-all and be-all of a State is power, — and he who 
is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not 
meddle with politics" — (Treitschke.) 

Kaiser Wilhelm II repeatedly remarked that his army 
and navy, and not parliamentary bodies and negotiations 
with other countries, were his main reliance and the hope of 
Germany ; and when he made the historic statement that "Ger- 



The League of Nations 191 

many's future lies upon the water," he was counting the years 
until the "inevitable day" that was the toast of many a Ger- 
man drink in high naval, military, and governmental circles. 
What faith could such characters have in a true "freedom of 
the seas"? 

"The State is itself the highest conception in the wider 
community of man . . . for there is nothing higher than 
it in the world's history. . . . The verdict of history will 
condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsi- 
bility of a bold decision, and sacrifice the hopes of the future 
to the present need of peace." — (Bernhardi, referring es- 
pecially to the German reverses in the Moroccan crisis, 1909- 
1911.) 

"While on the one side she (United States) insists on the 
Monroe Doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own 
arms toward Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her 
fleets. . . . The United States' aim at the economic, and 
where possible, the political command of the American conti- 
nent, and at the naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their 
interests, both political and economic, notwithstanding all 
commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those 
of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter 
this. . . . Again, the principle that no State can ever 
interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant 
to the highest rights of the State. . . . No one stands above 
the State ; it is sovereign. . . . In no case, therefore, may a 
sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the 
affairs of other States." — (Bernhardi.) (How, then, can it 
enter into a League of Nations, to enforce peace or justice?) 

In hinting at the turn of affairs of "the next war," Gen- 
eral Bernhardi made the following comment on Germany's 
justification should she break her treaty and violate Belgian 
neutrality: "This argument (in favor of breaking the neu- 
trality treaty) is the more justifiable because it may safely 
be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany (notice he 
puts Germany first) against France and England, the two 



192 The Causes Of War 

last mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Bel- 
gium" (a thing which they did not do, but which Germany 
did do, in violation of her pledged word). — (Bernhardi.) It 
is highly significant that this suggestion was published to the 
German nation three years before the deed actually happened 
in August, 1914. It is easy from this evidence of purpose 
to trace whence originated that German fiction that England 
and France both had attacked, or would immediately, attack 
Germany through Belgium, on the 1st of August, 1914. 
(The German versions of the story varied from day to day, 
you will recall.) We have always heard that an evil-minded 
person thinks evil of others. 

And again, "That England would pay much attention to 
the neutrality of weaker nations when such a stake ( a general 
naval and continental war was at issue is hardly credible." 
— (Bernhardi, Ibid, p. 158.) 

"It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists 
merely for defense." — (Ibid, p. 228.) 

"We must also devote our full attention to submarines, 
and endeavor to make them more effective in attack." — 
(Ibid, p. 234.) 

"We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty 
towards civilization than the Great Asiatic power (Japan). 
We, like the Japanese, can fulfil it only by the sword." — 
(Ibid.) 

"In one way or another we must square our account with 
France, if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. 
. . . This is the first and foremost condition of a sound 
German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all 
cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be 
settled by force of arms. France must be so completely 
crushed that she can never again come across our path!' 9 — 
(Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," p. 106.) Pray, 
reader, does this not explain the terrible German terror in 
France during the War? — in Belgium, and in all sections 
that might be of any strength against Germany should they 
not "be so completely crushed"? 



The League of Nations 193 

The above quotations are but a fraction of the declara- 
tions among leading Germans that serve to show their atti- 
tude toward a League to Enforce Peace, and toward inter- 
national conciliation by means of Arbitration Courts. The 
temper of the whole German policy, up to the very hour of 
their final defeat last November, is strongly opposed to a 
League of Nations, whose fundamental purpose is to estab- 
lish lasting peace for mankind. They, — and the leaders of 
the German Government at the time of the armistice are the 
same as its leaders today, — gave sanction to the League of 
Nations idea in President Wilson's fourteen points only be- 
cause of military and political necessity. The German peo- 
ple I dare say had hardly entertained the idea of a League to 
enforce peace until it was forced upon them in the last days 
of the war. Just another incident to illustrate the spirit 
that was abroad among the people in Germany in the years 
before and leading up to the War, which unmistakably shows 
the effect of such teaching as we have noted above. The 
writer has an intimate friend, an English professor of music. 
His family had friends in Germany, whom they were visiting 
a few years ago, i. e., German friends. Although on very 
intimate and friendly terms, the matron of the German house- 
hold remarked to the English Professor's sister-in-law one 
day in casual conversation : "Germany and England are go- 
ing to have a war one of these days, because we hate your 
people, and England had better look out !" 

The preceding examples are given simply because they 
readily come to mind, and because Gen. Von Berhardi's 
book is on my desk at the present moment. Among other 
high German authorities who have given like utterances are 
the ex-Crown Prince of Germany, Maximilian Harden, the 
famous Tannenburg, Admiral Kirchhoff, Werner Sombat, 
Ernest Jackh, Ernest Hasse, Gen. von Schellendorf, Fried- 
erick Lange, A. Sprenger, Paul Rohrbach, Rudolph Theuden, 
and a great number of the now notorious group of German 
professors. The book, "Out of Their Own Mouths," also 
contains a number of quotations from Germans that have 



194 The Causes Of War 

a bearing on this subject. Now, what shall we say of all 
this? Can the authors of such statements be at heart in 
accord with the principles of the League to Enforce Peace? 
And there is no evidence as yet that any fundamentally dif- 
ferent voice than theirs is the voice of Germany today. We 
are therefore forced to conclude that Germany has been, and 
to all intents and purposes still is, the arch-enemy to the 
peace movement, as well as foremost in her war-mindedness 
and militarism. Else why does she not confess her wrongs? 
Why does she not repudiate her methods? Why does she 
not cast aside her war-lords ? Why does she not voluntarily 
return many of the precious relics of Europe's best civiliza- 
tion that her Vandal hands seized upon ? Why does she not 
fall on her knees and in contrition beg forgiveness for the 
crimes of Rheims, Louvain, Dinant, — of her Zeppelins, her 
submarines, her "super-gun," her murderous raids over the 
unprotected English and French towns, her deportations of 
workmen and women into slavery, her deliberate and syste- 
matic starvation of peoples in portions of her occupied dis- 
tricts? — and a hundred other questions we might ask. 

Now, let us give our attention briefly to the second phase 
listed in the opening of this chapter — the attitude of the 
Allied countries on the same subject. We shall begin with 
Great Britain, because there, next to our own country, we 
find the leadership in the peace movement. Not least sig- 
nificant among the German remarks above are the specific 
references to the efforts of the United States and Great 
Britain toward international peace and arbitration in the 
last two decades before the War. These references help to 
bring into relief, as I have just stated, the fact that despite 
the British-Boer war of 1899-1901 and the still more recent 
Persian incident with Russia, Great Britain, both as a gov- 
ernment and as a people, has been, among the nations of 
the earth, the greatest, most hopeful and sincere champion 
of universal peace, save only the United States of America. 
The utterances of such statesmen as Gladstone and James 



The League of Nations 195 

Bryce, and the readiness of her foreign ministers to enter 
into arbitration treaties for the settlement of international 
difficulties, and even the limitation of armaments, as well as 
the remarkable backing by the English people of the League 
of Nations at the present hour, — attest to this fact. Also, 
history, — Gen. Bernhardi's statements to the contrary not- 
withstanding, — will be glad to acknowledge that Foreign 
Minister Gray, with the aid of other British statesmen, 
fought for peace and not for war; that months before the 
war, if not years before, he publicly championed the idea of 
a League of Nations ; that he held out against hope, for 
peace, in the days just before the outbreak of hostilities, up 
to the very last moment, indeed, — and had the ear of every 
great Government of Europe (even that of the German Am- 
bassador to England) save only the war-bent, blood-thirsty 
German Imperial Government. Even after the Great War 
had been raging for more than a year, Mr. Gray remarked 
what a pity it was that the League, which was so near to 
realization, could not have been made a fact before the ca- 
tastrophe came. 

Of what virtue is it that Kaiser Wilhelm II, as Mr. Arthur 
Bullard tries to make the deduction, was not converted to the 
War Party's plan until after the Moroccan crisis in 1911? 
It was with him merely a matter of expediency and not of 
principle, that he opposed war before that time. It was 
simply that the Kaiser felt the time had not yet come. So 
many times in his speeches in the two decades between 1888 
and 1909 did he refer to this subject, that there can be no 
doubt of his constant anticipation of this war and the glori- 
ous part he, as the emulator of Frederick the Great, was to 
play in it. 

France also was listening attentively to the idea of the 
League, though naturally more distrustful than England, on 
account of the direct German menace. Still, she was hope- 
ful that war would not come, even though she felt that she 
must increase her period of military service in 1913 from two 



196 The Causes Of War 

to three years, because of the alarming military program 
and unmistakable threat of Germany. 

The United States of America can well be proud of the 
fact that she has led in all this movement for Arbitration as 
a check upon war (though not at all proud of what many 
of her pacifists, before and during the war, have done; 
and it is but natural, therefore, that she should occupy the 
leading position in the present supreme fight, — for fight it 
is, — for peace. Whether the constitution of the League as 
now drawn up is accepted in its entirety or not, those Ameri- 
can statesmen and would-be statesmen, — whether from con- 
viction or for political reasons — who oppose the principle of 
the League of Nations to Enforce Peace, not only are com- 
mitting an illogical act in the light of America's position so 
far, but will also find themselves running counter to the great 
statesmanship of the world by their wilfulness ( as did the 
"wilful twelve" in the beginning of the war) and at the same 
time lowering the confidence of the great common peoples of 
the world in the unselfish charity and utter sincerity of the 
people of the United States of America. A great spectacle 
indeed, will it present to the world, should the United States, 
the chief champion of the League, and without whom it could 
never have been formed, cast off her own product, and with 
it the present hope of the world for the solution of its great- 
est problem ! 

It boots but little that men may argue that this League 
cannot abolish war. Most thinking men perhaps do not 
claim so much for it in the immediate future. But it can 
prevent another world struggle such as the one we have just 
passed through, or put it off until the coming governments 
of the people make war a thing of the past. Nor is there 
any more strength to the argument that the League consti- 
tution would conflict fundamentally with the Constitution of 
the United States. Personally, I do not believe the February 
draft does, or that another one adopted by the Peace Con- 
ference would. But if it did, by implication, on some one 



The League of Nations 197 

or more minor points (in a major sense it cannot, as now 
drawn up, or possible to be drawn up, or passed upon by the 
democracies of the nations) there are two sufficient reasons, 
to the writer's mind, why we need not be alarmed over the 
prospect, namely: (1), Enough democratic nations with con- 
stitutions or fundamental laws similar to ours will be mem- 
bers of the League, having the same problem to face, that 
amendments to remedy such defects will be forthcoming > 
and (2), No great constitution was ever entered into without 
compromise and sacrifice of some degree or sort, real or 
imaginary, by all parties to the compact. Trusting to its 
future (and often a very few years of experience sufficed) 
and in its fundamental justices, each party has looked for- 
ward to the future to remedy the defects and guarantee that 
party's liberties or rights. We should apply the lesson of 
our own early national history in this respect. The Consti- 
tution of the United States did not prevent trouble, it is true ; 
it did not even prevent a civil conflict ; but it did survive all 
conflict, and has made a great civil war again impossible. 
Likewise will the constitution of the League of Nations have 
to be tested; but its fundamental democracy and justice will 
prove its salvation. Likewise also, its democratic principles 
will save its various members from participation in a for- 
eign conflict unless they see, as in the case of the war just 
closed, that it is a life and death struggle between right and 
wrong, — in which case any people would be proud to fight. 
How very true was this in the case of our own Constitu- 
tion of 1787, the greatest written governmental document on 
the face of the earth. So will time and the spirit of fairness 
and justice to all remedy by amendment all really objection- 
able features of the constitution of the League of Nations. 
Certainly today the world as a whole is more democratically 
minded than were the people of the United States in 1787; 
and if the people could be trusted then, with the United 
States' Constitution in their hands, verily the peoples of the 
world, who have just concluded a mighty war to prove that 



198 The Causes Of War 

there is no master above them, can be depended upon to suc- 
cessfully administer the international relationship of the na- 
tions in the future. If not, then as well admit that de- 
mocracy throughout the earth is doomed, and Lincoln's idea 
but a dream. 

It is not in fine legal and constitutional distinctions that 
mankind's security in the future is to rest, but in the good- 
will and fairmindedness of its peoples, one toward another. 
Let us see to it that no vain quibblings and obstructions of 
words is put in their way. It is not so much the letter as 
the spirit of the law, as expressed in the League of Nations 
that is to guarantee peace in the future. Away with that 
type of politician and statesman who still thinks the world 
is so small and isolated that he need not look beyond the 
boundaries of his own country, and has no vital concern out- 
side of it ! Such persons helped to make this war possible. 
Henceforth America's final safety is the safety of the world, 
and vice versa. 

In 1911 (repeated in an early chapter of this book) the 
writer made this statement: "One nation, in its philan- 
thropic enthusiasm, cannot bring peace to the world ; it can- 
not adopt a policy of peace and say it will have it, whether 
others will or no." We all realize this now, though so many 
of us doubted it at that time that we were unprepared for war 
when it came. Now, if one nation cannot adopt such a 
policy, then there is only one way under heaven that peace 
can come, and that is by its joint adoption by the govern- 
ments representing the overwhelming majority of mankind. 
What other than this is the League of Nations? The for- 
mer isolation and peace is forever impossible; the latter, 
then, must come, else Bernhardi is right; might is right in 
the political and moral world, as well as in the realm of na- 
ture, and the War-god rules forever and aye. 

Summing up then, we may say that the governments of the 
Allied nations, and their peoples, led by the United States 
and Great Britain, through their program of Arbitration 



The League of Nations 199 

treaties and good-will were rapidly preparing the way for an 
initial hopeful experiment of a League of Nations or "Fed- 
eration of the World," when the Machiavellian Teutonic gov- 
ernments launched the world suddenly upon the greatest of 
all wars. This was because these selfsame Teutonic govern- 
ments were rapidly drifting in the opposite direction to the 
Allied or democratic countries, and more and more were con- 
sidering war as their birthright and the manna of their 
future existence. 

What, therefore, is our conclusion? Does our champion- 
ship of the League of Nations contradict our earlier stand to 
the effect that a League of Nations could not be the final 
remedy for war? If the reader will examine carefully the 
author's whole treatment in this work he will find that no- 
where have we objected to a League of Nations, or hinted 
that we would not support it ; we have only doubted its abil- 
ity to "abolish war in the near future." We have said that 
such a league, if formed at the time we were writing, "could 
last only for a time," and we believe that probably is still 
true, even though two momentous years have passed since 
the above statement was made. Does our (and by "our" I 
mean a considerable number of men everywhere) recent claim 
that "it is only the spirit of Christ" in the "hearts and con- 
sciences of men" that can "save us from our animal instincts 
and from war," and that peace for weary mankind cannot 
come until the "beast in nations" is conquered, and until 
governments must abide by the same principles of conduct 
and honor as obtain between individuals, — does this all con- 
flict with our present stand on the League of Nations? I 
think not. Certainly, the spirit of Christ has advanced far 
into the council chambers of the great nations of the world 
within the past two years ; certainly the "beast in nations" 
is not the ruling power today, the "beasts" being for the 
most part removed, — interned in neutral countries, or in 
ignominious hiding (except the Bolsheviki, another type of 
beast, that is even worse) ; certainly the world on the eve of 



200 The Causes Of War 

the adoption of the League is much nearer to the "same 
principles of conduct and honor as obtain between individ- 
uals" — since this code forms one of the articles of the League 
constitution. In looking upon the whole matter of war and 
peace in the historical, biological, or evolutionary light, such 
as we have consistently followed in this work, we have come 
to an intelligent and intelligible interpretation of the present 
world status. We have been obliged at times to recognize 
accelerating and reactionary currents, as we pointed out in 
the beginning. The terrible, the astounding, the wonderful 
and glorious events of the years 1914-1919 have lent an un- 
foreseen and tremendous impetus to the onward sweep of 
democracy and to the idea of a world society as a remedy for 
war. We have stated more than once in our earlier treat- 
ment of the War and its issues, that "the coming Peace 
Conference" possesses momentous and almost unlimited possi- 
bilities along this line ; but no one could foresee what magni- 
tude these possibilities should actually assume at the end 
of hostilities, and what gigantic political changes were im- 
mediately in store for the world. (We could, we did, 
prophesy some of them.) The World War has simply has- 
tened for generations the slow transformation which we were 
justified in feeling was coming surely, if slowly, in the evolu- 
tion of the race. 

Moreover, there were those among us who felt already, 
before the fateful year of 1914, that we had come to the 
parting of the way, and the old order no longer sufficed. On 
this point the author made the following statement (found 
in an earlier chapter of this book) : "War, we have said, 
assumes the survival of the fittest, the best. But, the best for 
what? The fittest for what? That is the capital question 
now. It is not easy for one people to modify the wish, the 
interests and, still less, the national characteristics of an- 
other. ' The failure of many efforts as it has helped to bring 
on this colossal war. (Here I was thinking especially 
of Germany's attempts to Germanize Alsace-Lorraine and 



The League of Nations 201 

Poland, Russia's similar attempts at times, and Austria-Hun- 
gary's race problems in her polyglot Empire.) Once it 
could be done by war, and the conqueror after the war ; but 
in so far as this transformation is possible today, it is not 
by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free in- 
tercourse between nations (another principle of the League 
of Nations), social and commercial, is perhaps the most 
powerful pacifying influence. When nations come to mingle 
with each other more vitally, like individuals they will come 
to understand and appreciate one another better, and will at 
last learn to heed that most costly and precious lesson, that 
peace, and not -war is to be the true and only rational basis 
of civilized human society." (Chapter 5.) 



CHAPTER XX 

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

As read by President Wilson before the Peace Conference at 
Paris, France, February 14, 1919. 

PREAMBLE 

/N order to promote international cooperation and to se- 
cure international peace and security by the acceptance 
of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of 
open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the 
firm establishment of the understandings of international law 
as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the 
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all 
treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with 
one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant adopt 
this constitution of the League of Nations: 

ARTICLE I 

The action of the high contracting parties under the terms 
of this covenant shall be effected through the instrumental- 
ity of a meeting of a body of delegates representing the high 
contracting parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals 
of an executive council and of a permanent international 
secretariat to be established at the seat of the league. 

ARTICLE II 

Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at stated in- 
tervals and from time to time as occasion may require for 

202 



The Constitution of the League of Nations 203 

the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of 
action of the league. Meetings of the body of delegates shall 
be held at the seat of the league or at such other places 
as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representa- 
tives of the high contracting parties. Each of the high con- 
tracting parties shall have one vote, but may have not more 
than three representatives. 

article in 

The executive council shall consist of representatives of 
the United States of America, the British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other 
States, members of the league. The selection of these four 
States shall be made by the body of delegates on such prin- 
ciples and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the 
appointment of these representatives of other States repre- 
sentatives of (blank left for names) shall be members of 
the executive council. 

Meetings of the council shall be held from time to time 
as occasion may be required and at least once a year, at 
whatever place may be decided on, or, failing any such de- 
cision, at the seat of the league, and any matter within the 
sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the 
world may be dealt with at such meetings. 

Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meet- 
ing of the council at which such matters directly affecting 
its interests are to be discussed, and no decision taken at any 
meeting will be binding on such Powers unless so invited. 

ARTICLE IV 

All matters of procedure at meetings of the body of dele- 
gates or the executive council, including the appointment of 
committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regu- 
lated by the body of delegates or the executive council, 



204 The Causes Of War 

and may be decided by a majority of the States represented 
at the meeting. 

The first meeting of the body of delegates and of the 
executive council shall be summoned by the President of the 
United States of America. 

article v 

The permanent secretariat of the league shall be estab- 
lished at , which shall constitute the seat of the 

league. The secretariat shall comprise such secretaries 
and staff as may be required, under the general direction and 
control of a scretary-general of the league, who shall be 
chosen by the executive council ; the secretariat shall be ap- 
pointed by the secretary-general subject to confirmation by 
the executive council. 

The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all 
meetings of the body of delegates or of the executive coun- 
cil. 

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the 
States members of the league in accordance with the ap- 
portionment of the expenses of the international bureau of 

the Universal Postal Union. 

i 

ARTICLE VI 

Representatives of the high contracting parties and of- 
ficials of the league when engaged in the business of the 
league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, and 
the buildings occupied by the league or its officials or by 
representatives attending its meetings shall enjoy the bene- 
fits of extraterritoriality. 

ARTICLE VII 

Admission to the league of States not signatories to the 
covenant and not named in the protocol hereto as States 
to be invited to adhere to the covenant requires the assent of 



The Constitution of the League of Nations 205 

not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the 
body of delegates, and shall be limited to fully self-govern- 
ing countries, including dominions and colonies. 

No state shall be admitted to the league unless it is able 
to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to ob- 
serve its international obligations and unless it shall con- 
form to such principles as may be prescribed by the league 
in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments. 

ARTICLE VIII 

The high contracting parties recognize the principle that 
the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of na- 
tional armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of interna- 
tional obligations, having special regard to the geographical 
situation and circumstances of each State, and the executive 
council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. 

The executive council shall also determine for the consid- 
eration and action of the several governments what military 
equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in propor- 
tion to the scale of forces laid down in the program of dis- 
armament, and these limits, when adopted, shall not be ex- 
ceeded without the permission of the executive council. 

The high contracting parties agree that the manufacture 
by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war 
lends itself to grave objections, and direct the executive 
council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such 
manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the 
necessities of those countries which are not able to manufac- 
ture for themselves the munitions and implements of war 
necessary for their safety. 

The high contracting parties undertake in no way to con- 
ceal from each other the conditions of such of their indus- 
tries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes 
or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be 



206 The Causes Of War 

full and frank interchange of information as to their mili- 
tary and naval programs. 

article rx 

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise 
the league on the execution of the provisions of Article 
VIII, and on military and naval questions generally. 

article x 

The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect 
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all States 
members of the league. In case of any such aggression or 
in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the ex- 
ecutive council shall advise upon the means by which the 
obligation shall be fulfilled. 

ARTICLE XI 

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
any of the high contracting parties or not, is hereby de- 
clared a matter of concern to the league and the high con- 
tracting parties reserve the right to take any action that 
may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of 
nations. 

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly 
right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the at- 
tention of the body of delegates or of the executive council 
to any circumstance affecting international intercourse which 
threatens to disturb international peace or the good under- 
standing between nations upon which peace depends. 

ARTICLE XII 

The high contracting parties agree that should disputes 
arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary 



The Constitution of the League of Nations £07 

processes of diplomacy they will in no case resort to war 
without previously submitting the questions and matters in- 
volved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the executive 
council and until three months after the award by the ar- 
bitrators, or a recommendation by the executive council, 
and that they will not even then resort to war as against a 
member of the league which complies with the award of 
the arbitrators or the recommendation of the executive 
council. 

In any case under this article the award of the arbitra- 
tors shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recom- 
mendation of the executive council shall be made within six 
months after the submission of the dispute. 

ARTICLE XIII 

The high contracting parties agree that whenever any 
dispute or difficulty shall arise between them which they 
recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and 
which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy they 
will submit the whole matter to arbitration. For this pur- 
pose the Court of Arbitration to which the case is referred 
shall be the Court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in 
any convention existing between them. The high contracting 
parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith 
any award that may be rendered. In the event of any fail- 
ure to carry out the award the executive council shall pro- 
pose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto. 

ARTICLE XIV 

The executive council shall formulate plans for the es- 
tablishment of a permanent court of international justice 
and this court shall, when established, be competent to hear 
and determine any matter which the parties recognize as 
suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the fore- 
going article. 



208 The Causes Of War 



ARTICLE XV 

If there should arise between States' members of the 
league, any dispute likely to lead to rupture, which is not 
submitted to arbitration as above, the high contracting 
parties agree that they will refer the matter to the executive 
council; either party to the dispute may give notice of the 
existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will 
make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and 
consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agee to 
communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as pos- 
sible statements of their case with all the relevant facts and 
papers, and the executive council may forthwith direct the 
publication thereof. Where the efforts of the council lead 
to the settlement of the dispute a statement shall be pub- 
lished indicating the nature of the dispute and that of set- 
tlement, together with such explanations as may be appro- 
priate. 

If the dispute has not been settled a report by the coun- 
cil shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts 
and explanations the recommendations which the council 
thinks just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If 
the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of the 
council other than the parties to the dispute the high con- 
tracting parties agree that they will not go to war with any 
party which complies with the recommendations and that, if 
any party shall refuse so to comply, the council shall pro- 
pose measures necessary to give effect to the recommenda- 
tions. 

If no such unanimous report can be made it shall be the 
duty of the majority and the privilege of the minority to 
issue statements indicating what they believe to be the 
facts and containing the reasons which they consider to be 
just and proper. 

The executive council may in any case under this article 



The Constitution of the League of Nations £09 

refer the dispute to the body of delegates. The dispute 
shall be so referred at the request of either party to the 
dispute, provided that such request must be made within 
fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In a 
case referred to the body of delegates all the provisions of 
this article and of Article XII, relating to the action and 
powers of the executive council shall apply to the action 
and powers of the body of delegates. 

ARTICLE XVI 

Should any of the high contracting parties break or dis- 
regard its covenants under Article XII, it shall thereby ipso 
facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against 
all the other members of the league, which hereby undertakes 
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or 
financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between 
their nations and the nationals of the covenant breaking 
State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or per- 
sonal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant 
breaking State, and the nationals of any other State, whether 
a member of the league or not. 

It shall be the duty of the executive council in such case 
to recommend what effective military or naval force the 
members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed 
forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league. 

The high contracting parties agree further that they 
will mutually support one another in the financial and eco- 
nomic measures which may be taken under this article in 
order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from 
the above measures and that they will mutually support one 
another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of 
their number by the covenant breaking State, and that they 
will afford passage through their territory to the forces 
of any of the high contracting parties who are cooperating 
to protect the covenants of the league. 



210 The Causes Of War 



ARTICLE XVH 

In the event of disputes between one State member of the 
league and another State which is not a member of the 
league, or between States not members of the league, the 
high contracting parties agree that the State or States not 
members of the league shall be invited to accept the obliga- 
tions of membership in the league for the purposes of such 
dispute upon such conditions as the executive council may 
deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation the 
above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as 
may be deemed necessary by the league. 

Upon such invitation being given the executive council 
shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances 
and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may 
seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 

In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept the 
obligations of membership in the league for the purposes 
of the league which in the case of a State member of the 
league would constitute a breach of Article XII, the pro- 
visions of Article XVI, shall be applicable as against the 
state taking such action. 

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to 
accept the obligations of membership in the league for the 
purpose of such dispute the executive council may take such 
action and make such recommendations as will prevent hos- 
tilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. 



ARTICLE XVHI 

The high contracting parties agree that the league shall 
be intrusted with general supervision of the trade in arms 
and ammunition with the countries in which the control of 
this traffic is necessary in the common interest. 



The Constitution of the League of Nations 211 



AETICLE XIX 

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence 
of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of 
the States which formerly governed them and which are in- 
habited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves un- 
der the strenuous conditions of the modern world there 
should be applied the principle that the well being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civili- 
zation, and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in the constitution of the league. 

The best method of giving practical effect to this prin- 
ciple is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted 
to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their 
experience or their geographical position can best undertake 
this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised 
by them as mandatories on behalf of the league. 

The character of the mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other 
similar circumstances. 

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached the stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally recog- 
nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a mandatory Power until such time as they are 
able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must 
be a principal consideration in the selection of the manda- 
tory Power. 

Other peoples, especially those of central Africa, are at 
such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the 
administration of the territory subject to conditions which 
will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only 
to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibi- 
tion of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and 



21 % The Causes Of War 

the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of 
fortifications or military and naval bases and of military 
training of the natives for other than police purposes and 
the defence of territory, and will also secure equal oppor- 
tunities for the trade and commerce of other members of 
the league. 

There are territories such as southwest Africa and cer- 
tain of the South Pacific isles which, owing to the sparse- 
ness of their populations or their small size or their remote- 
ness from the centers of civilization or their geographical 
contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, 
can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory 
State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards 
above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous popula- 
tion. 

In every case of mandate the mandatory State shall ren- 
der to the league an annual report in reference to the terri- 
tory committed to its charge. 

The degree of authority, control or administration to be 
exercised by the mandatory State shall, if not previously 
agreed upon by the high contracting parties in each case, 
be explicitly defined by the executive council in a special 
act or charter. 

The high contracting parties further agree to establish 
at the seat of the league a mandatory commission to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the mandatory powers, 
and to assist the league in insuring the observance of the 
terms of all mandates. 

ARTICLE xx 

The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and 
maintain fair and human conditions of labor for men, women 
and children both in their own countries and in all countries 
to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, 



The Constitution of the League of Nations 213 

and to that end agree to establish as part of the organiza- 
tion of the league a permanent bureau of labor, 

ARTICLE XXI 

The high contracting parties agree that provision shall 
be made through the instrumentality of the league to se- 
cure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treat- 
ment for the commerce of all States members of the league, 
having in mind, among other things, special arrangements 
with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated dur- 
ing the war of 1914-1918. 

ARTICLE XXn 

The high contracting parties agree to place under the 
control of the league all international bureaus already es- 
tablished by general treaties if the parties to such treaties 
consent. Furthermore they agree that all such international 
bureaus to be constituted in future shall be placed under 
control of the league. 

article xxni 

The high contracting parties agree that every treaty or 
international engagement entered into hereafter by any 
State, member of the league, shall be forthwith registered 
with the secretary-general and as soon as possible published 
by him, and that no such treaty or international engage- 
ment shall be binding until so registered. 

ARTICLE XXIV 

It shall be the right of the body of delegates from time 
to time to advise the reconsideration by States, members 
of the league, of treaties which have become inapplicable, 



214 The Causes Of War 

and of international conditions, of which the continuance 
may endanger the peace of the world. 

ARTICLE XXV 

The high contracting parties severally agree that the 
present covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations 
inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and 
solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any 
engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case 
any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted 
to the league shall, before becoming a party to this covenant, 
have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with 
the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power 
to take immediate steps to procure its release from such 
obligations. 

ARTICLE XXVI 

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when rati- 
fied by the States whose representatives compose the execu- 
tive council and by three-fourths of the States whose repre- 
sentatives compose the body of delegates. 



APPENDIX I 

president wilson's address at paris 

On February 14, 1919, Before the Peace Conference, at the Reading 
of the Constitution of the League of Nations 

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor, and assume it a 
very great privilege, of reporting in the name of the 
commission constituted by this conference on the formulation 
of a plan for the League of Nations. I am happy to say 
that it is a unanimous report, a unanimous report from the 
representatives ,of fourteen nations — the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and 
Serbia. 

"I think it will be serviceable and interesting if I, with 
your permission, read the document, as the only report we 
have to make." 

After having read the entire document, President Wilson 
continued as follows : 

"It gives me pleasure to add to this formal reading of 
the result of our labors that the character of the discussion 
which occurred at the sittings of the commission was not only 
of the most constructive but of the most encouraging sort. 
It was obvious throughout our discussions that, although 
there were subjects upon which there were individual differ- 
ences of judgment with regard to the method by which our 
objects should be obtained, there was practically at no 
point any serious differences of opinion or motive as to the 
objects which we were seeking. 

"Indeed, while these debates were not made the oppor- 
tunity for the expression of enthusiasm and sentiment, I 

215 



216 The Causes Of War 

think the other members of the commission will agree with 
me that there was an undertone of high respect and of en- 
thusiasm for the thing we were trying to do, which was 
heartening throughout every meeting, because we felt that in 
a way this conference did intrust unto us the expression of 
one of its highest and most important purposes, to see to 
it that the concord of the world in the future with regard to 
the objects of justice should not be subject to doubt or 
uncertainty, that the co-operation of the great body of na- 
tions should be assured in the maintenance of peace upon 
terms of honor and of international obligations. 

"The compulsion of that task was constantly upon us, 
and at no point was there shown the slightest desire to do 
anything but suggest the best means to accomplish that 
great object. There is very great significance, therefore, 
in the fact that the result was reached unanimously. 

"Fourteen nations were represented, among them all of 
those powers which for convenience we have called the great 
powers, and among the rest a representation of the greatest 
variety of circumstances and interests. So that I think we 
are justified in saying that the significance of the result, 
therefore, has the deepest of all meanings, the union of 
wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot 
be resisted, and which, I dare say, no nation will run the 
risk of attempting to resist. 

"Now as to the character of the document. While it has 
consumed some time to read this document, I think you will 
see at once that it is very simple, and in nothing so simple 
as in the structure which it suggests for a League of Nations 
— a body of delegates, an Executive Council, and a perma- 
nent secretariat. 

"When it came to the question of determining the charac- 
ter of the representation in the body of delegates, we were 
all aware of a feeling which is current throughout the world. 
Inasmuch as I am stating it in the presence of the official 
representatives of the various Governments here present, in- 



Appendix I 217 

eluding myself, I may say that there is a universal feeling 
that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official gui- 
dance. There has reached us through many channels the 
feeling that if the deliberating body of the League of Na- 
tions was merely to be a body of officials representing the 
various Governments, the peoples of the world would not be 
sure that some of the mistakes which preoccupied officials 
had admittedly made might not be repeated. 

"It was impossible to conceive a method or an assembly 
so large and various as to be really representative of the 
great body of the peoples of the world, because as I roughly 
reckon it, we represent, as we sit around this table, more 
than twelve hundred million people. You cannot have a rep- 
resentative assembly of twelve hundred million people, but 
if you leave it to each Government to have, if it pleases, one 
or two or three representatives, though only with a single 
vote, it may vary its representation from time to time, not 
only, but it may [originate] the choice of its several rep- 
resentatives. [Wireless here unintelligible.] 

"Therefore, we thought that this was a proper and a 
very prudent concession to the practically universal opinion 
of plain men everywhere that they wanted the door left open 
to a variety of representation, instead of being confined to a 
single official body with which they could or might not find 
themselves in sympathy. 

"And you will notice that this body has unlimited rights 
of discussion — I mean of discussion of anything that falls 
within the field of international relations — and that it is 
especially agreed that war or international misunderstand- 
ings, or anything that may lead to friction or trouble, is 
everybody's business, because it may affect the peace of the 
world. 

"And in order to safeguard the popular power so far as 
we could of this representative body, it is provided, you will 
notice, that when a subject is submitted, it is not to arbitra- 
tion, but to discussion by the Executive Council. It can, 



218 The Causes Of War 

upon the initiative of either of the parties to the dispute, be 
drawn out of the Executive Council into the larger forum 
of the general body of delegates, because through this in- 
strument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one 
great force, and this is the moral force of the public opinion 
of the world — the pleasing and clarifying and compelling 
influences of publicity, so that intrigues can no longer have 
their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any 
time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are 
destroyed by the light may be promptly destroyed by the 
overwhelming light of the universal expression of the con- 
demnation of the world. 

"Armed force is in the background in this program, but it 
is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will 
not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that 
is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of 
peace, not as a league of war. 

"The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one 
of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was un- 
able to see the variety of circumstances with which this 
League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan 
all the machinery that might be necessary to meet the differ- 
ing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say 
of this document that it is not a strait jacket, but a vehicle 
of life. 

"A living thing is born, and we must see to it what clothes 
we put on it. It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in 
which power may be varied at the discretion of those who 
exercise it and in accordance with the changing circum- 
stances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is 
general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we 
were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee 
of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against ag- 
gression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which 
have just come near bringing the whole structure of civiliza- 
tion into ruin. 



Appendix I . 819 

"Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its pur- 
poses are declared, and its powers are unmistakable. It is 
not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to 
secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be 
used for co-operation in any international matter. That 
is the significance of the provision introduced concerning 
labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions 
which can be effected by conference and discussion. I antici- 
pate that there will be a very great usefulness in the Bureau 
of Labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the 
League. Men and women and children who work have been 
in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed 
to be forgotten, while Governments have had their watchful 
and suspicious eyes upon the manoeuvres of one another, 
while the thought of statesmen has been about structural 
action and the larger transactions of commerce and finance. 

"Now, if I may believe the picture which I see, there 
comes into the foreground the great body of the laboring 
people of the world, the men and women and children upon 
whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from 
day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not, people 
who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of 
lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of 
international consultation and help, and will be among the 
wards of the combined Governments of the world. There is, 
I take leave to say, a very great step in advance in the mere 
conception of that. 

"Then, as you will notice, there is an imperative article 
concerning the publicity of all international agreements. 
Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agree- 
ment valid which it has not registered with the Secretary- 
General, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the 
examination of anybody representing a member of the 
League. And the duty is laid upon the Secretary-General 
to publish every document of that sort at the earliest pos- 
sible time. 



220 The Causes Of War 

"I suppose most persons who have not been conversant 
with the business of foreign affairs do not realize how many 
hundreds of these agreements are made in a single year, and 
how difficult it might be to publish the more unimportant of 
them immediately, how uninteresting it would be to most of 
the world to publish them immediately, but even they must 
be published just as soon as it is possible for the Secretary- 
General to publish them. 

"Then there is a feature about this covenant which, to 
my mind, is one of the greatest and most satisfactory ad- 
vances that has been made. We are done with annexations 
of helpless peoples, meant in some instances by some powers 
to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most 
solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of 
the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon 
us to look after their interests primarily before we use 
them for our interests, and that in all cases of this sort 
hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the 
nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and 
directors of these peoples shall look to their interests and 
their development before they look to the interests and 
desires of the mandatory nation itself. 

"There has been no greater advance than this, gentlemen. 
If you look back upon the history of the world you will see 
how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to powers 
that had no conscience in the matter. It has been one of 
the many distressing revelations of recent years that the 
great power which has just been, happily, defeated, put in- 
tolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people 
of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself, that its 
interest was rather their extermination than their develop- 
ment, that the desire was to possess their land for Euro- 
pean purposes and not to enjoy their confidence in order that 
mankind might be lifted in these places to the next higher 
level. 

"Now, the world, expressing its conscience in law, says 



Appendix I £21 

there is an end of that, that our consciences shall be settled 
to this thing. States will be picked out which have already 
shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, 
and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world 
will come into a new light and into a new hope. 

"So I think I can say of this document that it is at one 
and the same time a practical document and a human docu- 
ment. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a com- 
pulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and 
yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate. And I 
want to say that so far as my observation instructs me, this 
is in one sense a belated document. I believe that the con- 
science of the world has long been prepared to express itself 
in some such way. We are not just now discovering our 
sympathy for these people and our interest in them. We are 
simply expressing it, for it has long been felt, and in the 
administration of the affairs of more than one of the great 
States represented here — so far as I know, all of the great 
States that are represented here — that humane impulse has 
already expressed itself in their dealings with their colonies, 
whose peoples were yet at a low stage of civilization. 

"We have had many instances of colonies lifted into the 
sphere of complete self-government. This is not the dis- 
covery of a principle. It is the universal application of a 
principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which 
have tried to live by these standards in their separate ad- 
ministrations to unite in seeing that their common force and 
their common thought and intelligence are lent to this great 
and humane enterprise. I think it is an occasion, therefore, 
for the most profound satisfaction that this humane decis- 
ion should have been reached in a matter for which the world 
has long been waiting and until a very recent period thought 
that it was still too early to hope. 

"Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentle- 
men, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. 
Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been 



%9£ The Causes Of War 

more conscious than it ever was before of the majority of 
right. People that were suspicious of one another can now 
live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire 
to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared 
away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying, 'We are 
brothers and have a common purpose. We did not realize 
it before, but now we do realize it, and this is our covenant 
of friendship.' " 



APPENDIX II 

president wilson's address at boston 

On February 24, 1919, on the Subject of the Constitution of the 

League of Nations 

GOVERNOR COOLIDGE, Mr. Mayor, Fellow Citizens: 
I wonder if you are half as glad to see me as I am to see 
you. It warms my heart to see a great body of my fellow cit- 
izens again, because in some respect during the recent months 
I have been very lonely indeed without your comradeship and 
counsel, and I tried at every step of the work which fell to 
me to recall what I was sure would be your counsel with re- 
gard to the great matters which were under consideration. 

I do not want you to think that I have not been apprecia- 
tive of the extraordinarily generous reception which was 
given to me on the other side. In saying that it makes me 
very happy to get home again I do not mean to say that 
I was not very deeply touched by the cries that came from 
the great crowds on the other side. But I want to say to 
you in all honesty that I felt them to be a call of greeting 
to you rather than to me. 

I did not feel that the greeting was personal. I had in 
my heart the overcrowning pride of being your representa- 
tive and of receiving the plaudits of men everywhere who 
felt that your hearts beat with theirs in the cause of liberty. 
There was no mistaking the tone in the voices of those 
great crowds. It was not a tone of mere greeting; it was 
not a tone of mere generous welcome; it was the calling of 
comrade to comrade, the cries that come from men who 
say, "We have waited for this day when the friends of liberty 
should come across the sea and shake hands with us, to see 

223 



224? The Causes Of War 

that a new world was constructed upon a new basis and 
foundation of justice and right." 

I can't tell you the inspiration that came from the senti- 
ments that came out of those simple voices of the crowd, 
and the proudest thing I have to report to you is that this 
great country of ours is trusted throughout the world. 

I have not come to report the proceedings or the results 
of the proceedings of the Peace Conference; that would be 
premature. I can say that I have received very happy im- 
pressions from this conference; the impression that while 
there are many differences of judgment, while there are some 
divergencies of object, there is nevertheless a common spirit 
and a common realization of the necessity of setting up new 
standards of right in the world. 

Because the men who are in conference in Paris realize as 
keenly as any American can realize that they are not the 
masters of their people ; that they are the servants of their 
people and that the spirit of their people has awakened to 
a new purpose and a new conception of their power to realize 
that purpose, and that no man dare go home from that con- 
ference and report anything less noble than was expected 
of it. 

The conference seems to you to go slowly; from day to 
day in Paris it seems to go slowly; but I wonder if you 
realize the complexity of the task which it has undertaken. 
It seems as if the settlements of this war affect, and affect 
directly, every great, and I sometimes think every small, 
nation in the world, and no one decision can prudently be 
made which is not properly linked in with the great series of 
other decisions which must accompany it, and it must be 
reckoned in with the final result if the real quality and char- 
acter of that result is to be properly judged. 

What we are doing is to hear the whole case ; hear it from 
the mouths of the men most interested; hear it from those 
who are officially commissioned to state it; hear the rival 
claims ; hear the claims that affect new nationalities, that 



Appendix II 225 

affect new areas of the world, that affect new commercial 
and economic connections that have been established by the 
great world war through which we have gone. And I have 
been struck by the moderateness of those who have repre- 
sented national claims. 

I can testify that I have nowhere seen the gleam of pas- 
sion. I have seen earnestness, I have seen tears come to 
the eyes of men who plead for downtrodden people whom 
they were privileged to speak for; but they were not the 
tears of anguish, they were the tears of ardent hope. 

And I don't see how any man can fail to have been sub- 
dued by these pleas, subdued to this feeling, that he was not 
there to assert an individual judgment of his own but to 
try to assist the case of humanity. 

And in the midst of it all every interest seeks out first of 
all, when it reaches Paris, the representatives of the United 
States. Why? Because, and I think I am stating the most 
wonderful fact in history — because there is no nation in 
Europe that suspects the motives of the United States. 

Was there ever so wonderful a thing seen before? Was 
there ever so moving a thing? Was there ever any fact 
that so bound the nation that had won that esteem forever 
to deserve it? 

I would not have you understand that the great men who 
represent the other nations there in conference are dises- 
teemed by those who know them. Quite the contrary. But 
you understand that the nations of Europe have again and 
again clashed with one another in competitive interest. It 
is impossible for men to forget those sharp issues that were 
drawn between them in times past. 

It is impossible for men to believe that all ambitions have 
all of a sudden been foregone. They remember territory that 
was coveted; they remember rights that it was attempted to 
extort; they remember political ambitions which it was at- 
tempted to realize, and, while they believe that men have 
come into a different temper they cannot forget these things, 



226 The Causes Of War 

and so they do not resort to one another for a dispassion- 
ate view of the matters in controversy. They resort to that 
nation which has won the enviable distinction of being re- 
garded as the friend of mankind. 

Whenever it is desired to send a small force of soldiers 
to occupy a piece of territory where it is thought nobody 
else will be welcome they ask for American soldiers, and 
where other soldiers would be looked upon with suspicion and 
perhaps met with resistance the American soldier is welcomed 
with acclaim. 

I have had so many grounds for pride on the other side 
of the water that I am very thankful that they are not 
grounds for personal pride, but for national pride. If they 
were grounds for personal pride I'd be the most stuck up 
man in the world, and it has been an infinite pleasure to me 
to see those gallant soldiers of ours, of whom. the Constitu- 
tion of the United States made me the proud commander. 

You may be proud of the Twenty-sixth Division, but I 
commanded the Twenty-sixth Division, and see what they 
did under my direction, and everybody praises the American 
soldier with the feeling that in praising him he is subtract- 
ing from the credit of no one else. 

I have been searching for the fundamental fact that con- 
verted Europe to believe in us. Before this war Europe did 
not believe in us as she does now. She did not believe in us 
throughout the first three years of the war. She seems 
really to have believed that we were holding off because we 
thought we could make more by staying out than by going 
in. And all of a sudden, in a short eighteen months, the 
whole verdict is reversed. 

There can be but one explanation for it. They saw what 
we did — that without making a single claim we put all our 
men and all our means at the disposal of those who were 
fighting for their homes, in the first instance, but for a cause, 
the cause of human rights and justice, and that we went in 
not to support their national claims but to support the 
great cause which they held in common. 



Appendix II 227 

And when they saw that America not only held ideals 
but acted ideals they were converted to America and became 
firm partisans of those ideals. 

I met a group of scholars when I was in Paris — some 
gentlemen from one of the Greek universities who had come 
to see me, and in whose presence, or rather in the presence 
of whose traditions of learning, I felt very young indeed. I 
told them that I had one of the delightful revenges that 
sometimes come to a man. All my life I had heard men 
speak with a sort of condescension of ideals and of idealists, 
and particularly those separated, encloistered persons whom 
they choose to term academic, who were in the habit of utter- 
ing ideals in the free atmosphere when they clash with nobody 
in particular. 

And I said I have had this sweet revenge. Speaking 
with perfect frankness in the name of the people of the 
United States I have uttered as the objects of this great war 
ideals, and nothing but ideals, and the war has been won by 
that inspiration. Men were fighting with tense muscle and 
lowered head until they came to realize those things, feeling 
they were fighting for their lives and their country, and 
when these accents of what it was all about reached them 
from America they lifted their heads, they raised their eyes 
to heaven, when they saw men in khaki coming across the 
sea in the spirit of crusaders, and they found that these were 
strange men, reckless of danger not only, but reckless because 
they seemed to see something that made that danger worth 
while. 

Men have testified to me in Europe that our men were 
possessed by something that they could only call a religious 
fervor. They were not like any of the other soldiers. They 
had a vision, they had a dream, and they were fighting in the 
dream, and fighting in the dream they turned the whole tide 
of battle and it never came back. 

One of our American humorists, meeting the criticism that 
American soldiers were not trained long enough, said : "It 
takes only half as long to train an American soldier as any 



228 The Causes Of War 

other, because you only have to train him one way and he 
did only go one way, and he never came back until he could 
do it when he pleased." 

And now do you realize that this confidence we have es- 
tablished throughout the world imposes a burden upon us — 
if you choose to call it a burden. It is one of those burdens 
which any nation ought to be proud to carry. Any man who 
resists the present tides that run in the world will find him- 
self thrown upon a shore so high and barren that it will 
seem as if he had been separated from his human kind for- 
ever. 

The Europe that I left the other day was full of something 
that it had never felt fill its heart so full before. It was 
full of hope. The Europe of the second year of the war, 
the Europe of the third year of the war was sinking to a 
sort of stubborn desperation. They did not see any great 
thing to be achieved even when the war should be won. They 
hoped there would be some salvage; they hoped that they 
could clear their territories of invading armies ; they hoped 
they could set up their homes and start their industries 
afresh, but they thought it would simply be the resumption 
of the old life that Europe had led — led in fear, led in anx- 
iety, led in constant suspicious watchfulness. They never 
dreamed that it would be a Europe of settled peace and of 
justified hope. 

And now these ideals have wrought this new magic, that 
all the peoples of Europe are buoyed up and confident in 
the spirit of hope, because they believe that we are at the 
eve of a new age in the world when nations will understand 
one another, when nations will support one another in every 
just cause, when nations will unite every moral and every 
political strength to see that the right shall prevail. 

If America were at this juncture to fail the world, what 
would come of it? I do not mean any disrespect to any 
other great people when I say that America is the hope of 
the world; and if she does not justify that hope the results 



Appendix II 229 

are unthinkable. Men will be thrown back upon the bitter- 
ness of disappointment not only but the bitterness of de- 
spair. 

All nations will be set up as hostile camps again ; the men 
at the peace conference will go home with their heads upon 
their breasts, knowing that they have failed — for they were 
bidden not to come home from there until they did something 
more than sign a treaty of peace. 

Suppose we sign the treaty of peace and that it is the most 
satisfactory treaty of peace that the confusing elements of 
the modern world will afford and go home and think about 
our labors, we will know that we have left written upon the 
historic table at Versailles, upon which Vergennes and Ben- 
jamin Franklin wrote their names, nothing but a modern 
scrap of paper; no nations united to defend it, no great 
forces combined to make it good, no assurance given to the 
downtrodden and fearful people of the world that they shall 
be safe. Any man who thinks that America will take part 
in giving the world any such rebuff and disappointment as 
that does not know America. 

I invite him to test the sentiments of the nation. We set 
this up to make men free and we did not confine our concep- 
tion and purpose to America, and now we will make men 
free. If we did not do that the fame of America would be 
gone and all her powers would be dissipated. She then would 
have to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial 
purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no 
sweep beyond the nearest horizon. 

I should welcome no sweeter challenge than that. I have 
fighting blood in me, and it is sometimes a delight to let it 
have scope, but if it is a challenge on this occasion it will 
be an indulgence. Think of the picture, think of the utter 
blackness that would fall on the world. America has failed! 
America made a little essay at generosity and then withdrew* 
America said: "We are your friends," but it was only for 
today, not for tomorrow. America said: "Here is our 



230 The Causes Of War 

power to vindicate right," and then the next day said : "Let 
right take care of itself and we will take care of ourselves." 
America said: "We set up a fight to lead men along the 
paths of liberty, but we have lowered it ; it is intended only 
to light our own path." We set up a great ideal of liberty 
and then we said: "Liberty is a thing that you must win 
for yourself. Do not call upon us," and think of the world 
that we would leave. Do you realize how many new nations 
are going to be set up in the presence of old and powerful 
nations in Europe and left there, if left by us, without a dis- 
interested friend? 

Do you believe in the Polish cause, as I do? Are you 
going to set up Poland, immature, inexperienced, as yet un- 
organized, and leave her with a circle of armies around her ? 
Do you believe in the aspiration of the Czecho-Slovaks and 
the Jugo-Slavs as I do? Do you know how many Powers 
would be quick to pounce upon them if there were not the 
guarantees of the world behind their liberty? 

Have you thought of the sufferings of Armenia? You 
poured out your money to help succor the Armenians after 
they suffered ; now set your strength so that they shall never 
suffer again. 

The arrangements of the present peace cannot stand a 
generation unless they are guaranteed by the united forces 
of the civilized world. And if we do not guarantee them 
cannot you not see the picture ? Your hearts have instructed 
you where the burden of this war fell. It did not fall upon 
the national treasuries, it did not fall upon the instruments 
of administration, it did not fall upon the resources of the 
nation. It fell upon the victims' homes everywhere, where 
women were toiling in hope that their men would come back. 

When I think of the homes upon which dull despair would 
settle were this great hope disappointed, I should wish for 
my part never to have had America play any part whatever 
in this attempt to emancipate the world. But I talk as if 
there were any question. I have no more doubt of the ver- 



Appendix II 231 

diet of America in this matter than I have doubt of the 
blood that is in me. 

And so, my fellow citizens, I have come back to report 
progress, and I do not believe that the progress is going to 
stop short of the goal. The nations of the world have set 
their heads now to do a great thing, and they are not going 
to slacken their purpose. And when I speak of the nations 
of the world I do not speak of the governments of the world. 
I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the 
world. They are in the saddle, and they are going to see 
to it that if their present governments do not do their will 
some other governments shall, and the secret is out and the 
present governments know it. 

There is a great deal of harmony to be got out of com- 
mon knowledge. There is a great deal of sympathy to be 
got of living in the same atmosphere and except for the 
differences of languages, which puzzled my American ear 
very sadly, I could have believed I was at home in France or 
in Italy or in England when I was on the streets, when I was 
in the presence of the crowds, when I was in great halls 
where men were gathered together irrespective of class. 

I did not feel quite as much at home there as I do here, 
but I felt that now, at any rate, after this storm of war had 
cleared the air, men were seeing eye to eye everywhere and 
that these were the kind of folks who would understand what 
the kind of folks at home would understand and that they 
were thinking the same things. 

I feel about you as I am reminded of a story of that ex- 
cellent witness and good artist, Oliver Herford, who one day, 
sitting at luncheon at his club was slapped vigorously on the 
back by a man whom he did not know very well. He said: 
"Oliver, old boy, how are you?" He looked at him rather 
coldly. He said, "I don't know your name, I don't know 
your face, but your manners are very familiar." And I must 
say that your manners are very familiar, and let me add, 
very delightful. 



%%% The Causes Of War 

It is a great comfort for one thing to realize that you all 
understand the language I am speaking. A friend of mine 
said that to talk through an interpreter was like witnessing 
the compound fracture of an idea. But the beauty of it is 
that, whatever the impediments of the channel of communi- 
cation the idea is the same, that it gets registered, and it 
gets registered in responsive hearts and receptive purposes. 

I have come back for a strenuous attempt to transact 
business for a little while in America but I have really come 
back to say to you, in all soberness and honesty, that I have 
been trying my best to speak your thoughts. 

When I sample myself I think I find that I am a typical 
American, and if I sample deep enough and get down to 
what is probably the true stuff of a man, then I have hope 
that it is part of the stuff that is like the other fellow's at 
home. 

And, therefore, probing deep in my heart and trying to 
see the things that are right without regard to the things 
that may be debated as expedient, I feel that I am inter- 
preting the purpose and the thought of America; and in 
loving America I find I have joined the great majority of 
my fellowmen throughout the world. 



APPENDIX III 

president wilson's address at new york 
On March 4, 1919, in Further Explanation of the League of Nations 

]\/TY Fellow Citizens: I accept the intimation of the air 
*Vl just played; I will not come back "till it's over, over 
there." And yet I pray God, in the interests of peace and 
of the world, that that may be soon. 

The first thing that I am going to tell the people on the 
other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of 
the American people is in favor of the League of Nations. 
I know that that is true; I have had unmistakable intima- 
tions of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings 
true in every case. I account myself fortunate to speak here 
under the unusual circumstances of this evening. I am 
happy to associate myself with Mr. Taft in this great cause. 
He has displayed an elevation of view and a devotion to 
public duty which is beyond praise. 

And I am the more happy because this means that this is 
not a party issue. No party has the right to appropriate 
this issue, and no party will in the long run dare oppose it. 

We have listened to so clear and admirable an exposition 
of many of the main features of the proposed covenant of 
the League of Nations that it is perhaps not necessary for 
me to discuss in any particular way the contents of the 
document. I will seek rather to give you its setting. I do 
not know when I have been more impressed than by the con- 
ferences of the commission set up by the Conference of Peace 
to draw up a covenant for the League of Nations. The rep- 
resentatives of fourteen nations sat around that board — not 
young men, not men inexperienced in the affairs of their own 

233 



234. The Causes Of War 

countries, not men inexperienced in the politics of the world ; 
and the inspiring influence of every meeting was the concur- 
rence of purpose on the part of all those men to come to 
an agreement and an effective working agreement with regard 
to this League of the civilized world. 

There was a conviction in the whole impulse; there was 
conviction of more than one sort; there was the conviction 
that this thing ought to be done, and there was also the con- 
viction that not a man there would venture to go home and 
say that he had not tried to do it. 

Mr. Taft has set the picture for you of what a failure of 
this great purpose would mean. We have been hearing for 
all these weary months that this agony of war has lasted of 
the sinister purpose of the Central Empires, and we have 
made maps of the course that they meant their conquests to 
take. Where did the lines of that map lie, of that central 
line that we used to call from Bremen to Bagdad ? They lay 
through these very regions to which Mr. Taft has called 
your attention, but they lay then through a united empire, 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose integrity Germany 
was bound to respect, as her ally lay in the path of that line 
of conquest; the Turkish Empire, whose interests she pro- 
fessed to make her own, lay in the direct path that she in- 
tended to tread. And now what has happened ? The Austro- 
Hungarian Empire has gone to pieces and the Turkish Em- 
pire has disappeared, and the nations that effected that great 
result — for it was a result of liberation — are now respon- 
sible as the trustees of the assets of those great nations. 
You not only would have weak nations lying in this path, but 
you would have nations in which that old poisonous seed of 
intrigue could be planted with the certainty that the crop 
would be abundant; and one of the things that the League 
of Nations is intended to watch is the course of intrigue. 
Intrigue cannot stand publicity, and if the League of Na- 
tions were nothing but a great debating society it will kill 
intrigue. 



Appendix HI 235 

It is one of the agreements of this covenant that it is the 
friendly right of every nation a member of the League to call 
attention to anything that it thinks will disturb the peace 
of the world, no matter where that thing is occurring. There 
is no subject that may touch the peace of the world which 
is exempt from inquiry and discussion, and I think every- 
body here present will agree with me that Germany would 
never have gone to war if she had permitted the world to 
discuss the aggression upon Serbia for a single week. The 
British Foreign Office suggested, it pleaded, that there might 
be a day or two delay so that the representatives of the na- 
tions of Europe could get together and discuss the possibili- 
ties of a settlement. Germany did not dare permit a day's 
discussion. You know what happened. So soon as the world 
realized that an outlaw was at large, the nations began one 
by one to draw together against her. We know for a cer- 
tainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that 
Great Britain would go in with France and with Russia she 
never would have undertaken the enterprise, and the League 
of Nations is meant as a notice to all outlaw nations that 
not only Great Britain, but the United States and the rest 
of the world will go in to stop enterprises of that sort. And 
so the League of Nations is nothing more nor less than the 
covenant that the world will always maintain the standards 
which it has now vindicated by some of the most precious 
blood ever spilled. 

The liberated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and of the Turkish Empire call out to us for this thing. It 
has not arisen in the council of statesmen. Europe is a 
bit sick at heart at this very moment, because it sees that 
statesmen have had no vision, and that the only vision has 
been the vision of the people. Those who suffer see. Those 
against whom wrong is wrought know how desirable is the 
right and the righteous. The nations that have long been 
under the heel of the Austrian, that have long cowered before 
the German, that have long suffered the indescribable agonies 



236 The Causes Of War 

of being governed by the Turk, have called out to the world, 
generation after generation, for justice, for liberation, for 
succor; and no Cabinet in the world has heard them. Pri- 
vate organizations, pitying hearts, philanthropic men and 
women have poured out their treasure in order to relieve 
these sufferings ; but no nation has said to the nations re- 
sponsible, "You must stop; this thing is intolerable, and we 
will not permit it." And the vision has been with the people. 
My friends, I wish you would reflect upon this proposition; 
the vision as to what is necessary for great reforms has sel- 
dom come from the top in the nations of the world. It has 
come from the need and the aspiration and the self-assertion 
of great bodies of men who meant to be free. And I can 
explain some of the criticisms which have been leveled against 
this great enterprise only by the supposition that the men 
who utter the criticisms have never felt the great pulse of 
the heart of the world. 

And I am amazed — not alarmed, but amazed — that there 
should be in some quarters such a comprehensive ignorance 
of the state of the world. These gentlemen do not know 
what the mind of men is just now. Everybody else does. 
I do not know where they have been closeted, I do not know 
by what influence they have been blinded; but I do know 
that they have been separated from the general currents of 
the thought of mankind. 

And I want to utter this solemn warning, not in the way 
of a threat; the forces of the world do not threaten, they 
operate. The great tides of the world do not give notice 
that they are going to rise and run; they rise in their maj- 
esty and overwhelming might, and those who stand in the 
way are overwhelmed. Now the heart of the world is awake, 
and the heart of the world must be satisfied. Do not let 
yourselves suppose for a moment that the uneasiness in the 
populations of Europe is due entirely to economic causes or 
economic motives ; something very much deeper underlies it 
all than that. They see that their Governments have never 



Appendix III 237 

been able to defend them against intrigue or aggression, and 
that there is no force of foresight or of prudence in any mod- 
ern Cabinet to stop war. And therefore they say, "There 
must be some fundamental cause for this," and the funda- 
mental cause they are beginning to perceive to be that na- 
tions have stood singly or in little jealous groups against 
each other, fostering prejudice, increasing the danger of 
war rather than concerting measures to prevent it ; and that 
if there is right in the world, if there is justice in the world, 
there is no reason why nations should be divided in the sup- 
port of justice. 

They are therefore saying if you really believe that there 
is a right, if you really believe that wars ought to be stopped, 
stop thinking abojut the rival interests of nations, and think 
about men and women and children throughout the world. 
Nations are not made to afford distinction to their rulers by 
way of success in the manoeuvres of politics ; nations are 
meant, if they are meant for anything, to make the men and 
women and children in them secure and happy and prosper- 
ous, and no nation has the right to set up its special inter- 
ests against the interests and benefits of mankind, least of all 
this great nation which we love. It was set up for the benefit 
of mankind ; it was set up to illustrate the highest ideals 
and to achieve the highest aspirations of men who wanted 
to be free ; and the world — the world of today — believes that 
and counts on us, and would be thrown back into the black- 
ness of despair if we deserted it. 

I have tried once and again, my fellow citizens, to say to 
little circles of friends or to larger bodies what seems to be 
the real hope of the peoples of Europe, and I tell you frankly 
I have not been able to do so because when the thought tries 
to crowd itself into speech the profound emotion of the 
thing is too much; speech will not carry. I have felt the 
tragedy of the hope of those suffering peoples. 

It is tragedy because it is a hope which cannot be realized 
in its perfection, and yet I have felt besides its tragedy, its 



238 The Causes Of War 

compulsion — its compulsion upon every living man to exer- 
cise every influence that he has to the utmost to see that as 
little as possible of that hope is disappointed, because if men 
cannot now, after this agony of bloody sweat, come to their 
self-possession and see how to regulate the affairs of the 
world, we will sink back into a period of struggle in which 
there will be no hope, and, therefore, no mercy. There can 
be no mercy where there is no hope, for why should you spare 
another if you yourself expect to perish? Why should you 
be pitiful if you can get no pity? Why should you be just if, 
upon every hand, you are put upon? 

There is another thing which I think the critics of this 
covenant have not observed. They not only have not ob- 
served the temper of the world, but they have not even ob- 
served the temper of those splendid boys in khaki that they 
sent across the seas. I have had the proud consciousness of 
the reflected glory of those boys, because the Constitution 
made me their Commander-in-Chief, and they have taught 
me some lessons. When we went into the war, we went into 
it on the basis of declarations which it was my privilege to 
utter, because I believed them to be an interpretation of the 
purpose and thought of the people of the United States. 
And those boys went over there with the feeling that they 
were sacredly bound to the realization of those ideals ; that 
they were not only going over there to beat Germany; they 
were not going over there merely with resentment in their 
hearts against a particular outlaw nation; but that they 
were crossing those three thousand miles of sea in order to 
show to Europe that the United States, when it became neces- 
sary, would go anywhere where the rights of mankind were 
threatened. They would not sit still in the trenches. They 
would not be restrained by the prudence of experienced con- 
tinental commanders. They thought they had come over 
there to do a particular thing, and they were going to do 
it and do it at once. And just as soon as that rush of spirit 
as well as rush of body came in contact with the lines of the 



Appendix HI 239 

enemy, they began to break, and they continued to break 
until the end. They continued to break, my fellow citizens, 
not merely because of the physical force of those lusty 
youngsters, but because of the irresistible spiritual force of 
the armies of the United States. It was that they felt. It 
was that that awed them. It was that that made them feel, 
if these youngsters ever got a foothold, they could never be 
dislodged, and that therefore every foot of ground that they 
won was permanently won for the liberty of mankind. 

And do you suppose that having felt that crusading spirit 
of these youngsters, who went over there not to glorify 
America but to serve their fellow men, I am going to per- 
mit myself for one moment to slacken in my effort to be 
worthy of them and of their cause? What I said at the 
opening I said with a deeper meaning than perhaps you have 
caught ; I do mean not to come back until it's over over there, 
and it must not be over until the nations of the world are 
assured of the permanency of peace. 

Gentlemen on this side of the water would be very much 
profited by getting into communication with some gentlemen 
on the other side of the water. We sometimes think, my 
fellow citizens, that the experienced statesmen of the Euro- 
pean nations are an unusually hard-headed set of men, by 
which we generally mean, although we do not admit it, that 
they are a bit cynical, that they say "This is a very prac- 
tical world," by which you always mean that it is not an 
ideal world; that they do not believe that things can be 
settled upon an ideal basis. Well, I never came into intimate 
contact with them before, but if they used to be that way, 
they are not that way now. They have been subdued, if that 
was once their temper, by the awful significance of recent 
events and the awful importance of what is to ensue; and 
there is not one of them with whom I have come in contact 
who does not feel that he cannot in conscience return to his 
people from Paris unless he has done his utmost to do some- 
thing more than attach his name to a treaty of peace. Every 



S40 The Causes Of War 

man in that Conference knows that the treaty of peace in 
itself will be inoperative, as Mr. Taft has said, without this 
constant support and energy of a great organization such 
as is supplied by the League of Nations. 

And men who when I first went over there were skeptical 
of the possibility of forming a League of Nations admitted 
that if we could but form it it would be an invaluable in- 
strumentality through which to secure the operation of the 
various parts of the treaty; and when that treaty comes 
back, gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only 
in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant 
that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty with- 
out destroying the whole vital structure. The structure of 
peace will not be vital without the League of Nations, and 
no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him. 

I must say that I have been puzzled by some of the criti- 
cisms — not by the criticisms themselves ; I can understand 
them perfectly, even when there was no foundation for them ; 
but by the fact of the criticism. I cannot imagine how these 
gentlemen can live and not live in the atmosphere of the 
world. I cannot imagine how they can live and not be in 
contact with the events of their times, and I particularly 
cannot imagine how they can be Americans and set up a doc- 
trine of careful selfishness, thought out to the last detail. 
I have heard no counsel of generosity in their criticism. I 
have heard no constructive suggestion. I have heard nothing 
except, "Will it not be dangerous to us to help the world?" 
It would be fatal to us not to help it. 

From being what I will venture to call the most famous 
and the most powerful nation in the world we would of a 
sudden have become the most contemptible. So, I did not 
need to be told, as I have been told, that the people of the 
United States would support this covenant. I am an Ameri- 
can and I knew they would. What a sweet revenge it is upon 
the world. They laughed at us once, they thought we did 
not mean our professions of principle. They thought so 



Appendix III 241 

until April of 1917. It was hardly credible to them that 
we would do more than send a few men over and go through 
the forms of helping, and when they saw multitudes hasten- 
ing across the sea, and saw what those multitudes were eager 
to do when they got to the other side, they stood at amaze 
and said: "The thing is real, this nation is the friend of 
mankind as it said it was." The enthusiasm, the hope, the 
trust, the confidence in the future bred by that change of 
view are indescribable. Take an individual American and 
you may often find him selfish, and confined to his special 
interests ; but take the American in the mass and he is willing 
to die for an idea. The sweet revenge, therefore, is this, that 
we believed in righteousness, and now we are ready to make 
the supreme sacrifice for it, the supreme sacrifice of throwing 
in our fortunes with the fortunes of men everywhere. Mr. 
Taft was speaking of Washington's utterance about en- 
tangling alliances, and if he will permit me to say so, he put 
the exactly right interpretation upon what Washington said, 
the interpretation that is inevitable if you read what he said, 
as most of these gentlemen do not. And the thing that he 
longed for was just what we are now about to supply; an 
arrangement which will disentangle all the alliances in the 
world. 

Nothing entangles, nothing enmeshes a man except a self- 
ish combination with somebody else. Nothing entangles a 
nation, hampers it, binds it, except to enter into a combina- 
tion with some other nation against the other nations of the 
world. And this great disentanglement of all alliances is 
now to be accomplished by this covenant, because one of the 
covenants is that no nation shall enter into any relationship 
with another nation inconsistent with the covenants of the 
League of Nations. Nations promise not to have alliances. 
Nations promise not to make combinations against each 
other. Nations agree that there shall be but one combina- 
tion, and that is the combination of all against the wrong- 
doer. 



242 The Causes Of War 

And so I am going back to my task on the other side with 
renewed vigor. I had not forgotten what the spirit of the 
American people is, but I have been immensely refreshed by 
coming in contact with it again. I did not know how good 
home felt until I got here. 

The only place a man can feel at home is where nothing- 
has to be explained to him. Nothing has to be explained to 
me in America, least of all the sentiment of the American 
people. I mean about great fundamental things like this. 
There are many differences of judgment as to policy — and 
perfectly legitimate — sometimes profound differences of 
judgment; but those are not differences of sentiment, those 
are not differences of purpose, those are not differences of 
ideals. And the advantage of not having to have anything 
explained to you is that you recognize a wrong explanation 
when you hear it. 

In a certain rather abandoned part of the frontier at one 
time it was said they found a man who told the truth; he 
was not found telling it, but he could tell it when he heard 
it. And I think I am in that situation with regard to some 
of the criticisms I have heard. They do not make any im- 
pression on me, because I know there is no medium that will 
transmit them, that the sentiment of the country is proof 
against such narrowness and such selfishness as that. I com- 
mend these gentlemen to communion with their fellow citizens. 

What are we to say, then, as to the future? I think, my 
fellow citizens, that we can look forward to it with great 
confidence. I have heard cheering news since I came to this 
side of the water about the progress that is being made in 
Paris toward the discussion and clarification of a great many 
difficult matters and I believe that settlements will begin to 
be made rather rapidly from this time on at those confer- 
ences. But what I believe, what I know as well as believe, is 
this: That the men engaged in those conferences are gath- 
erning heart as they go, not losing it ; that they are finding 
community of purpose and community of ideal to an extent 
that perhaps they did not expect; and that amidst all the 



Appendix HI 243 

inter-play of influence — because it is infinitely complicated 
— amidst all the inter-play of influence, there is a forward 
movement which is running toward the right. Men have at 
last perceived that the only permanent thing in the world 
is the right, and that a wrong settlement is bound to be a 
temporary settlement — bound to be a temporary settlement 
for the very best reason of all, that it ought to be a tem- 
porary settlement, and the spirits of men will rebel against 
it, and the spirits of men are now in the saddle. 

When I was in Italy a little limping group of wounded 
Italian soldiers sought an interview with me. I could not 
conjecture what it was they were going to say to me, and 
with the greatest simplicity, with a touching simplicity, they 
presented me with a petition in favor of the League of Na- 
tions. Their wounded limbs, their impaired vitality were the 
only argument they brought with them. It was a simple re- 
quest that I lend all the influence that I might happen to 
have to relieve future generations of the sacrifices that they 
had been obliged to make. That appeal has remained in my 
mind as I have ridden along the streets in European capitals 
and heard cries of the crowd, cries for the League of Na- 
tions, from lips of people who, I venture to say, had no par- 
ticular notion of how it was to be done, who were not ready 
to propose a plan for a League of Nations, but whose hearts 
said that something by way of a combination of all men 
everywhere must come out of this. As we drove along coun- 
try roads weak old women would come out and hold flowers 
up to us. Why should they hold flowers up to strangers 
from across the Atlantic? Only because they believed that 
we were the messengers of friendship and of hope, and these 
flowers were their humble offerings of gratitude that friends 
from so great a distance should have brought them so great 
a hope. 

It is inconceivable that we should disappoint them, and we 
shall not. The day will come when men in America will look 
back with swelling hearts and rising pride that they should 
have been privileged to make the sacrifice which it was neces- 



244 The Causes Of War 

sary to make in order to combine their might and their moral 
power with the cause of justice for men of every kind every- 
where. 

God give us the strength and vision to do it wisely ! God 
give us the privilege of knowing that we did it without count- 
ing the cost and because we were true Americans, lovers of 
liberty and of the right ! 



LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

REVISED DRAFT ADOPTED AT PARIS, APRIL £8, 1919 

IN order to promote international co-operation and to 
achieve international peace and security, by the accept- 
ance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescrip- 
tion of open, just and honorable relations between nations, 
by the firm establishment of the understanding of interna- 
tional law as to actual rule of conduct among governments, 
and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect 
for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peo- 
ples with one another, the high contracting parties agree to 
this covenant of the League of Nations. 

(In the original preamble the last sentence read: "Adopt 
this constitution," instead of "Agree to this covenant") 

Article One 

The original members of the League of Nations shall be 
those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this 
covenant, and also such of those other states named in the 
annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. 
Such accessions shall be affected by a declaration deposited 
with the secretariat within two months of the coming into 
force of the covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all 
other members of the league. 

Any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony not 
named in the annex may become a member of the league if 
its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly, pro- 
vided it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere inten- 
tion to observe its international obligations and shall accept 

245 



246 The Causes Of War 

such regulations as may be prescribed by the league in re- 
gard to its military and navel forces and armaments. 

Any member of the league may, after two years' notice of 
its intention so to do, withdraw from the league, provided 
that all its international obligations and all its obligations 
under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of 
its withdrawal. 

{This article is new, embodying with alterations and ad- 
ditions the old article seven. It provides more specifically 
the method of admitting new members and adds the entirely 
new paragraph providing for withdrawal from the league. 
No mention of withdrawal was made in the original docu- 
ment.) 

Article Two 

The action of the league under this covenant shall be ef- 
fective through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a 
council, with permanent secretariat. 

(Originally this was a part of Article One. It gives the 
name "assembly" to the gathering of representatives of the 
members of the league, formerly referred to merely as "the 
body of delegates.") 

Article Three 

The assembly shall consist of representatives of the mem- 
bers of the league. 

The assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time 
to time as occasion may require, at the seat of the league, or 
at such other places as may be decided upon. 

The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter 
within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the 
peace of the world. 

At meetings of the assembly, each member of the league 
shall have one vote, and may have not more than three rep- 
resentatives. 

( This embodies parts of the original articles one, two and 



League of Nations 247 

three with only minor changes. It refers to "members of the 
league" where the term "high contracting parties" originally 
was used, and this change is followed throughout the revised 
draft.) 

Article Four 

The council shall consist of representatives of the United 
States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of 
Italy and of Japan, together with representatives of four 
other members of the league. These four members of the 
league shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in 
its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives 
of the four members of the league first selected by the as- 
sembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the 
council. 

With the approval of the majority of the assembly the 
council may name additional members of the league, whose 
representatives shall always be members of the council; the 
council with like approval may increase the number of mem- 
bers of the league, to be selected by the assembly for repre- 
sentation on the council. 

The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may 
require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league, 
or at such other place as may be decided upon. 

The council may deal at its meetings with any matter 
within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the 
peace of the world. 

Any member of the league not represented on the council 
shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member 
at any meeting of the council during the consideration of 
matters specially affecting the interests of that member of 
the league. 

At meetings of the council each member of the league rep- 
resented on the council shall have one vote, and may not 
have more than one representative. 

(This embodies that part of the original article three 



248 The Causes Of War 

designating the original members of the council. The para- 
graph providing for increase in the membership of the coun- 
cil is new.) 

Article Five 

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this coven- 
ant, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or the council 
shall require the agreement of all the members of the league 
represented at the meeting. 

All matters of procedure of meetings of the assembly or 
of the council, the appointment of committees to investigate 
particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by 
the council, and may be decided by a majority of the mem- 
bers of the league represented at the meeting. 

The first meetings of the assembly and the first meeting 
of the council shall be summoned by the President of the 
United States of America. 

(The first paragraph requiring unanimous agreement in 
both assembly and council except where otherwise provided 
is new. The other two paragraphs originally were included 
m article four.) 

Article Six 

The permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat 
of the league. The secretariat shall comprise a secretariat- 
general and such secretaries and staff as may be required. 

The first secretary-general shall be the person named in 
the annex; thereafter the secretary-general shall be ap- 
pointed by the council with the approval of the majority of 
the assembly. 

The secretaries and the staff of the secretariat shall be 
appointed by the secretary-general with the approval of the 
council. 

The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all 
meetings of the assembly and of the council. 

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the 



League of Nations 249 

members of the league in accordance with the apportion- 
ment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union. 

(This replaces the original article five. In the original 
the appointment of the first secretary-general was left to the 
council, and approval of the majority of the assembly was 
not required for subsequent appointments.) 

Article Seven 

The seat of the league is established at Geneva. 

The council may at any time decide that the seat of the 
league shall be established elsewhere. 

All positions under, or in connection with the league, in- 
cluding the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and 
women. 

Representatives of the members of the league and officials 
of the league when engaged on the business of the league 
shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. 

The buildings and other property occupied by the league 
or its officials, or by representatives attending its meetings, 
shall be inviolable. 

(Embodying parts of the old articles five and six, this 
article names Geneva instead of leaving the seat of the league 
to be- chosen later and adds the provision for changing the 
seat in the future. The paragraph opening positions to 
women equally with men is new. ) 

Article Eight 

The members of the league recognize that the maintenance 
of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the 
lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforce- 
ment by common action of international obligations. 

The council, taking account of the geographical situation 
and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for 



£50 The Causes Of War 

such reduction for the consideration and action of the sev- 
eral governments. 

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revi- 
sion at least every ten years. 

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several 
governments, limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be 
exceeded without the concurrence of the council. 

The members of the league agree that the manufacture by 
private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open 
to grave objections. The council shall advise how the evil 
effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, 
due regard being had to the necessities of those members of 
the league which are not able to manufacture the munitions 
and implements of war necessary for their safety. 

The members of the league undertake to interchange full 
and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, 
their military and naval programmes and the condition of 
such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike pur- 
poses. 

( This covers the ground of the original article eight, but 
is rewritten to make it clearer that armament reduction 
plans must be adopted by the nations affected before they 
become effective.) 

Article Nine 

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the 
council on the execution of the provisions of article 1 and 8 
and on military and naval questions generally. 

{Unchanged except for the insertion of the words "Article 
One: 9 ) 

Article Ten 

The members of the league undertake to respect and pre- 
serve as against external aggression the territorial integrity 
and existing political independence of all members of the 
league. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any 
threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall ad- 



League of Nations 251 

vise upon the means by which this obligation shall be ful- 
filled. 

( Virtually unchanged. ) 

Article Eleven 

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared 
a matter of concern of the whole league, and the league shall 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency 
should arise, the secretary-general shall, on the request of 
any member of the league, forthwith summon a meeting of the 
council. 

It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each 
member of the league to bring to the attention of the assem- 
bly, or of the council, any circumstances whatever affecting 
international relations which threatens to disturb either the 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which 
peace depends. 

{In the original it was provided that the "high contract- 
ing parties reserve the right to take any action," etc., where 
the revised draft reads, "the league shall take any action" 
etc.) 

Article Twelve 

The members of the league agree that if there should arise 
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by 
the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until 
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the re- 
port by the council. 

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators 
shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the 
council shall be made within six months after the submission 
of the dispute. 

{Virtually unchanged, except that some provisions of the 
original are eliminated for inclusion in other articles.) 



252 The Causes Of War 

Article Thirteen 

The members of the league agree that whenever any dis- 
pute shall arise between them which they recognize to be 
suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be 
satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the 
whole subject matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the in- 
terpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international 
law, as to the existence of any fact which if established 
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, 
or as to the extend and nature of the reparation to be made 
for any such breach, are declared to be among those which 
are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For 
the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitra- 
tion to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed 
on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any conven- 
tion existing between them. 

The members of the league agree that they will carry out 
in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that 
they will not resort to war against a member of the league 
which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to 
carry out such an award, the council shall propose what 
steps should be taken to give effect thereto. 

(Only minor changes in language.) 

Article Fourteen 

The council shall formulate and submit to the members of 
the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a per- 
manent court of international justice. The court shall be 
competent to hear and determine disputes of an international 
character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court 
may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or ques- 
tion referred to it by the council or by the assembly. 

(Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.) 



League of Nations 253 

Article Fifteen 

If there should arise between members of the league any 
dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to 
arbitration as above, the members of the league agree that 
they will submit the matter to the council. Any party to 
the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of 
the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who 
will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation 
and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to 
the dispute will communicate to the secretary-general, as 
promptly as possible, statements of their cases, all the rele- 
vant facts and papers ; the council may forthwith direct the 
publication thereof. 

The council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of any 
dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall 
be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding 
the dispute, terms of settlement thereof as the council may 
deem appropriate. 

If the dispute is not thus settled, the council, either unani- 
mously or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a re- 
port containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and 
the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in 
regard thereto. 

Any member of the league represented on the council may 
make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of 
its conclusions regarding the same. 

If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the 
members thereof other than the representatives of one or 
more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league 
agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dis- 
pute which complies with the recommendations of the report. 

If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously 
agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representa- 
tives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the mem- 
bers of the league reserve to themselves the right to take 



254 The Causes Of War 

such action as they shall consider necessary for the main- 
tenance of right and justice. 

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of 
them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter 
which by international law is solely within the domestic jur- 
isdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall 
make no recommendation as to its settlement. 

The council may in any case under this article refer the 
dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at 
the request of either party to the dispute, provided that 
such request be made within fourteen days after the submis- 
sion of the dispute to the council. 

In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of 
this article and of article twelve relating to the action and 
powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers 
of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assem- 
bly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members 
of the league represented on the council and of a majority 
of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of 
the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have 
the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all 
members thereof other than the representatives of one or 
more of the parties to the dispute. 

(The paragraph specifically excluding matters of "domes- 
tic jurisdiction" from action by the council is new. In the 
last sentence the words "if concurred in by the representa- 
tives of those members of the league represented on the 
council" etc., have been added.) 

Article Sixteen 

Should any member of the league resort to war in disre^ 
gard of its covenants under Articles Twelve, Thirteen or 
Fifteen, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an 
act of war against all other members of the league, which 
hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance 



League of Nations 255 

of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all in- 
tercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking 
member of the league and the nationals of any other state, 
whether a member of the league or not. 

It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recom- 
mend to the several governments concerned what effective 
military or naval forces the members of the league shall 
severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used 
to protect the covenants of the league. 

The members of the league agree, further, that they will 
mutually support one another in the financial and economic 
measures which are taken under this article, in order to min- 
imize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above 
measures, and that they will mutually support one another 
in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their num- 
ber by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take 
the necessary steps to afford passage through their terri- 
tory to the forces of any of the members of the league which 
are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league. 

Any member of the league which has violated any coven- 
ant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member 
of the league by a vote of the council, concurred in by the 
representatives of all the other members of the league repre- 
sented thereon. 

{Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.) 

Article Seventeen 

In the event of a dispute between a member of the league 
and a state which is not a member of the league, or between 
states not members of the league, the state or states not 
members of the league shall be invited to accept the obliga- 
tions of membership in the league for the purpose of such 
dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. 



256 The Causes Of War 

If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of articles 
twelve to sixteen, inclusive, shall be applied, with such modi- 
fications as may be deemed necessary by the council. 

Upon such invitations being given the council shall imme- 
diately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
dispute, and recommend such action as may seem best and 
most effectual in the circumstances. 

If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations 
of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, 
and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the 
provisions of article sixteen shall be applicable as against 
the state taking such action. 

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to 
accept the obligations of membership in the league for the 
purpose of such dispute, the council may take such measures 
and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities 
and will result in the settlement of the dispute. 

( Virtually unchanged. ) 

Article Eighteen 

Every convention or international engagement entered into 
henceforward by any member of the league shall be forth- 
with registered with the secretariat and shall, as soon as 
possible, be published by it. No such treaty or international 
engagement shall be binding until so registered. 

(Same as original article twenty-three.) 

Article Nineteen 

The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsid- 
eration by members of the league of treaties which have be- 
come inapplicable, and the consideration of international 
conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of 
the world. 

(Virtually the same as original article twenty-four.) 



League of Nations 257 

Article Twenty 

The members of the league severally agree that this cov- 
enant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or under- 
standings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms 
hereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter 
enter into any engagements, inconsistent with the terms 
thereof. 

In case members of the league shall, before becoming a 
member of the league, have undertaken any obligations in- 
consistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the 
duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its 
release from such obligations. 

{Virtually the same as original article twenty-five.) 

Article Twenty-one 

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the 
validity of international agreements such as treaties of arbi- 
tration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine 
for securing the maintenance of peace. 

{Entirely new.) 

A rticle Twen ty- two 

To those colonies and territories, which, as a consequence 
of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of 
the states which formerly governed them and which are in- 
habited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves un- 
der the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and de- 
velopment of such peoples from a sacred trust of civilization 
and that securities for the performance of this trust should 
be embodied in this covenant. 

The best method of giving practicable effect to this princi- 
ple is that the tutelage of such peoples be entrusted to ad- 



258 The Causes Of War 

vanced nations, who, by reasons of their resources, their ex- 
perience or their geographical position, can best undertake 
this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that 
this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on 
behalf of the league. 

The character of the mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
situation of the territory, its economic condition and other 
similar circumstances. 

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their ex- 
istence as independent nations can be provisionally recog- 
nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able 
to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. 

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at 
such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the 
administration of the territory under conditions which will 
guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to 
the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition 
of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the 
liquor traffic and the prevention of the establishment of for- 
tifications or military and naval bases and of military train- 
ing, of the nations for other than police purposes and the 
defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities 
for the trade and commerce of other members of the league. 

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and cer- 
tain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparse- 
ness of their population or their small size or their remote- 
ness from the centers of civilization or their geographical 
contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other cir- 
cumstances can be best administered under the laws of the 
mandatory as integral portions of its territory subject to 
the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the in- 
digenous population. In every case of mandate, the manda- 



League of Nations 259 

tory shall render to the council an annual report in reference 
to the territory committed to its charge. 

The degree of authority, control or administration to be 
exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed 
upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in 
each case by the council. 

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to 
advise the council on all matters relating to the observance 
of the mandates. 

(This is the original article 19, virtually, except for the 
insertion of the words "and who are willing to accept" in de- 
scribing nations to be given mandatories.) 

Article Twenty-three 

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of inter- 
national conventions existing, or hereafter to be agreed 
upon, the members of the league (a) will endeavor to secure 
and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, 
women and children, both in their own countries and in all 
countries to which their commercial and industrial relations 
extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the 
necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to se- 
cure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories 
under their control; (c) will entrust the league with the gen- 
eral supervision over the execution of agreements with re- 
gard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in 
opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the 
league with the general supervision of the trade in arms and 
ammunition with the countries in which the control of this 
traffic is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make 
provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication 
and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of 
all members of the league. In this connection the special 
necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914- 



260 The Causes Of War 

1918 shall be in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in 
matters of international concern for the prevention and con- 
trol of disease. 

(This replaces the original article twenty and embodies 
parts of the original articles eighteen and twenty-one. It 
eliminates a specific provision formerly made for a bureau 
of labor and adds the clauses (b) and (c).) 

Article Twenty-four 

There shall be placed under the direction of the league all 
international bureaus already established by general treaties 
if the parties to such treaties consent, All such interna- 
tional bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of 
matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall 
be placed under the direction of the league. 

In all matters of international interest which are regu- 
lated by general conventions, but which are not placed under 
the control of international bureaus or commissions, the 
secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the 
council, and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute 
all relevant information and shall render any other assist- 
ance which may be necessary or desirable. 

The council may include as part of the expenses of the 
secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which 
is placed under the direction of the league. 

(Same as article twenty-two in the original, with the mat- 
ter after the first two sentences added.) 

Article Twenty- five 

The members of the league agree to encourage and pro- 
mote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized 
voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as pur- 
poses improvement of health, the prevention of disease and 
the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. 

(Entirely new.) 



League of Nations 261 

Article Twenty-six 

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified 
by the members of the league, whose representatives compose 
the council and by a majority of the members of the league 
whose representatives compose the assembly. 

No such an amendment shall bind any member of the 
league which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case 
it shall cease to be a member of the league. 

(Same as the original, except that a majority of the 
league instead of three-fourths is required for ratification of 
amendments with the last sentence added.) 

Annex to Covenant 

One — Original members of the League of Nations. 

Signatories of the treaty of peace: 

United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brit- 
ish Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, 
India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, 
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, 
Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Ru- 
mania, Serbie, Siam, and Uruguay. 

States invited to accede to the covenant: 

Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Nether- 
lands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Venezuela. 

Two — First secretary general of the League of Nations 
(blank). 

{The annex was not published with the original draft of 
the covenant.) 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

General 

1. Lagorgette, Jean: Le Role de la Guerre, Paris, 1906. 
^ 2. Amos, Sheldon: Political and Legal Remedies for War (57-130). 
Cassel, Petter, Galpin & Co., London. 

3. Anitchkow: War and Labor (1900), Part II, page 189. Archibald 

Constable & Co.— Westminster— 1900. 

4. Peyronnard: Des Causes de la Guerre (1901). 

5. Salieres: La Guerre, ses causes ses resultats. Paris, 1879. 

6. Laveleye: Des Causes Actuelles de la Guerre en Europe et de 

l'arbitrage. 

7. Richet: La Passe de la Guerre et PAvenir de la Paix. Parii, 1907. 

8. D'Eichthal: Guerre et Paix, 1909. 

9. Letorneau, Ch.: La Guerre dans Les Diverses Races Humaines. 

Paris, 1906. 
10. Mahan, Captain A. T.: Some Neglected Aspects of War. Little, 
Brown & Co., Boston, 1907, 

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

1. Chadwick, French Ensor: Relations of the United States and 

Spain — Diplomacy. Scribners, New York, 1909. 

2. Lebraud, Elie: La Guerre Hispano-Americaine et le Droit Des 

Gens. Paris, 1904. 

3. Benton, E. J.: International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- 

American War. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1908. 

4. Lodge, Henry Cabot: The War with Spain: Harper's, N. Y., 

1899. 

5. Mahan, Captain Alfred T.: Lessons of the War with Spain. Little, 

Brown & Co., Boston, 1899. 

6. Mahan, Captain A. T.: Some Neglected Aspects of War. Little, 

Brown & Co., Boston, 1907. 
jjgf 7. Alger, R. H.: The Spanish-American War. Harper's, New York, 
1901. 
8. Moore, John Bassett: Digest of International Law, Vol. VI (es- 
pecially) on Documents and Diplomacy. (Government Printing 
office, Washington, 1906.) 

WARS IN SOUTH AFRICA 

/ 1. Doyle, A. Conan: The War in South Africa, Its Cause and Con- 
duct. McClure, Phillips & Co., N. Y., 1902. 

t: ' 2. Green, James: Causes of the War in South Africa, Worcester, 
Mass. June, 1900. 

263 



864 Bibliography 

3. D'Espagnet, La Guerre: Sud-Africane. Paris, 1902. 

4. Bryce, James: Impressions of South Africa, The Century Co., 

N. Y., 1897. 

5. Sanderson, Edgar: Africa in the 19th Century. Scribners, N. Y., 

1898. 

6. Schreiner, Olive: The South African Question. C. H. Sergei Co., 

Chicago, 1899. 

7. Hillegas, Howard C: Oom Paul's People. Appleton's, N. Y., 1899. 

8. Holland, Thos. Erskine: The European Concert in the Eastern 

Question, Oxford, 1885. 

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 

1. Rev. M. Francis: Chronique des Faits Internationaux. In Vol. 

XII, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1905, pp. 
215 ff. 

2. Asakawa: The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 1904. 

3. Hershey, A. S.: International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- 
Japanese War. McMillan Co., New York, 1906. 

4. Lawrence, T. J.: War and Neutrality in the Far East. McMil- 

lan & Co., New York, 1904. 

5. Rose, J. Holland: Development of the European Nations, 1870- 
y 1900. Two Vols. Putnam's, N. W. 1905. 

6. Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12. 

7. Hazen, Chas. Downer: Europe Since 1815. Chapter XXX. Henry 

Holt & Co., New York, 1910. 

8. Cordier: Histoire des relations de la Claine avec les Puissances 

Occidentales, Paris, 1902, 3 Vol. in 8. 

9. Gairal de Serezin: Autour du Conflict d'Extreme Orient. Paris, 

1905, I Vol. in 8. 

10. Stead, A.: Japan's Position in the Far East. Fortnightly Re- 

view, 1903. 

11. The Conflict in the Far East. Edinburgh Review, 1904. 

12. Mackray, R.: The Crisis in the Far East. Monthly Review, 

Feb., 1904. 

13. Vickers, E. H.: The Eastern Crisis and Its Origin, The Nation, 

Feb., 1904. 

HISTORIES 

1. Rose, J. Holland: Development of European Nations (Vol. I, 
Ch. I), (Vol. I, Chs. VII-IX). On Balkan situation and Russo- 
Turkish War, Putnam's, New York, 1905. 
> 2. Seignobos: Political History of Europe Since 1814. (McVane 
' translation.) Henry Holt & Co., 1899. 

- 3. The Balkan Question: Ed. by Luigi Villari (Published by John 
' Murray, London, 1905). 

4. Cambridge Modern History, Vols. XI and XII. 

5. Robinson and Beard: Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II. 

6. Hazen, Chas. D.: Europe Since 1815. Henry Holt & Co., New 

York, 1910. 



INDEX 



Aaronsohn, "With the Turks in 
Palestine," 126 

Agidir, incident, 56 

Algeciras, conference, 56 

Alsace-Lorraine, recovery of, a 
motive of France, 37; Germany's 
selfish motive concerning, 44 ; a 
cause for war en part of the 
French, 60, 67; Prussia's mon- 
ster crime in 1871, 120; French 
army concentrated, not expect- 
ing German advance through 
Belgium, 130; armistice terms, 
154-5; Pope's proposal concern- 
ing (p. 4), 166; President Wil- 
son's statement concerning, 180 
(point 6) 

Allenby, General, captures Jeru- 
salem, 144 

Allepo, capture of, 150 

Argonne, battle of, Americans in, 
147, 149 

Armistice, terms for Germany, 
154-8; for Austria-Hungary, 
152-4; for Bulgaria, 152; Tur- 
key, 152 

Assassination, of Franz-Ferdinand, 
135 

Austria-H un g ary, fundamental 
cause for war, 28; arch-enemy 
of Italian freedom and unity, 
36; revolution of her peoples 
certain, 33; "Dreibund," 1881, 
52; intervention in Russo-Turk- 
ish war, 1878, 53; imperial de- 
signs, 55, 56, 57; causes for war 
in 1914, 63, 70; aggressions since 
1900, 75, 78, 79; terms of armis- 
tice (see Armistice above) 

Bagdad, railway, 63, 70; city cap- 
tured by Turks, 140; recaptured 
by British, 144 

Baker, Secretary, "The Nation in 
Arms," 170 



Baku, evacuated by Turks, 150 

Balkan States, causes for war, 
1914-16, 61; troubled past, 76-8 

Balkan Wars, 1912-13, causes of, 
73 

Bank, German Imperial, finances 
Bolsheviki, 176 

Bapaume, in Second battle of the 
Somme, 142 

Belgium, causes of war, 1914, 62; 
invasion by Germany planned, 
59, 192; armistice terms, 154; 
Brand Whitlock's "Story of," 
125 

Belgrade (Serbia), captured by 
Austro-Bulgarian armies, 137 

Berard, Victor, prophecy of War, 
79 

Bernhardi, General, principles, 72, 
187-92; quotations from, 187-92 

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, speech in 
Reichstag, 189; resignation, 174 

Bismarck, policies, 34-35; at Con- 
gress of Berlin, 52-53-54 

Bolsheviki, rise of, 143; effect on 
Russian army, I43, 145; and on 
Russia, 145, 176-7; danger of, 
159 

Boris, of Bulgaria, succeeds to 
throne, 150; abdicates, 151 

Boxer, uprising, 131-2 

Brest-Litovsk, treaty, nature of, 
176-7; German violation of, 
145 

Breslau, German warship, enters 
Dardanelles, 136; sunk by Brit- 
ish, 148 

Bryan, W. J., treaties, 48 

Bryce, James, on the Balkan ques- 
tion, 79, 80 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation, 
26, 55-6 

Bulgaria, and Turkey, 76, and oth- 
er Balkans, 53, 76-8; causes of 
war, 64; Armistice terms, 152 



265 



266 



Index 



Byng, General, advance, lJfi\ re- 
verses, 143 

Cambrai, falls to British, 149 

Carthage, commercial struggle, 31, 
41 

Chadwick, Admiral, on Spanish- 
American War, 105-6 

Chateau-Thierry, American ad- 
vance, 146 

China, declares war, I4I 

Commercial causes of war, 24, 30, 
SI 

Congress, of Berlin, 54, 76 

Conquest, wars of, 37-8 

Constitution of League of Nations, 
202-14; of United States, 197 

Crown Prince, German, 46, 48 

Cuba, why not independent in 
1825? 106-7; American interests 
in, 107-8, 112, 114 

Czar of Russia, not the aggressor 
in 1914, 129; guilt of his gov- 
ernment, 67; overthrow, 174 

Dardanelles, neutralization of, SI- 
S', British and French at, #>, 
1S8 

Denmark, war with Prussia and 
Austria, 35 

Doyle, A. C, on British-Boer war, 
92, 95 

Economic wars, 31-2 

Ecquador, 142 

England, Causes of war in 1914, 
60; causes of war with Boers, S'. 
Africa, 103-4; Opium War with 
China, 31; England and Ireland, 
44 ; colonial expansion, 32, dv, 4® » 
Great Britain and the Triple Al- 
liance, 53-4-5-6; Nature of Brit- 
ish government, 26, 32, 34, 44> 
46, 47, 60, 64-5; Great Britain 
and the "League of Nations," 
194-5 

European War, 1914, causes of, 
58-64; background of, 51-7 

Falkenhayn, Gen. von, in Rou- 

mania, 139 
Ferdinand, of Bulgaria, resigns, 

150 



Finland, reference to, lfi\ and Bol- 
sheviki, 145; German conquest 
of, 148 

Foch, General, in battle of Marne, 
136, allied commander-in-chief, 
142; in Italy, 144 

Formosa, ceded to Japan, 84 

France, confronted with danger of 
war, 18, 26, 35, 37, 58, 56, 60, 66, 
116-18; causes of war, 1914, 60; 
causes of Franco-Prussian war, 
115; military program, 59, 66; 
treaty relation, 54-5, 59, 60; Ger- 
man invasion, 61, 135; General 
Bernhardi's statement concern- 
ing, 192 

Franz-Ferdinand, Archduke, assas- 
sination, 59, 135 

Frederick the Great, his principles 
and wars, 47, 187; Bemhardi, a 
German authority on these wars, 
190 

Gerard, Ambassador, book on Ger- 
many, 126 

Germany, causes of war, 1914, 63; 
ultimatums, 39, 59; invasion of 
Belgium, 34, 39, 59, 62, 66, 135, 
154, 191-2; atrocities and policy 
of frightfulness, 22, 34, 63 (mili- 
tarism) 52-3, 60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 
131-4, 170; starvation in con- 
quered territory, 132-4 

German ideals and political prac- 
tices, 17-18, 27, 31, S4-6, 44, 46, 
53, 55, 59, 63, 65, 66, 69-72, 131- 
2; treaty obligations broken, 58, 
60, 62, 66, 145-177; ("necessity 
knows no law") 131, 191-2; 
Propaganda in United States, 
27, 69-71, 123, 125; progress in 
industries, 66; in militarism, 27, 
35, 66, 131, 186-7, 187-93 

Goeben, enters Dardanelles, 136; 
sunk by British, I48 

Great Britain (see England) 

Greece, causes of war, 1914, 61; 
declaration of war, 142; strug- 
gles for liberty and union of her 
peoples, 49, 77 

Guatemala, war on Germany, 142 

Heligoland, Battle of, 136 
Hershey, A. S., on Spanish-Ameri- 



Index 



267 



can War, 106 ; on Russo-Japan- 
ese War, 81-83, 88 

Hindenburg, Gen. von, stops Rus- 
sian advance, 136; drive in Po- 
land, 137 

"Hindenburg Lin*," 142 

Hindus, 45 

Holy Alliance, 51 

Hoover, Herbert, and U. S. food 
administration (testify to starva- 
tion by Germans) 133-4 

Hungary, revolution of 1848, 49; 
freedom, 4$ 

Huns, reason for name, 131-2 

India, 44 

Italy, war with Turkey, 68, 73, 80; 
causes of war, 1914, 61; Italian 
unity and nationality, 35, 37, 45, 
52, 67-8; Declares war on Aus- 
tria, 137; on Germany, 139; in- 
terest in Adriatic and Balkans, 
61, 79; Great victory in close of 
war, 149-50 

Jameson Raid, 97, 100 

Japan, causes of Russo-Japanese 
war, 81, 90; causes of war, 1914, 
62; war with China, 83, 84; in 
Korea, 82-4-7, 88-9-90; in Man- 
churia, 83, 86, 87-89, 90; Ger- 
man proposals to, 69, 123 

Jerusalem, captured by British, 
144 

Jutland, battle of, 140 

Kaiser, the German, claims to di- 
vine right, 27, 124; speeches and 
character of rule, 27, 48, 56-7, 
59, 60, 63, 65, 131; threats to 
peace of Europe, 55-7, 128-30; 
visits to Turkey, and responsibil- 
ity for Turkish massacres, 57, 
65; abdication, 152 

Karl, Emperor, leaves Austria, 
151 

Kemmel, Mt., captured by Ger- 
mans, 146 

Korea (see Japan) 

Kossuth, 49 

Kruger, Paul, in S. Africa, 99- 
100 

League of Nations, a discussion, 
186-201; German attitude, 187- 



League of Nations ("to enforce 

peace") 49, 76, 162, 164-5, 178, 

ISO, 184 
League Covenant, text of February 

draft, 202-214; final draft, 244- 

261 
Lens, coal city, siege by British, 

137, 142; evacuated, 149 
Liberia, declares war on Germany, 

m 

Lille, evacuated by Germans, 149 
Lloyd-George, answer to German 

peace proposal, 171 
Lodge, Henry Cabot, on Spanish- 
American war, 107, 112 

Mackensen, Gen. von, expels Rus- 
sians, 136; in Roumania, 139 

Mahan, Capt., on Spanish-Ameri- 
can war, 112 

Marne, first battle of, 59, 130, 136; 
second battle of, 146-9 

Messines Ridge, 142, I46 

Mexico, German intrigues in, 69, 
123 

Mihiel/St, battle of, 147 

Monastir, taken by Allies, 139 

Monroe Doctrine, 26, 52, 122; Gen. 
Bernhardi on, 191 

Morganth.au, Henry, Ambassador's 
"story," 126, 183 

Nationality, growth of, as cause 

for war, 23, 34-6, 61-3, 67-8 
Navigation Laws, 43 
Neuve Chapelle, battle, 137 
Nicaragua, declares war, 142 
Noyon, battle line, 146 

Ostend, Sub-base, British attack 
on, 148 

Panama, canal and neutralization, 
32; war on Germany, 141 

Paris, German Super-gun fires on, 
132, 146 

Peronne, capture of, 147 

Poland, partitions, 50, 182; must 
be restored 50,164,180; "When 
the Prussians Came to Poland," 
126; German government in, 44* 
123 ("Ireland and Poland"), 
126; efforts to Germanize, 200 

Portugal, revolution in, 36; ally of 
England, 62; in Belgium, 146 



268 



Index 



Prussia, and Bismarck, 35; Triple 
Alliance, 52; War with France, 
115-20; militarism, 35, 168 (war 
lords), 193 

Quotations, from Pres. Wilson's 
Flag Day Address, 68-72; from 
Jan. 22, 1917 speech, 162-4; Re- 
ply to Pope, 166; "Four points" 
from July 4, 1918 speech, 177- 
178; "five points" from Sept. 27, 
1918 speech, 179; from German 
leaders on war, and arbitration, 
187-92 

Red Cross, hospitals fired upon by 
Germans, 132 

Religion, wars of, 23, 29 

Rheims, shelling by Germans, 132 
(cathedral) ; German attack in 
Rheims salient, 146; French and 
Americans wipe out salient, lift 

Roulers, recaptured by Belgians, 
149 

Roumania, historical sketch, 76-8; 
declares war on, 139; Germany, 
Turkey, Bulgaria declare war 
on, 139; overrun by armies of 
Central Powers, 139 

Russia, member of Triple Entente, 
54-5; Crimean War, 75-6; war 
with Turkey, 1878, 76; and Con- 
gress of Berlin, 53, 76-7, and 
Constantinople, 28, 61, 67; access 
denied to Mediterranean, 76; 
causes of war in 1914, 61; 
causes of Russo-Japanese war, 
81, 90; revolution, and overthrow 
of Czar, 11, 17, 28, 174, US 

Russo-Japanese War, causes of 
(see Russia above) 

Selective Service Draft, in U S., 
141 

Serbia, causes of war, 1914, 61 ; 
historical sketch, 75, 77-8; Aus- 
tria declares war upon, 135; re- 
sists Austrians, 135; crushed by 
Austro-Bulgarian invasion, 137; 
nucleus of new Jugo-Slav state, 
78 

Spain, negotiations with U. S. over 
Cuba, 106; revolution in, 110-36; 
Moroccan crisis, 56; war with 



U. S., 1898 (causes), 118-14 
Spanish-American War, causes of, 
113-14; Chadwick on, 105-6; 
Lodge on, 107, 112; Capt. Ma- 
han on, 112 

Tannenburg, battle of, 186; junker, 

193 
Tarif, protective, 43, 183-4 
Turkey, character of government, 
33, 183; war with Italy, 80; First 
Balkan war, 74; Crimean War, 
76; with Russia, 1878, 76; causes 
of war, 1914, 63; in thrall of 
Germany, 65, 70; declares war 
on Russia, 135; Great Britain 
and France declare war on, 135; 
declares war on Roumania, 139; 
armistice terms, 152; fortifica- 
tions at Dardanelles, 138 

United States, interest in Cuba, 
107-9, 114; causes of war, 1914, 
64, 68-72, 122-8; part in League 
of Nations, 196-8; importance of 
entry into World War, 17; Ger- 
man hatred toward, 36; greatest 
contribution to the world, 39; 
military program in 1917, 141 

Uruguay, 142 

Valenciennes, capture of, 149 

Venezuela, Roosevelt and the 
Kaiser, 122 

Verdun, first battle of, 140; French 
counter-stroke at, 14O; second 
counter-thrust by French, 143 

Versailles, congress of, 51; Pres. 
Wilson at, 182 

Vienna, Congress of, 51; responsi- 
bility for this war, 51 

War, an instinct, 29-30; classifica- 
tion of causes, 23-4; funda- 
mental causes, 31-9; pretexts 
and excuses, 28, 35, 40, 4U 43-4> 
45; Austrian and German pre- 
texts, 59-60; nature and func- 
tion of, 22; causes of World 
War, 58-64; outline for study of, 
in U. S. A., 135-59; immediate 
causes for U. S., and fundamen- 
tal (outline), 121-27, 
First year of, 135 



Index 



269 



Second year of, 137 
Third year of, 138 
Fourth year of, 141 
Fifth year of, 145 
Last events, 149 
Balkan Wars, causes of, 73-ff 
British-Boer War, causes of, 

91-fS 
Franco-Prussian War, causes of, 

115-ft 
Russo-Japanese War, causes of, 

87-fP 
Spanish-American War, causes 

of, 105-8 



No longer same necessity for war, 
50, 199-201; war and the League 
of Nations, 49, 76, 196-201; war 
the political gospel of the Ger- 
man government, 187-92 



Y. M. C. A., duty to support, 125; 
treatment by Germans, 132 



Zimmermann, German foreign min- 
ister, notes to Mexico and Japan, 
69, 123 






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